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Abstract
Traditionally, attacks on cryptographic algorithms looked for mathematical weaknesses in
the underlying structure of a cipher. Side-channel attacks, however, look to extract secret
key information based on the leakage from the device on which the cipher is implemented,
be it smart-card, microprocessor, dedicated hardware or personal computer. Attacks based
on the power consumption, electromagnetic emanations and execution time have all been
practically demonstrated on a range of devices to reveal partial secret-key information
from which the full key can be reconstructed.
The focus of this thesis is power analysis, more specifically a class of attacks known
as profiling attacks. These attacks assume a potential attacker has access to, or can
control, an identical device to that which is under attack, which allows him to profile the
power consumption of operations or data flow during encryption. This assumes a stronger
adversary than traditional non-profiling attacks such as differential or correlation power
analysis, however the ability to model a device allows templates to be used post-profiling to
extract key information from many different target devices using the power consumption of
very few encryptions. This allows an adversary to overcome protocols intended to prevent
secret key recovery by restricting the number of available traces.
In this thesis a detailed investigation of template attacks is conducted, along with how
the selection of various attack parameters practically affect the efficiency of the secret
key recovery, as well as examining the underlying assumption of profiling attacks in that
the power consumption of one device can be used to extract secret keys from another.
Trace only attacks, where the corresponding plaintext or ciphertext data is unavailable,
are then investigated against both symmetric and asymmetric algorithms with the goal of
key recovery from a single trace. This allows an adversary to bypass many of the currently
proposed countermeasures, particularly in the asymmetric domain.
i
An investigation into machine-learning methods for side-channel analysis as an alterna-
tive to template or stochastic methods is also conducted, with support vector machines,
logistic regression and neural networks investigated from a side-channel viewpoint. Both
binary and multi-class classification attack scenarios are examined in order to explore the
relative strengths of each algorithm. Finally these machine-learning based alternatives are
empirically compared with template attacks, with their respective merits examined with
regards to attack efficiency.
ii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cryptography is the science of keeping communications secure such that only the intended
recipients can read a message. The value of this was clear to the ancient Romans, who
encrypted their military communications using the Caesar Cipher, one of the first known
algorithms used to encrypt information. For as long as encryption algorithms have been
used, people have also looked to break them, and advances in cryptographic algorithm
design often go step in step with advances in cryptanalysis. Historically, the use of cryp-
tography was limited to the military and governmental organisations, with research in the
area often classified for reasons of national security and subject to export controls due to
cryptography being classed as military technology. This can be seen in the fascinating
work done at Bletchley Park in breaking the German Enigma encoding machines during
World War II which was only released to the public many years later.
While Claude Shannon’s pioneering work on information theory (and subsequently on
the One-Time Pad) was published in the late forties [197], this was declassified wartime
work, and it was not until the mid to late seventies that research into cryptography
really began to become mainstream in universities and research labs. It was then that
IBM developed the Data Encryption Standard (DES) encryption standard in conjunction
with the National Security Agency (NSA) [162], and the seminal work on asymmetric
cryptography such as Diffie-Hellman (DH) [60] and Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) [192]
was published. Indeed the secretive nature of cryptographic research was such that the
mathematical basis for both DH and RSA had previously been discovered by an English
mathematician Clifford Cocks working for Government Communications Headquarters
(GCHQ), the UK intelligence agency, however the work was only declassified in 1998.
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Authentication Proves that a user is who they claim to be
Non-Repudiation Prevents a user subsequently denying that they
sent the data. This is particularly important for
online commerce
Confidentiality Provides secretary between parties such that
only users with knowledge of the key can read
the data.
Integrity Ensures that data has not been tampered with
in transit.
Table 1.1: Cryptographic functions.
While the banking and financial sectors have made widespread use of cryptography, the
advent of the internet and the always connected world of smart-phones, has ensured that
it has turned from an esoteric technology originally only used by the military to some-
thing that is used by the majority of the internet connected people around the world on
a daily basis, often without even realising it as they log into their email accounts, Face-
book, etc. Indeed the recent revelations about widespread monitoring of the internet by
the NSA and GCHQ by the ongoing Edward Snowden document cache only highlights
the importance of securing online communications through the widespread adoption of
cryptographic algorithms and protocols.
End to end encryption between two entities requires the use of a cryptographic protocol
such as transport layer security (TLS)/secure socket layer (SSL) for example, which is a
widely used protocol for internet communications. The goal of a protocol is to provide the
cryptographic functions as defined in Table 1.1 as required. These protocols are in turn
constructed from cryptographic primitives which can be seen as the building blocks of
cryptographic systems. These building blocks can further be classified into symmetric and
asymmetric algorithms. Symmetric algorithms utilise the same key for both encryption
and decryption operations. This allows designers to construct extremely fast and secure
algorithms that can encrypt large amounts of information quite efficiently. Block ciphers
such as DES and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [163], and stream ciphers such
as RC4 are examples of symmetric-key algorithms that form the basis of many protocols.
The disadvantage of symmetric-key algorithms is the requirement for both parties to share
the same key. The key-sharing problem amplifies with scale as every pair of people who
want to communicate require unique keys. The previously mentioned DH key exchange
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overcomes this limitation by allowing two parties who have never previously met to estab-
lish a shared key for secure communications. Further research into asymmetric encryption
led to the development of RSA which has a public encryption key that anybody can use
to encrypt a message, however only the owner of the corresponding private decryption key
can recover the message. More recently, elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [123, 152] has
been widely adopted for asymmetric purposes due to its shorter key lengths, particularly
in the embedded domain.
Additional primitives are required to achieve the cryptographic functions in Table 1.1.
Hash functions are one-way functions that provide an irreversible fingerprint of a block of
data which is useful for providing integrity, and secure random number generators (RNGs)
are essential to any protocol. Indeed the recent controversy over the dual elliptic curve
deterministic random bit generator [18], shows that tampering with the RNG can be a
somewhat efficient and subtle way to undermine a cryptographic system.
More recently, public cryptographic competitions have been utilised to select new algo-
rithms which provides an insurance that no back doors are present in a new standard.
This was the case with both AES and the recent SHA-3 hash function competition run
by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), as well as eSTREAM, the
European Union funded ECRYPT stream cipher project. As well as algorithm design,
these competitions have lead to great advances in cryptanalysis also, particularly when
combined with parallel computing using graphics cards, or dedicated hardware such as
application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs) or reconfigurable devices such as field pro-
grammable gate arrays (FPGAs). Indeed a brute-force search of DES keys now takes less
than a week with a reconfigurable hardware cracker such as copacobana [128].
Traditionally, attacks on cryptographic primitives have focused on analysing inputs and
outputs of systems, however in the late nineties the first scientific publications of tim-
ing [125] and power [126] attacks showed that the implementation of an algorithm must
also be taken into account, especially in the context of embedded security where an at-
tacker might have direct access to a device. This was followed up with further research
showing that electromagnetic emanations could also leak key information [77, 184]. Since
then a wide body of research has been produced1 by a large number of universities and
research labs around the world, and a large number of conferences such as CHES [26], CT-
RSA [22], SAC [122], and COSADE [183], to name but a few, have dedicated side-channel
tracks.
1As of the 1st April 2014, the original timing and power analysis papers by Kocher et al. have 2583 and
4035 citations respectively according to Google scholar
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Active Passive
Non-Invasive Glitching, Temperature, Volt-
age, . . .
Timing, Power, EM, . . .
Semi-Invasive Light, Radiation, . . . EM (decapsulation), Optical
Inspection, . . .
Invasive Short Circuiting, permanent
circuit change, . . .
Probing, . . .
Table 1.2: Attack taxonomy.
While academic interest in side-channel attacks against cryptographic algorithms grew
after the publications by Kocher et al., some vulnerabilities were known much earlier
against non-cryptographic targets. For example in 1985, van Eck looked at using elec-
tromagnetic radiation from the cathode ray video display units that were in use at the
time to reconstruct what was on the screen [215]. Recently declassified information on the
tempest program conducted by the NSA shows that they were aware of the importance of
blocking (and potential for exploiting) electromagnetic emanations [57]. Indeed acoustic
side-channel attacks have more recently published against keyboard strokes [235] and dot
matrix printers as used in banks [14].
Attacks themselves can be classified into active and passive depending on if they affect the
cryptographic output of the computation being performed. For example voltage glitch-
ing can be used to introduce faults into a computation and subsequently recover the
key [32]. Passive attacks in contrast do not affect the cryptographic result. Attacks can
also be grouped according to their effect on the target device, with attacks that don’t leave
permanent damage to a device classified as non-invasive, with attacks that permanently
damage or destroy it as invasive. A taxonomy of attacks is given in Table 1.2 [142].
The work of this thesis examines Power Analysis Attacks, as originally introduced by
Kocher et al. [126], which utilises the power consumption of a secure device while perform-
ing an cryptographic operation to recover some secret about the device. Power attacks
can be further broken into non-profiling or profiling attacks.
Non-profiled attacks include simple power analysis (SPA) which assumes that an attacker
has access to a single or very few power traces which can be visually inspected to extract
key information through some timing or distinct power consumption pattern. This class of
attacks includes the classical differential power analysis (DPA) [126] and the widely utilised
correlation power analysis (CPA) [34], as well as related attacks which compare many
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recorded power traces with some hypothetical power model for a given key, determining
the correct key through some distinguisher. Collision attacks [196] fall somewhere in-
between SPA and DPA, and look to identify parts of a power trace where the same variable
or operation is processed by comparing the power consumption at that point, with the
number of traces required for successful key recovery dependent on the target device and
context.
Profiling Attacks are the main focus of this thesis. They assume a stronger attack model
with an attacker having access to an identical or similar device to learn the power con-
sumption characteristic of a device by building templates [42] or stochastic methods (SMs)
[195] for example. This model of the power consumption can then be used to break a differ-
ent target device quickly and easily. They can be viewed as a statistical learning problem
for which there is a wide range of literature available such as [30, 63, 95, 106]. Various
adversarial models give attackers different capabilities ranging from having full control
over the identical device and knowing all secret information [42], to simply knowing that
it has some bias in its RNG [3]. They are an important class of attacks as the availability
of a profiling device gives an attacker a wide range of possibilities, as well as being able
to mount very powerful attacks. They are also beneficial in the context of penetration
testing when evaluating the susceptibility of a device to side-channel attacks (SCAs).
Academic publications have shown the real world implications of side-channel analysis,
such as the attacks against the KeeLoq remote entry system [67], attacks against contact-
less payment cards [169], the bit-stream encryption in Xilinx FPGAs [155], and more
recently the YubiKey multi-factor authentication token [171]. In the last two decades
research into SCAs has moved from an niche academic research topic to a large multi-
million dollar industry with companies such as Cryptography Research (http://www.
cryptography.com/) and Riscure (https://www.riscure.com/) selling testing equipment
and countermeasures, the former having been bought out by Rambus for $345.5M .
1.1 Summary of Contributions
The following summarises the contributions discussed in this thesis,
• A thorough evaluation of template attacks (TAs) is performed, and the effect of
practical attack considerations is examined. When conducting a profiling TA there
are many inter-related parameters to choose, and an empirical study is conducted
on various software platforms.
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• The basic premise of a TA requires that the profiling device has a similar power
consumption such that templates built on one device are applicable to another. This
assumption is examined by conducting attacks across twenty different smart-cards
to examine its validity.
• Power attacks in general assume some knowledge of plaintext or ciphertext informa-
tion. An attack is developed that can recover key information based on the power
consumption alone.
• An efficient TA on the key schedule across multiple rounds is presented, and it is
shown how the original key can subsequently be recovered. Again no knowledge of
input or output texts are required.
• It is shown how to build templates to determine if the inputs to a multiplication are
equal or not using only power consumption hence distinguishing between multipli-
cation and squaring operations. An attack on RSA is outlined and the effect of the
key bit-size examined.
• A TA on elliptic curve digital signature standard (ECDSA) is performed based on
distinguishing multiplication and squaring operations. The effect of various coun-
termeasures on the attacks is examined, and practical considerations examined.
• A comparison between different machine learning methods in the context of SCA is
performed to investigate what algorithm is most advantageous to use for different
contexts.
• Logistic regression (LR) and neural networks (NNs) learning algorithms are used
for the first time in the context of SCA, and used to recover key information from
various cryptographic algorithms.
• A new variation of the construction of the SM is presented which is advantageous
where a large number of training examples is available, and empirically compared to
alternative models.
1.2 Thesis Layout
The background chapter, Chapter 2, gives a wide ranging overview of power analysis in
general. Power trace components and trace acquisition setups are explained, as well as
why power attacks are feasible. Some of the many different attack distinguishers are briefly
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examined and attack metrics explained. The effect of pre-processing techniques such as
filtering is also explored here.
Next in Chapter 3 a through investigation of TA is performed. Using AES as a baseline
comparison, different attack choices such as the chosen power model, the effect of data
normalisation, feature selection and target value is explored. The required training set
size for the target device is examined, and how to determine if a larger training set size
will increase the attack feasibility. A brief examination of the how the platform effects the
attack is also conducted, as well as the premise that similar devices have similar power
consumption.
Unknown plaintext attacks are then conducted against AES in Chapter 4. Two methods
are proposed, a higher order attack where multiple templates are built for different oper-
ations around where the key is used, as well as how to efficiently build templates directly
on the sub-keys. The effect of masking in the first scenario is also examined.
TA against secure asymmetric algorithms are then examined in Chapter 5, again with the
goal of using a single power trace only and no input or output information. It is shown
how to utilise the difference in Hamming weight of multiplication and squaring operations
to build templates that can recover key information from RSA and ECC implementations.
Finally in Chapter 6 various non-parametric machine learning methods are explored as
alternatives to Gaussian based TA and SM. An empirical comparison is performed for two
different datasets to determine the different strengths and weaknesses of the algorithms.
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Background
The field of SCA is by its very nature multidisciplinary, combining number theory for
the analysis of cryptographic algorithms, engineering and signal processing for the acqui-
sition and analysis of side channel information, and statistical analysis to extract secret
information. While the statistical methods for information extraction are what this thesis
is chiefly concerned with, the other steps are equally important in order to successfully
mount an attack on a device. This background section deals with the engineering aspects
of SCAs, from expected attack scenarios, to the physical aspects as to why the attacks ac-
tually work, as well as a brief examination of some signal processing techniques to reduce
the noise of side-channel traces. The notation and success metrics as used throughout the
thesis are also introduced here.
2.1 Embedded Systems
Embedded security is becoming ever more important as the world is increasingly connected.
Many of us carry in our pockets smart-phones that can easily allow us talk, send texts,
check our bank balances, surf the internet etc., through WiFi, GSM, HSDPA, Bluetooth,
NFC . . . . In our wallets we carry bank-cards, transit cards, access cards, all of which
now have some sort of processing capability to enable its functionality. Newer passports
now contain biometric data that is accessed via contact-less technology. All these devices
contain (and leak) personal information which needs to be protected. These low power,
low cost devices can be particularly susceptible to SCAs due to the simplicity of their
underlying architecture. The leakage of information will only become worse as the new
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generation of wearable “smart” devices become more mainstream and personal computing
devices begin to communicate with each other. Looking beyond the security of personal
devices, motor vehicles are an example where security is becoming ever more important
due to the increasing electronic nature of cars. Loss of security in these cyber-physical
systems could lead to events that are considerably worse than your bank account being
emptied or your identity stolen. Interesting research in the area of embedded security for
cars can be found in the proceedings of conferences such as ESCAR (https://www.escar.
info/).
Due to power and cost restrictions, along with the fact that embedded devices often only
need to perform specific tasks, powerful general purpose processors such as those found on
desktop computers are usually not required. For security token type devices, small low-
power 8 or 32-bit micro-controllers are often used. For example, Atmel R© have dedicated
hardware encryption blocks on some of their low cost AVR XMEGA-A devices [13], as
well as security focused CryptoMemory EEPROMS [12] (both of which have been attacked
using power analysis in [121] and [15] respectively).
For large scale deployment dedicated ASICs are often used, where a higher initial develop-
ment cost can be offset by the relatively lower cost of each individual unit both in power
and monetary terms. For passively powered radio-frequency identification (RFID) devices
this might be the only option due to power restrictions. Reprogrammable FPGAs also
have interesting characteristics with regards to security applications, as they can be easily
reprogrammed in situ should updates be required to protocol or algorithm specifications.
While they have higher power requirements due to their reprogrammable nature, they are
particularly useful for developing attacks, and countermeasures, such as with the Sasebo
boards [190].
While in general SCAs are a threat for embedded devices, that is not to say that they
can’t be applied remotely to large-scale server systems either. Also it must be noted that
an attacker might own the device under attack and that he stands to gain by extracting
the secret information in it. An example of this could be breaking a Pay-TV system to
show all available channels, or to arbitrarily add value to a transit or charge card such as
performed by Oswald et al. in [169]. Hence, given that an adversary can possibly have
unlimited access to an embedded security device, as well as controlling environmental con-
ditions such as temperature, supply voltage, etc., it is clear that creating secure embedded
computing devices is far from a trivial problem which the straightforward implementation
of cryptography alone cannot solve.
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2.2 Cryptographic Algorithms
To secure communications and provide the functions specified in Table 1.1, various cryp-
tographic protocols are required such as TLS. These are defined by standards bodies such
as the International Organization for Standardisation (ISO) or NIST to allow for compati-
bility between devices. Cryptographic protocols, can be broadly viewed as the application
of cryptographic algorithms in a specified manner. As mentioned in the introduction, the
algorithms themselves can be roughly split into symmetric (private key) and asymmetric
(private and public key) cryptography.
Symmetric cryptographic algorithms use the same key for encryption and decryption, and
are generally quite fast hence are used for the bulk encryption of data. Block ciphers such
as AES and DES or stream ciphers such as Grain, RC4 or A5/2 are examples of symmetric
algorithms. Asymmetric algorithms use a different key for encryption and decryption,
allowing the encryption key to be made public to allow anybody use it, however only the
holder of the corresponding decryption key can unlock the data. RSA based on integer
factorisation, DH or ElGamal based on discrete logs, and ECC based on the elliptic curve
discrete log problem (ECDLP) are some examples of asymmetric algorithms. Due to the
relative lack of speed when compared to symmetric algorithms, generally they are used for
key exchange and message signatures to provide authentication, rather than encryption of
the data itself. Hash functions form a third grouping, and provide an irreversible one-way
function on the data. While no key per-se is used in the algorithm, they can be used as
the basis for constructions to provide message authentication and data integrity such as
the keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC).
When implementing cryptographic algorithms, they are themselves composed of smaller
building blocks. For example, finite field arithmetic is usually required in classical algo-
rithms (i.e. algorithms that are not post quantum) as rounding leads to a loss of informa-
tion and could lead to incorrect decryption. AES requires the multiplication of polynomials
modulo an irreducible polynomial, while ECC is commonly performed in either a prime
field Fp or binary extension field Fpn .
2.3 Side-Channel Attacks
In academic literature, classical side-channel attacks generally refer to passive timing,
power or electromagnetic attacks, as outlined in Table 1.2 previously, or fault attacks
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which encompass a wide range of attacker models and capabilities. Fault analysis (FA) can
be quite powerful when used in conjunction with cryptanalysis methods or with passive
attacks. There are other potential side-channels such as acoustic [14, 235] or photonic
emission analysis (PEA) [73], however these somewhat more esoteric methods are not of
relevance here.
2.3.1 Timing Analysis
Trivially, timing leakages could be something as simple as an array comparison when
checking a login pin or password. If the password is checked byte-by-byte, then the length
of time required to verify it is determined by the number of correct bytes at its beginning.
They were the first published SCA, presented by Kocher at Crypto ’96 [125], where
he showed how to recover key bits from asymmetric algorithms by accurately measuring
how long they take to execute. As execution time was dependent on the key value, secret
information could be recovered. Initially timing attacks were most effective against simpler
targets such as smart-cards etc., however it was shown by Brumley et al. that remote
attacks against servers were possible also [36]. It is not just asymmetric algorithms that
are vulnerable however, certain implementations of the MixColumns operation in AES
were shown to be vulnerable [127] also, and cache-timing attacks due to look-up operations
when indexed by some secret value are also feasible [23]. Processor optimisations such as
early termination of multiplication operations when the upper operands are zero can also
lead to serious timing leakages [87]. It must also be noted that it is not just cryptographic
algorithms that are vulnerable to timing attacks, protocol level implementations are also
vulnerable as shown in the recent Lucky Thirteen attack by AlFardan and Paterson [9].
2.3.2 Power Analysis
Power analysis can be broadly divided into three categories with considerable overlap,
with many attacks combining aspects from two or all of the areas.
Simple Power Analysis
SPA is the most straightforward type of attack, and can be used to trivially extract key
bits from a power trace where key dependent operations are performed [126]. For asym-
metric algorithms such as RSA [192], the obvious way of implementing the exponentiation
is though repeated squarings and multiplications. If the power consumption difference
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between these operations can be determined, then the key can be easily read out from a
single trace. As the squaring operation can be performed more efficiently than a multi-
plication [149], for low power devices such as smart-cards this is a real concern. A similar
analysis also applies to ECC [123, 152].
While in general, applying SPA to symmetric algorithms is not quite as straightforward,
it is sometimes possible where conditional branches are present such as during the DES
key schedule [126] or as an alternative to measuring timing information during an afore-
mentioned vulnerable AES MixColumns implementation [127]. SPA is particularly useful
however for selecting areas of time in which to perform differential or profiling attacks
which allows for a significant computational saving.
Non-Profiling
Broadly speaking, non-profiling attacks partition the trace set based on a function of some
key hypothesis. This is repeated for all valid keys and some statistical distinguisher is used
to determine which is the correct guess. These non-profiling attacks are considered in more
detail in §2.7 after the acquisition and make-up of power traces are examined.
Profiling
As profiling attacks are the main concern of this thesis and are dealt with in it later
chapters, if suffices to say here that profiling attacks assume a somewhat stronger attacker
model in that an identical or similar device is available to model the power consumption
prior to the attack. How much control or knowledge of the key they are assumed to have
over said device is open to interpretation per adversarial model, hence this assumption is
not as restricting it may first seem. For example, in [169] a non-profiling attack was first
used to recover a key prior to subsequently using the broken device to build templates.
In [3], it was shown how a device with a faulty RNG suffices to build templates, while
more recently in [137] it was shown how two devices with different unknown keys could
be used. It was also suggested in [92] that public verification functions could be used to
build templates using the device under attack itself. The first published profiling attack
was presented by Fahn and Pearson [70], where they introduced inferential power analysis
(IPA) to make detailed models of the power consumption of a device prior to an attack.
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2.3.3 Electromagnetic Analysis
Electromagnetic (EM) leakages were first demonstrated as source of side-channel leakage
by Quisquater and Samyde [184], and by Gandolfi et al. [77]. Rather than recording the
power consumption of a device, an EM probe is used to measure the changing electrical or
magnetic fields around a circuit due to current flow within it. While the analysis is quite
similar to that as is performed for power traces, there are certain advantages to examining
EM leakage. For example the ability to localise the acquisition to a specific region rather
than measure the power of the chip as a whole, as well as, practically, not having to
directly access the supply current which might not always be easily accessible. On the
other hand, the probe selection, placement and orientation are extra factors to consider,
as well the fact that low-amplitude signal might require decapsulation of the chip in order
to measure it. While EM attacks are not examined in this thesis, the statistical analysis
techniques are equally applicable to EM traces.
2.3.4 Fault Analysis
The area of FAs is quite broad and encompasses a wide range of attacks that all essentially
take a target device outside of its recommended operating conditions in order to induce
an error during the computation. Taking it outside its operating range can mean anything
from increasing the ambient temperature, reducing, glitching or cutting the supply voltage,
varying the clock frequency, blasting the chip with a laser, or even inducing an EM fault
via the spark plug of a car [118], to name but a few. There is also the potential for
inadvertent faults due to bugs in chip design as highlighted by the older Intel 80286 popf
or Pentium fdiv bugs, a risk that increases with chip complexity.
Once an attacker can inject (or knows how to inject in the case of a hardware bug) a
fault, some very elegant attacks can be derived such as the Bellcore attack of Boneh et
al. [32]. While this attack can be performed by injecting a fault at any point in time,
some require much more specific timing or even location based faults. Combining fault
and power analysis can also lead to effective attacks such as previously mentioned attack
an the Atmel R© CryptoMemory EEPROMS [15]. An overview of various FA and methods
can be found in [16].
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2.4 Trace Acquisition
The first step of any power attack is the acquisition of traces from a target device. The
quality of the traces has a major bearing on both the feasibility of an attack, as well as the
number of traces required to recover a key. Indeed version three of the DPA contest [211]
was an acquisition competition to see who could minimise the number of traces required
for an attack through the setup alone.
An example attack setup is given in Figure 2.1, where a controlling personal computer
(PC) synchronises the sending and receiving of messages to the device under attack, while
the power consumption is recorded using an oscilloscope. The external power supply and
function generator are not strictly necessary, however they can help provide cleaner traces.
Where a device is powered via universal serial bus (USB) there can be oscillations on the
line due the PC power supply unit. Likewise an external function generator will likely
provide an more stable clock than an on-board oscillator, even a very slight drift can
cause de-synchronisation over the course of an RSA or ECC operation. Generally this
is less of an issue for symmetric block ciphers such as AES or DES due to their shorter
computation time.
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Figure 2.1: Example power analysis setup.
To measure the power consumption a resistor is usually placed in series with the power
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supply and the target chip, with the varying current drawn by the chip causing a change in
voltage that can be measured. This causes a slight fluctuation at the device Vdd, however
if a small resistor is chosen this can generally be safely ignored. The resistor can equally
be placed on the ground line where a differential probe is not available. A proposal for an
active power measurement circuit has also be demonstrated by Bucci et al. in [37], where
they use Op-Amps to provide a stable voltage to the target device as well as amplifying
the current measurement.
A consequence of using a small resistor to measure the drop in voltage across, is that only a
small fluctuation is available to record. To prevent excessive quantisation noise, the power
trace should occupy the entire range of values of the scope resolution, hence an amplifier
might be required. Analog pre-processing with amplifiers, demodulators, filters, etc.,
can reduce the quantisation noise by ensuring the recorded signal which contains the side-
channel information occupies the majority of the range of the oscilloscope analog-to-digital
converter (ADC). This was used to good effect in [119] to perform low-cost attacks on
contact-less smart-cards. Another low cost attack setup was shown in [166], hence it is
clear that SCA is easily accessible to a wide range of attackers.
Another important aspect is that of triggering, as the traces need to be aligned with each
other for a successful attack. For controlled experiments, an output pin can be easily set
high to allow consistent triggering at the point of interest. Any de-synchronisation is then
likely due to offsets between the clocks of the device and the oscilloscope. However when
attacking a real-world device a suitable trigger must be found (such as the communication
bus) and the traces subsequently aligned.
Unless otherwise specified, the attacks in this thesis are performed against an arm7 mi-
croprocessor [138], and is typical of what would have been found in a previous generation
smart-phone. The software implementations of target algorithms were written by Dr. Mike
Tunstall, and the traces were acquired using a LeCroy AP034 differential probe across a
10Ω resistor on the Vdd side of the arm7 microprocessor, using a LeCroy WaveRunner
104Xi oscilloscope. The clock frequency of the device was supplied by a 7.3728MHz crystal
oscillator, and the power supply was provided via the JTAG programmer unit rather than
directly from an AC/DC converter which caused excessive noise. The sampling frequency
Fs was set to 250MSs
-1 and the 20MHz bandwidth limiter of the scope was used. A
dedicated trigger signal was used at the start of an acquisition to allow easy trace align-
ment. The arm7 microprocessor was manufactured by NXP, and the target board was
the LPC-H2124 from Olimex, as shown in Figure 2.2(a). Note this board had a dedicated
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resistor for SCA in its Vdd line. All communication was performed through the serial
port. No averaging was performed to reduce signal noise. The arm7-TDMI core has a
Von Neumann architecture with a single 32-bit data bus carrying both instructions and
data. A block diagram of the core architecture is given in Figure 2.2(b) [138].
(a) Evaluation board.
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Figure 2.2: Target Arm7 microprocessor.
2.5 Power Trace Components
Complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) is the most widely used technology
for constructing integrated circuits (ICs) such as the microprocessors, ASICs and FPGAs
that are widely used for embedded security devices. Circuits typically consist of comple-
mentary pairs of metal oxide semiconductor field effect transistors (MOSFETs) as shown
in the inverter circuit of Figure 2.3. The overall power consumption of a CMOS device
can be viewed as containing static and dynamic power, Ptotal = Pstat + Pdyn. As only
one of the transistors can be on at any time, this arrangement leads to a low static power
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consumption, with Pdyn the dominant factor in the power consumption, Equation 2.1.
Vin Vout
CL
Vcc
Gnd
Figure 2.3: CMOS inverter.
Pdyn = f · CL · α · VDD
2 (2.1)
Here f denotes the clock frequency, CL the capacitive load, α the switching activity, and
VDD the supply voltage of the circuit. The switching activity α refers to the number of
transistors that change state, which itself is dependent on the data and operations being
performed, which is the underlying concept of SCAs. A good overview of the components
of a power trace in the context of SCA can be found in [145].
Again following [145], from an attackers viewpoint the power consumption can be viewed
as containing three parts as in Equation 2.2. The signal itself consists of a constant and
exploitable part, Pconst and Pexp respectively, with the random fluctuations due to natural
variations and quantisation noise represented by Pnoise. The signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
of a signal gives an idea of how noisy a signal is, which has a direct bearing on an attack
outcome. The constant part of the signal, or the direct current (DC) component, is that
which is, for a given point in time, the same regardless of what data is processed, i.e. the
operation being performed or a bus load. As this is constant across all the traces it has
no effect on the outcome and can easily be removed. The exploitable part due to bits
switching is that which an attacker seeks to exploit. Note that where only a subset of
the bits switching is targeted, the remaining bits can be viewed as algorithmic noise as,
where the data being processed is random, the power consumption of these bits follows a
normal distribution. This is true also for the naturally occurring noise Pnoise which has
been shown in many works to follow a normal distribution also.
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Ptot = Pconst + Pexp + Pnoise (2.2)
An example of this is given in Figure 2.4 where the distribution of a single point in time
of 10 k different traces from the arm7 microprocessor is given. It is clear that the data
follows a Gaussian distribution, with a mean and standard deviation of 135.67mV and
1.64mV respectively. Note that the x-axis of the histogram is labelled mV as the values
represent the voltage drop across the shunt resistor which is proportional to the power
consumption as explained in the previous section. Each bin is a distinct voltage level as
recorded by the oscilloscope. While the 8-bit ADC of the oscilloscope has 256 distinct
levels, for the single time point of the trace examined only 18 of those values are actually
utilised. This is as a larger range of values occur over the length of the power trace hence
the vertical oscilloscope resolution must be set accordingly (over the entire trace > 220
of the ADC levels are utilised). It does mean however, that the quantisation noise can
be greatly reduced where the location of the target power consumption can be narrowly
focused.
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Figure 2.4: Gaussian noise distribution of a trace point.
In order to attack a device, it can be beneficial for an adversary to model the expected
power consumption. As Pdyn is the dominant factor of the power consumption
1, use of the
Hamming distance is a straightforward and effective method to model Pexp. The Hamming
distance is a count of the number of bits that change state between two points in time
as shown in Equation 2.3, where Rj,i is the i
th bit of register R at time j. While the
previous state is usually required when attacking hardware implementations, in the case
of software it is not always available or required. For example the previous value on a
1Note that as manufacturing processes decrease, it becomes increasingly important to consider Pstat.
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bus might be an op-code call hence will be some constant unknown value when attacking
the output of that operation. Alternatively, lower end microprocessors sometimes pre-set
their data-bus to an all zero or one state. In this scenario the Hamming weight model
can be used, which is essentially the Hamming distance model with an all zero previous
state. In fact when attacking software implementations, the Hamming weight models is
often sufficient. More complex models are available, such as suggested in [179] where they
apply a weighting to the 1 → 0 transition which consumed a slightly different amount of
power than the 0 → 1 transition for their setup. This can obviously be further extended
to have a vector of weights for each separate bit. These weights need to be calculated
somehow which implies some sort of profiling or regression based methods. In general
however, despite their simplicity, the Hamming weight and Hamming distance models
provide accurate enough approximates to allow successful SCA in many scenarios.
HD(Rt1 ,Rt2) =
n−1∑
i=0
Rt1,i ⊗ Rt2,i (2.3)
The point in time used to generate the histogram in Figure 2.4 was selected by taking the
location that returned maximum SNR after calculating it for each time point in the trace.
The SNR was calculated following Equation 2.4 [145, Ch. 4], and it was assumed that the
leakage followed the Hamming weight model, with the output of the first S-Box of the first
round taken as the signal. To calculate Equation 2.4, the mean of each Hamming weight
value is first computed. For σ2signal, each trace is replaced by its equivalent mean. The
variance is then calculated across the mean replaced signals. For σ2noise, the corresponding
mean is subtracted from each trace with the variance calculated across the resultant noise
vectors. To put the noise of the power trace in context, the SNR at this point was
calculated to be 0.97. As the SNR also depends on the utilised power model (i.e. exploiting
less bits increases the algorithmic noise), the SNR when the data was assumed to leak only
a single bit of information was calculated at 0.14. For reference, the SNR for the Hamming
weight and bitwise power models after the post-processing stages as described in §2.10,
were 0.23 and 1.66 respectively.
SNR =
σ2signal
σ2noise
(2.4)
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2.6 Notation and Methodology
Throughout the thesis, the following notation is utilised. A set of power traces x is of
size m× n where m is the number of traces (or samples) and n is the number points (or
features) in each trace. A single trace (i.e. row vector) from this set is denoted x(i), with
x
(i)
j a single point in time of this trace, or xj a single point in time across the entire trace
set. The plaintexts (resp. ciphertexts) corresponding to this trace set are denoted by p
(resp. c), with a single input again denoted by p(i) (resp. c(i)), and the valid set of values
by P (resp. C). The secret (or key) s from the set S is estimated by an adversary by sˆ
after making a hypothesis on a number of various values for s∗. Each trace x(i) can be
assigned to a class y(i) ∈ K where a class can be some intermediate value or the result
of a leakage mapping such as the Hamming weight. The unique values of y are denoted
by o(1), o(2), . . . , o(|K|), where |K| is the number of elements in K. Estimates and guesses
on y are denoted by yˆ and y∗ respectively as with s. The individual bits of the binary
representation of y are denoted by yj . While performing a SCA it is usual to only attack
a portion of the secret at a time, however no distinction is made here between partial
and full secret recovery as it should be clear from the context what is being referred to.
Additional notation is introduced as required.
When selecting a subset of m traces from a larger acquisition set to perform an attack,
they are always randomly selected to avoid any potential bias. This applies in all cases
whenever a subset is required, including when selecting both training and testing sets
when conducting profiling attacks. Training traces are used for the building of profiling
models, with a separate testing (or attack) set used to verify to model.
With regards the profiling attacks on the arm7 microprocessor, for AES the training and
testing sets are taken from the same device but in two separate runs. When acquiring the
training traces, a random key is used for each trace, while for the testing traces a constant
key is used. For the attacks on the Montgomery multiplication operation, the traces were
acquired in the same run and are randomly allocated to training and test sets each time
an attack is performed. For the attack on ECDSA the training and testing sets had to be
acquired in different acquisitions runs, as will be clear in §5.7.
2.6.1 Cross Validation
Cross validation is a widely used method for estimating prediction error from the training
data, as well as for choosing any learning parameters that may be required. Rather than
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simply calculating the training classification error and using that as a basis for parameter
selection, the training set is split up into CV sets, with CV − 1 sets used as training data
and a single set used for testing, with the model trained CV times. This removes the bias
of testing on the same data that has been used to generate the templates which generally
will predict a lower error than will be obtained on unseen data [95, Ch. 7]. Once the
parameters are selected, the templates are then generated over the entire training data
set. Obviously the greater the cross validation number the greater the computational
complexity, with the leave one out method where CV = m generally only used for very
small data sets. Care must be taken not to choose too small a CV parameter, where
the reduction in the training set size is such that the individual classes can no longer
accurately modelled. Any pre-processing of the data such as normalisation or transforms
must be calculated from the reduced CV training set.
As the acquisition of traces for this thesis is not restricted, cross validation is not used
and a separate testing set is used for parameter selection. A third validation set could
also have be used to estimate the expected error on unseen data after all parameters are
selected, but in practice there was little difference between this validation error and that
of the testing set. The exceptions with regards to cross validation are for the parameter
selection in the attack on ECDSA in §5.7, and for support vector machines (SVMs) in §6.4
where a grid search is implemented for parameter optimisation.
2.7 Non-Profiling Attacks
While there are many different methodologies to perform a non-profiled SCA, when at-
tacking block ciphers they all roughly follow the same sequence of steps. Initially some
target intermediate value or operation y that is a function of the secret s and some known
input p is chosen. Many attacks are also equally valid against a known output ciphertext
c. A suitable target value when attacking block ciphers is often the output of a S-Box due
to its non-linear properties [181]. For all possible values of the secret s∗ ∈ S a hypothetical
intermediate value is calculated and a power model applied if required. Some statistical
distinguisher is then used to determine the most likely key guess sˆ. As generating hy-
pothesis for all possible keys is infeasible for any modern cipher, the key is broken into
appropriately sized chunks and the attack is simply performed multiple times.
While the same steps are used for attacking both hardware and software implementations,
when attacking hardware it will be likely that some previous register value will have to
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be used as already mentioned. Generally speaking, attacking hardware targets will likely
require a greater number of traces to succeed due to both the nature of the leakage, as
well as the parallel nature of designs which induces a larger amount of algorithmic noise
on the traces [207].
2.7.1 Differential Power Analysis
The original DPA attack introduced by Kocher et al. [126], simply partitioned the traces
into two sets based on a projected bit value y = F (p, s∗). Examining the difference
between the means of these two sets as in Equation 2.5, when s∗ ≡ s then peaks should
occur as the sets have been correctly partitioned. These peaks occur at the points in time
wherever y is processed, and for s∗ 6= s no peaks should occur although so called ghost
peaks can occur due to relationships in the data.
∆ =

m∑
i=1
y(i) x(i)
m∑
i=1
y(i)
−

m∑
i=1
(
1− y(i)
)
x(i)
m∑
i=1
(
1− y(i)
)
 (2.5)
As an example to highlight the effectiveness of the attack despite its simplicity, in Fig-
ure 2.5 an attack against an arm7 microprocessor implementation of AES using the setup
as previously described is shown. An overview of the AES algorithm is given in Ap-
pendix A. Only two keys are tested, the correct one and a single incorrect value. The
target bit value is chosen as the least significant bit (LSB) of the S-Box output in the
first round such that y(i) = bitget
(
S
(
p(i) ⊗ s∗
)
, 0
)
. The correct key can be clearly distin-
guished and the peaks in Figure 2.5(a) show the points in time where the LSB is processed
(note the majority of the leakage actually occurs during the use of y in theMixColumns op-
eration rather than the S-Box output). The histograms of each set at the point of the
largest peak are given in Figure 2.5(b) and it can be seen that while there is a significant
overlap between the sets, they can still be clearly distinguished. While m = 5k traces
were used for the example, for this set of traces the attack is feasible with considerably
less traces. The large data set was to provide a clear visualisation of the histograms.
Some post-processing as described later in §2.10 was also applied to the traces prior to
the attack.
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(a) Difference of means traces. (b) Histogram at peak difference of means.
Figure 2.5: Difference of means attack.
2.7.2 Correlation Power Analysis
One of the most widely used methods of performing SCAs is with the use of Pearson’s
correlation coefficient in a CPA attack [33, 34]. This provides a measure of the linearity
between two normally distributed variables, i.e. the recorded power traces and a hypothet-
ical power consumption based on a key guess. Where an accurate power model is used this
can be a very powerful attack which can recover a secret in the presence of considerable
noise. Conversely, where a poor or inaccurate model is used then an attack might not be
possible at all.
The formula for the correlation coefficient is given in Equation 2.6 where y is the hypothet-
ical power consumption, and like the DPA attack, this is applied to every point in a trace.
For a given correlation coefficient, confidence intervals can also be used to determine how
many traces an attacker would expect to need in order to recover a secret following the
rule of thumb as given in [145, Chap. 6].
ρ =
m∑
i=1
(
x(i) − x¯
) (
y(i) − y¯
)
√∑m
i=1
(
x(i) − x¯
)2√∑m
i=1
(
y(i) − y¯
)2 (2.6)
Using the same m = 5k traces AES as before, a CPA attack is performed targeting
the output of the S-Box once again and assuming a Hamming weight power model, y =
HW
(
S
(
p(i) ⊕ s∗
))
. There are multiple peaks in Figure 2.6(a) representing different parts
of the AES algorithm where y is used. The peaks are somewhat clearer than in the DPA
case as the leakage due to multiple bits is being utilised. Box-plots of the trace values at the
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point corresponding to the peak correlation and grouped by their Hamming weight are
given in Figure 2.6(b). The linear relationship can be clearly seen and shows that the
Hamming weight model is pertinent choice for this device.
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Figure 2.6: Correlation attack.
When attacking hardware devices such as FPGAs, or a smart-card with a co-processor,
it is beneficial to attack as many bits as is reasonably possible from a computational
viewpoint, as this reduces the algorithmic noise of the traces. It was shown in [34] that
when attacking a subset of bits bsub in a bus of width b, the maximum correlation is given
by Equation 2.7. An example of the practical effect of this is given in [214] where an
increasing number of parallel DES S-Boxes in a smart-card coprocessor are attacked.
ρsub = ρ
√
bsub
b
(2.7)
From a practical viewpoint, performing CPA on larger datasets where the number of
samples m >> 1 k and the number of time points n >> 10 k where each point will
typically be a single or double precision value of 4 or 8 bytes, can require a significant
amount of memory if the traces are loaded directly into memory for the calculation. Hence
it is often more efficient to implement to correlation function recursively as outlined in
[119], or with the proposed efficiency improvements in [139]. This has the added advantage
where the peak correlation is being plotted as a function of the number of required traces
as the intermediate correlations are being calculated regardless.
Profiling SCA on Crypto. Algorithms Neil Hanley
Section 2.7: Non-Profiling Attacks 25
2.7.3 More Non-Profiling Attack Methods
While the two attacks as described are widely used SCAs, there are many others. Any
statistical distinguisher that can be used to differentiate set partitions can be used as an
attack method. These are typically referred to as univariate attacks as they exploit the
leakage of a single time point of a trace. There are many variants of the original difference
of means (DOM) attack such as:
All-or-Nothing DPA [151] This is a straightforward extension of the DOM attack which
looks to maximise the DPA peak by partitioning the traces into sets such that
{x ; yi = 0 ∀i} and {x ; yi = 1 ∀i}. This has the disadvantage of leaving traces
where the bits of y contain both 0 and 1 unused for that particular DOM trace
however.
Generalised DPA [151] Here the traces are partitioned into two sets based on if the
Hamming weight is greater or equal to b2 where b is the number of bits under con-
sideration and is given by b = ⌈log2 (|K|)⌉, with K the set of values y can take.
Enhanced DPA [27] Multiple DOM attacks are performed seperately in an enhanced
DPA attack for each bit yi, with the resultant DOM curves summed in order to
maximise the leakage utilisation.
T-Test DPA [53] This utilises the popular t-test distinguisher which is a difference of
means test which also accounts for the respective variance of the two sets. In the
context of SCA, this generally will be more accurate than a straightforward DOM
test and require fewer samples to succeed. It can also be used in conjunction with
any of the DOM type attacks.
Partitioning PA [131] In partitioning power analysis, the traces are split into multiple
sets based on some power model and a weighted sum of means calculated. This is
quite similar to CPA, however weighting coefficients must be selected.
Absolute Sum DPA [61] This is quite similar to the enhanced DPAmethod, except that
absolute values are summed to ensure bit-dependent leakage doesn’t cancel out.
Variance power analysis [204], and differential cluster analysis [20] have also been sug-
gested, with the clustering method actually a form of unsupervised machine learning.
Equally, rather than using Pearson’s correlation coefficient which assumes the data is nor-
mally distributed, non-parametric rank correlation methods such as Spearman’s, Kendall’s
Tau or the Gamma statistic can be used as suggested in [20], or Gini correlation as exam-
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ined in [201]. These rank correlation methods don’t assume a linear dependency between
the model and the trace data, rather an ordinal one. This can be advantageous in hardware
scenarios where the leakage is more complex. Other useful non-parametric distinguishers
that have been proposed for SCA include mutual information analysis (MIA) [80], regres-
sion analysis [58], and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test [227], each with its own advantages
and disadvantages. For example, an interesting feature of MIA is its generality and its
natural extension to multivariate attacks [79], however optimal parameter selection is
non-trivial [217] and poor choices can result in the attack failing.
With a wide range of distinguishers available, the obvious question to ask is which is “best”
[98]. Due to the fact that SCAs are by their nature implementation dependent with the
underlying platform and target algorithm dictating the strategy, no single distinguisher is
most efficient in all cases. There are a number of publications which investigate the relative
merits of distinguishers through both theoretical and empirical analysis, for example [61,
82, 141, 146]. Many of these show that the attacks can be viewed as being asymptotically
equivalent, and can be re-written as a function of each other.
2.8 Comparison Metrics
To compare various SCA methods some sort of metric is required. Two commonly used
methods are the success rate and the guessing entropy [206]. To calculate the success rate,
multiple attacks are performed with the results averaged to estimate how the attack would
perform given a random set of traces from the same setup. A 1st order success rate returns
on average how often the correct key is recovered as a function of the number of traces. A
2nd order success rate is how often the correct key is selected among the two most likely
keys, etc.. The guessing entropy is also calculated as a function of the number of traces,
and returns the expected number of key guesses required after applying the distinguisher.
This allows an evaluation of attacks where maybe the majority of keys can be quickly
eliminated, however some (possibly related) keys are harder to distinguish between. An
information theoretic measure is also introduced in [206] to evaluate leakages independent
of adversarial models. Another comparison framework was introduced in [225] which, in
addition to key ranking similar to the success rate, also suggests the use of distinguishing
margins and standard scores.
With regards to comparison of profiling attacks which are the focus of this thesis, it is
of interest to compare the efficiency of both the profiling and attack stages. To compare
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the profiling step various empirical measures were suggested in [81], while in [205] the
information theoretic measures of [206] were suggested. In both cases the success rate was
used in the classification step.
In this thesis, the goal is the minimise the expected error given a single trace to recover a
secret. This is equal to 1 minus the success rate for a single trace. Intuitively, minimising
the expected error for a single randomly selected trace will also maximise the success rate
where multiple traces are available for secret recovery. Wherever the success rate is used
(e.g. in an amplified TA) then it is the 1st order success rate. Learning curves as commonly
used in machine learning are used here rather than information theoretic methods, with
the efficiency of the training and testing stages evaluated using the training and test error
rates. The training error is the error when classification is performed on the data set
used to build the profiling model, with the testing error the error of a separate trace set
unused in the profiling step. The learning curves are these error rates plotted against some
variable parameter such as the number of samples or features used to build the model.
An advantage of using learning curves is that the bias-variance trade-off of the model
can be easily visualised allowing the selection of parameters to minimise testing error. A
high bias model (under-fitting) can be seen by high training and test error, while a high-
variance model (over-fit) can be seen by low training error and a high testing error [95].
Hence the appropriate steps can be taken to improve the classifier rather than blindly
trying everything. For example, to improve a high variance model an appropriate approach
would be to increase the training set size, or maybe reduce the number of features selected.
Conversely, given a high bias model the addition of extra training samples will unlikely
improve the results and the addition of extra features is a more suitable path to take.
Finally, as previously mentioned in §2.6 when outlining the notation used, when attacking
some cryptographic algorithm via SCA the key is usually recovered step by step. For
example in the case of an embedded software implementation, if attacking AES the ar-
chitecture of the algorithm lends itself to attacking the key a byte at a time, whereas if
targeting DES in the same scenario then 4-bits might be more appropriate. For asymmet-
ric algorithms such as RSA and ECC the key is generally recovered bit-by-bit, with an
attacker maybe using the knowledge of the recovered key bit to extract the next one. In
this work, unless otherwise specified, the error rates are for the recovery of a single byte
of the AES key or a single bit of an asymmetric algorithm.
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2.9 Countermeasures
Various countermeasures have been proposed to protect against SCA, however in practice
provable security is difficult to achieve and a more realistic goal is to make the financial
cost of breaking a system greater than the projected gain. Depending on the adversarial
threat model and the algorithm under consideration, countermeasures based on secure
logic styles [213], masking [41, 85] or randomisation [52] might be appropriate, to name
but a few. In general a countermeasure will have some cost associated with it, such as
longer computation time, extra silicon or FPGA utilisation, increased power consumption
etc.., which must be factored into account when designing a secure system. Further detail is
provided where relevant in later chapters. As the use of countermeasures can be overcome
in a variety of ways, such as with higher-order attacks, a combination of them is usually
preferred where possible. Finally it is worth pointing out that Cryptography Research has
wide ranging patent claims on many countermeasure implementations.
2.10 Trace Pre-Processing
The success rate of SCAs can be improved through the application of trace pre-processing
methods prior to performing the attack itself. These can be filtering methods to reduce
noise on the raw traces or transformations to project the traces into a subspace. Another
application of pre-processing methods is to reduce the computational complexity of an
attack by removing redundant information prior to performing the attack without a sig-
nificant loss of information. This can have large effect on both the length of time it takes
to perform the attack, as well as the storage requirements. It must be noted however, that
the arm7 microprocessor traces used for the attacks here allow for relatively successful
attacks without any pre-processing. Noisier platforms such as FPGAs, or implementa-
tions with noise inducing (or desynchronising) countermeasures will have a greater benefit
from pre-processing. Pre-processing can also lead to attacks where previously none might
have been expected or possible. For example, Agrawal et al. in [2] apply demodulation to
recover amplitude modulated EM key dependent signals.
2.10.1 Direct Current Component Removal
Ideally the DC component of a power trace is unchanging across the entire trace set hence
removing it should have no effect on the outcome of a SCA. However in reality a DC
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drift can sometimes be observed across the length of a power trace, particularly when
recording long trace vectors. Even more noticeable is the DC drift across a large set of
traces acquired over a day or more. As the ambient room temperature changes, this can
have a visible effect on the DC offset of the power traces. Likewise the temperatures of
both the target device, and the oscilloscope probes will affect the DC component value,
hence equipment should be allowed “warm up” prior to acquisition by recording dummy
samples.
A straightforward way to remove the DC component at source is to set the oscilloscope
probe to use alternating current (AC) coupling. A capacitor within the oscilloscope is
then used to block the DC component of the analogue signal collected by the probe before
it is ever converted to a digital signal via the ADC. This might not always be desirable
however, hence two methods for removing the DC component are now examined:
Mean Subtraction: This is the easiest way of removing the DC component and simply
consists of subtracting the average value of a trace from each point in the trace.
Generally this method is very effective, however where there is a significant DC
difference between various sections of the trace, a DC component will still remain
post-subtraction. It has the advantage of affecting all points in the trace equally
however.
High-pass Filter: A high-pass filter can be used to remove the DC component of a sig-
nal [200, Ch. 14], however its effectiveness depends on the filter parameters. Due
to the vast number of filter types and parameters, the comparison here is limited to
examining the application of windowed linear-phase finite impulse response (FIR) fil-
ters while using a Blackman window [94]. The choice of a Blackman window was due
to its slightly wider lobe and greater stop-band attenuation, however experimental
evaluation found little difference in practice between it and other window shapes
such as the Hamming or Bartlett. Fixing the attenuation at the cut-off frequency Fc
to 6 decibel (dB), the filter order N and Fc are varied to see the effect on the traces.
As the end goal of any pre-processing is the improve the practicality of a SCA, the success
rate of a CPA attack against the first S-Box in the first round of AES is calculated for each
method. While there are limitations in using this as a metric for comparing pre-processing
methods (what is optimal for a CPA is not necessarily optimal for other attacks), it is
sufficient for the purposes here as later attacks will be compared on the same data set
anyway. Figure 2.7 gives the success rate for various N and Fc filter parameters, compared
to subtracting the mean and the original data set. All possible bytes are hypothesised for
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the key, and the correlation is calculated across the entire length of the first round (25 k
points in total).
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Figure 2.7: Success rate of DC removal methods.
It can be seen that simply subtracting the DC component, or filtering with [(Fc =
100Hz, N = 100), (Fc = 100Hz, N = 100)] high pass filters makes little difference to
the success rate of the attack. However for the filter with (Fc = 1MHz, N = 1k), there
is a significant drop off in the success rate. Note that these are not particularly suitable
filter parameters to remove a DC component in any case, as many other low-frequency
components are also attenuated. They were chosen to highlight that poor filter selection
can have a negative effect on SCA. As the effect on the success rate in minimal for the
other options, for all following attacks on the AES algorithm implemented on the arm7
microprocessor, the DC component is simply removed by subtracting the mean as this is
computationally the fastest method.
2.10.2 Filtering
As outlined in §2.5, noise is always present on power traces due to both acquisition
noise (such as quantization) and randomly occurring noise. This noise lowers the over-
all SNR and increases the number of traces required to perform a successful SCA. Low-pass
filters can be used to remove noise at high frequencies thereby increasing the SNR, hence
the effectiveness of the attack. Many oscilloscopes also provide an analogue bandwidth
limiter (generally about 20MHz or 25MHz) that suppresses signals above that frequency.
This can be quite effective at increasing the SNR of a trace as spurious noise is removed
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before digitisation, possibly allowing a smaller vertical voltage range to be selected which
in turn reduces the quantization noise. As mentioned previously, custom filters can also be
implemented in the analogue domain in an attempt to reduce quantization noise, however
we are only concerned with digital filters here. Bandpass filters are another option to
reduce noise on a trace. As shown in [145, Ch. 4], the peak that occurs on the rising edge
of a clock cycle is enough to perform an attack as this is where the majority of the power
consumed due to bit transitions occurs (glitching is also another source of power consump-
tion that must be accounted for, particularly when implementing countermeasures [147]).
As these peaks occur at the clock frequency, a bandpass filter can be used to remove
frequencies outside this range. The use of filters to reduce noise prior to performing an
attack, while common in the cryptographic community, is not extensively dealt with in
the literature, with [17, 132, 170, 202] some of the papers that directly look at application
of digital signal processing (DSP) methods to enhance SCA. However the selection of filter
parameters is dependent on the data at hand. Hence there is no all-encompassing set of
filters and parameters that can be recommended for all attack setups.
Moving Average Filter: While an extremely easy and efficient filter to implement, the
moving average filter (MAF) is actually optimal for reducing random white noise
while retaining a sharp step response [200, Ch. 15]. However for frequency domain
signals it is among the worst types of filter so should not be used where frequency
separation is required. The MAF is simply a rectangular windowed FIR filter. This
allows for an extremely fast implementation as a filtered point of a trace, xi, can be
used to calculate xi+1 with only a single addition and subtraction. A longer window
length allows for a cleaner trace as the noise reduction is equal to the square-root of
the window length (i.e. a rectangular window length of 100 will reduce the noise by
a factor of 10). However the longer the window length, the poorer the step response
which can impact an attack as seen for the case where N = 101 in Figure 2.8.
This can be compensated somewhat by an attacker by increasing the sampling rate,
trading acquisition and processing time, and storage space for noise reduction. While
power traces will generally have Gaussian rather than white distributed noise, due
to the simplicity and speed of the filter it is worth examining.
Lowpass Filter: The effect on the success rate of a windowed FIR low-pass filter, again
using a Blackman kernel, of different window lengths is given in Figure 2.9. It is
less efficient to implement than the MAF as it does not allow for a recursive im-
plementation due to the shape of its window. It performs similarly in the time
domain with regards noise suppression while being far superior for frequency sepa-
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Figure 2.8: Success rate of moving average filters.
ration. Once again, the cutoff frequency is kept constant, and the window length
N which is varied. As the clock frequency of the arm7 microprocessor is set at
7.3728MHz, the cut-off frequency of the filter Fc is chosen at 10MHz suppressing
any frequencies above this range including clock harmonics. It can be seen that all
filter kernel lengths reduce the number of traces required for a given success rate,
even the N = 101 point filter which in the MAF case caused a large reduction in
the attack effectiveness.
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Figure 2.9: Success rate of lowpass filters.
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Bandpass Filter: Once again the Blackman FIR filter is used, and the bandpass filter
passband frequencies are set to ±500 kHz either of the clock frequency. As can be
seen in Figure 2.10, in this case larger window lengths actually increase the success
rate of the attack as a sharper cut-off frequency is achieved. While the removal of
the DC component is not strictly necessary if using a bandpass filter as it will be
attenuated anyway, for consistency in the comparison with the other options the
same DC-free traces were used.
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Figure 2.10: Success rate of bandpass filters.
The most effective of each of three filter types are compared in Figure 2.11. The appli-
cation of a bandpass filter about the clock frequency leads to the best CPA attack for
this particular setup, indicating that the interesting power leakage largely occurs at the
clock frequency. Hence for all attacks on the AES algorithm implemented on the arm7
microprocessor in the following chapters, the mean is first subtracted to remove the DC
component, and an N = 51 point Blackman FIR bandpass filter with the passband set to
±500 kHz about the clock frequency is applied to reduce the noise on the trace.
2.10.3 Trace Reduction
The processing and storage requirements of a SCA are directly proportional to the length
of a power trace, hence dependent on both the algorithm being targeted and the sampling
rate. In the case of the traces under consideration, with a sampling rate of 250MSs-1,
each round of AES has ≈ 25 k points therefore requiring over 250 k points per trace, with
each point requiring 8 bytes of storage to store in double precision format. In the case
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Figure 2.11: Success rate comparison of various filters.
of asymmetric key algorithms such as RSA or ECC, storage and processing requirements
can be orders of magnitude larger due to the longer computation times. Reduction of the
sampling rate is one method to reduce the trace length (synchronous sampling methods
have also been shown to be effective [166]), but this is constrained by the Nyquist theorem
which states that the sampling rate must be at least twice the maximum frequency in a
system for an accurate representation of the signal [200, Ch. 3]. Due to the clock harmonics
in the system, the sampling rate needs to be considerably higher than the clock to prevent
aliasing on the traces. Examining the frequency response of the traces under consideration,
11th order clock harmonics were still visible around 81MHz (although greatly reduced in
amplitude) hence the sampling rate of 250MSs-1 was chosen.
In [145, Ch. 4], it is shown that only a single point from the duration of a clock cycle
is required to perform SCAs. This allows the removal all all but one point per clock
cycle in a trace without adversely affecting an attack outcome as mostly only redundant
information is removed. It also has the advantage of realigning power traces acquired from
a device where there is a very slight clock oscillator drift. These compressed traces allow
for both quicker attack evaluation, as well as reduced storage requirements. A method to
reconstruct clock edges from a power trace is given in [65], however for the AES traces
here, ⌊ Fs
Fclk
⌋ is used to approximate how many points per clock. This will not exactly
split up the trace into clock periods unless it is an even division, however as the floor
rather than ceiling function is used no data will be lost. Note this can only be used for
deterministic algorithms with no key or data dependent branches as de-synchronisation
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will occur otherwise. For the ECDSA traces of §5.7 the method of [65] is used. Various
methods are outlined in [145, Ch. 4], a few of which are now outlined:
Maximum point: It can be assumed that the maximum point in a clock period is where
the most bit transitions occur hence this point can be used as representative of the
clock period as a whole.
Integration: This method sums up all the points in a clock period and uses this value to
represent to clock period. This can decrease the SNR where many points consisting
of mostly noise are summed together.
Sum absolute values: This too sums up all the points, but the absolute value is take
prior to summation.
Dot product: This is equivalent to the summation of the squares of each point. The
idea here is that the signal component will amplify itself through the multiplication
hence the summation with points consisting of mostly noise will have a lesser effect.
Using the DC free and bandpass filtered traces from before, the success rate is once again
calculated using the different trace reduction methods. As illustrated in Figure 2.12, all
the summation trace reduction methods actually decrease the attack effectiveness due to
the noise components consisting of a greater portion of a trace point post compression.
Selecting the maximum point per trace on the other hand increases the success rate of
the attack slightly as small desynchronising effects are removed, hence this compression
technique is combined with mean subtraction and the use of a bandpass filter for the
remainder of thesis where this set of traces are used.
2.10.4 Trace Transformations
Further signal processing of the traces can be advantageous for SCA, particularly where
countermeasures have been applied. Performing attacks in the frequency domain [78] or
the use of principal component analysis (PCA) to transform the data prior to an attack
[21] can allow an attack to succeed where otherwise it might have not have due to de-
synchronisation or excessive noise. Similarly where randomised clocking countermeasures
have been utilised, methods have been suggested to reconstruct the original signal [114,
156, 216] through trace transformations and signal processing.
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Figure 2.12: Trace reduction comparison.
2.11 Conclusion
In this background chapter, a broad overview of embedded systems and why they are
vulnerable to SCAs has been presented, along with various categories of SCA and the
ideas behind them. The trace acquisition setup as used in this thesis, along with the
notation and success metrics which are utilised throughout have also been introduced.
A justification of the pre-processing steps applied to the arm7 microprocessor AES traces
in this work was presented through experimental analysis, and it was found that the
following three pre-processing steps help increase the efficiency of a CPA attack against
this dataset:
• Subtraction of the trace mean to remove the DC component.
• Applying a N = 51 point Blackman windowed FIR bandpass digital filter with the
cutoff frequencies set to the clock frequency of 7.3739MHz ± 500 kHz
• Reducing the traces to a single point per clock cycle by extracting the peak value
from each cycle.
These pre-processing steps are applied to all traces used in this thesis acquired from an
arm7 microprocessor while sampling at 250MSs-1.
Profiling SCA on Crypto. Algorithms Neil Hanley
Chapter 3
Template Attacks
3.1 Introduction
TAs, first introduced by Chari et al. [42], take a different approach to key extraction
than DPA, CPA or their variants. Rather than modelling the expected power consump-
tion of a device based on some leakage model, TAs look to accurately model the power
consumption using an identical device that an attacker has access to. Due to this strong,
possibly all-encompassing, attacker model, a TA can be viewed as the strongest SCA pos-
sible attack in an information theoretic sense as stated in [42]. There are variants to this
model, for example where an attacker does not have full control of the profiling device
however knows that it contains a faulty RNG [3], or where an attacker simply performs a
DPA attack to recover the key [169], but for the rest of this chapter we assume that the
key is known for the profiling stage. The validity of profiling on one device, and attacking
a second device can also be questioned, especially in smaller fabrication processes [188].
This question is further explored in §3.5, however in general it is assumed that different
devices have sufficiently similar leakage to allow the mounting of a TA. As TAs represent
the strongest possible attacker model, they are also particular useful for device manufac-
turers and vendors in evaluating side-channel resistance in a worst case scenario analysis
testing as suggested in [206].
In this chapter, an overview of template attacks is first given in §3.2. This is followed up
in §3.3 with an exploration of practical attack considerations and their effect on subse-
quent classification success rate, including a comparison of different classification methods
in §3.3.6. These attacks are evaluated in a known plaintext attacker model with the set of
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arm7 microprocessor AES traces acquired as described in §2.4. The attacks work equally
as well in a known ciphertext scenario, as is the case for many SCA, hence only known
inputs are considered here. The effect of artificially adding noise to traces to simulate poor
acquisition setups or noisier target devices is investigated in §3.3.7, and in §3.4 various
implementations of AES on different platforms are compared to show how the underly-
ing target device affects the attack. Finally in §3.5 multiple identical devices are used to
empirically test the validity of the premise of TAs for a given target platform.
3.2 Template Attacks
A significant advantage of TAs is the ability to recover keys with a few or only a single
power trace, overcoming implementations or countermeasures which restrict the number
of traces an adversary can acquire. The flip side of this being the sometimes restrictive
assumption that an identical device is available for profiling the power consumption. A TA
is a two-stage attack, the computationally intensive profiling or training stage on the
identical device, followed by the key recovery or classification stage of the target device.
The templates generated during the profiling stage can subsequently be reused for fast
key recovery from any similar device, potentially giving an attacker a large return for the
initial workload. The first published two-stage attack was IPA by Fahn and Pearson [70],
which made use of averaging to determine the location and leakage of individual key bits.
While it is assumed that an adversary can program, or knows the key of the profiling
device, it is not assumed that the underlying source code is known. Knowledge of the
source code would allow for a much stronger attack, most likely leading to a trivial key
extraction. There are scenarios where an identical device with a known key is not required
however, or the attacker assumptions are not as prohibitive as they might first seem. For
example an attacker might own a cryptographic device such as a smart card with some
unknown secret key. As the device is his own, he has unrestricted physical access to
it and can spend significant time and effort recovering the key using traditional DPA.
Subsequently he can build templates using this information for quick key extraction from
similar devices that he does not have unfettered access to. This was among the ideas
presented by Oswald an Paar in [169], however the authors were unable to transfer the
success of the TA across different profiling and target devices (it was suggested by the
authors this was possibly due to some desynchronising type countermeasure). Similarly, it
was suggested in [93], that in an asymmetric key cryptosystem where a public verification
function is available that uses the same sub-functions as a signature generation function,
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this function could be used to generate templates under the assumption that the public
key is known. No practical evaluation of this has been demonstrated to date however, and
very likely there are many practical issues to overcome. It does highlight however that the
TA model is not as restrictive or unrealistic as it might initially seem.
3.2.1 Template Training
The first stage of a TA is the training or profiling stage. A set of m power traces x, of
length n are collected with their corresponding plaintext p and key s inputs. The target
key space is given by S and contains |S| elements. The traces are assigned a label y ∈ K
such that y = F(p, s). The function F is chosen such that it maps y to a secret s given
p. This does not necessarily have to be a unique mapping, however unless it is bijective
the classification stage will require more than one target trace. The unique values in the
set K are denoted by, o(1), o(2), . . . , o(|K|). If the noise on the traces is additive and follows
a Gaussian distribution, the traces can be assumed to be drawn from the multivariate
normal distribution as given in Equation 3.1.
N
(
x | µ(i),Σ(i)
)
=
1√
(2π)n
∣∣Σ(i)∣∣ e−
1
2(x−µ(i))(Σ(i))
−1
(x−µ(i))⊤ (3.1)
Where µ(i) and Σ(i) represent the mean vector and noise covariance matrix of the class o(i),
and ⊤ represents the transpose operation. The training stage then consists of empirically
estimating the mean vector µˆ(i) and noise covariance matrix Σˆ(i) pair, for each instance
of o(i), as defined in Equation 3.2 and Equation 3.3. Here i ∈ {1, . . . , |K|}, and x(j,i)
represents the jth acquisition of the class o(i), where j ∈ {1, . . . ,m(i)} and m(i) is the
number of traces available for o(i) such that
∑|K|
i=1m
(i) = m.
µˆ(i) =
1
m(i)
m(i)∑
j=1
x(j,i) (3.2)
Σˆ(i) =
1
m(i) − 1
m(i)∑
j=1
(
x(j,i) − µˆ(i)
)(
x(j,i) − µˆ(i)
)⊤
(3.3)
This estimated mean vector and noise covariance matrix pair
(
µˆ(i), Σˆ(i)
)
is then the tem-
plate associated with o(i) and completely specifies its noise distribution. An example
operation that might be profiled could be the output of an intermediate function in a
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cipher where a known input is combined with an unknown secret. The output of the first
round AES S-Box is suitable in this regard as shown in [181], and used in many of the
experiments here. The choice of target intermediate value can determine the success or
otherwise of the attack, and is further investigated in §3.3.5. The template for each o(i)
is constructed from a large number of traces, x(j,i) where j ∈ {1, . . . ,m(i)}. However, the
actual value of m(i) will vary widely from one device to another, being dependent on a host
of different variables such as the size of the bus in the device under attack, the operation
being performed, the power model etc., which all contribute differing amounts of noise.
The traces used for the following experiments were acquired using randomly distributed
inputs rather recording them on a per class basis. Where the mapping function F is
bijective, the value of each m(i) will be similar, however if the Hamming weight power
model is used it must be kept in mind that randomly selected traces will lead to unbalanced
sets. Where all m(i) are large enough this is not a issue, as the sampling error between
the µ(i) and µˆ(i) will be small. As the noise is assumed normally distributed, the standard
error of the mean is given by σ√
m(i)
, allowing a relative comparison of the accuracy of each
template. A exploration of the effect of the total training set size m is examined in §3.3.4.
Where noise is an issue, it is also possible to perform TAs in the frequency domain as
demonstrated in [186] by applying the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) to the traces.
Trace compression methods such as described previously in §2.10.3 should not be used
where the DFT is being performed, but depending on how many points in the DFT, gen-
erally the computational complexity of generating the templates in the frequency domain
won’t be an issue.
Regardless of whether a trace compression method is used or not, for the construction of
templates further reduction is required to extract the features that the templates will be
based on. One option is to sum the absolute differences between each of the mean traces
and select the required number of highest points [186], which can be viewed as a variant
of the DPA attack. In fact most DPA or CPA type attacks will allow some relevant
features to be extracted as performing these attacks give the points in time where the
target operation or value is processed, which is what is being modelling with the building
of templates. Another approach is to use statistical pre-processing tools such as PCA
[11] or linear discriminant analysis (LDA) [203] to transform the traces into a subspace
of maximum variance. The attack is then performed on this set of transformed traces. A
closer examination of various feature extraction and processing methods is given in 3.3.3.
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3.2.2 Template Classification
To recover key information an attack, or testing, trace is required from the device under
attack, preferably recorded under the same conditions. The trace must first be reduced
in size and processed using the same steps that were used when generating the templates.
For each possible class o(i) ∈ K, the likelihood of the trace corresponding to it is calculated
using the multivariate Gaussian distribution from Equation 3.1, and plugging in the esti-
mated values of
(
µˆ(i), Σˆ(i)
)
. The likelihood of o(i) can then be converted to a probability
by applying Bayes’ theorem as given in Equation 3.4.
Pr
(
o(i) | x
)
=
p
(
x | o(i)
)
Pr
(
o(i)
)∑|K|
j=1 p
(
x | o(j)
)
Pr
(
o(j)
) (3.4)
Here Pr
(
o(i)
)
is the prior probability of the class occurring, and p
(
x | o(i)
)
is given by
N
(
x | µ(i),Σ(i)
)
. Applying the maximum likelihood principal, the estimated class is then
given by Equation 3.5. If all operations are equiprobable then the application of Bayes’
theorem is unnecessary as it simply scales the likelihood values, and Equation 3.5 can be
applied directly to the likelihood values.
sˆ = F
(
argmax
o
Pr
(
o(i) | x
)
, p
)−1
(3.5)
The success rate of the attack is increased if a set of power traces for a constant secret key
is available such that m > 1. In this scenario, Bayes’ theorem can be applied iteratively if
the power traces are statistically independent thereby increasing the power of the attack
as given in Equation 3.6 [173]. Note this is equivalent to Equation 3.4 when m = 1. Once
again the maximum likelihood is used to return the estimated key sˆ.
Pr
(
o(i) | x
)
=
(∏m
k=1 p
(
x(k) | o(i)
))
· Pr
(
o(i)
)∑|K|
j=1
((∏m
k=1 p
(
x(k) | o(j)
))
· Pr
(
o(j)
)) (3.6)
3.2.3 Template Attack on AES
As an example TA, an unprotected arm7 microprocessor AES implementation is attacked,
with the traces acquired as described in §2.4. To build the templates, 10 k power traces of
the first round of the encryption algorithm are recorded with different uniformly random
plaintexts and keys for each trace. The choice of 10 k is arbitrary, as are all parameter
selections, and simply provides an initial baseline comparison. The testing traces are
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recorded separately on the same device with uniformly random plaintexts and a constant
key. Note that both the plaintext and key need not be random to generate the templates,
just the target intermediate value. Pre-processing as described in §2.10 is applied to traces
prior to template training. The target operation of the attack that the templates are built
for is the output of the first S-Box of the first round. Any key dependent intermediate
value can be chosen, however the S-Box is particularly suitable as shown in §3.3.5.
Template Training
Assuming the arm7 microprocessor follows a Hamming weight power model, the output
byte of the S-Box will give |K| = 9 possible classes. To select the points of interest from
the recorded traces, the sum of squares of differences (sosd) method is used, as suggested
by [42, 186]. As shown in Equation 3.7, this consists of summing the squares of the
differences between each pair of mean traces for each class. The points in this difference
trace are the points that have the highest variance when grouped according to the target
class, which are the points that have the largest power component dependent on the target
leakage operation. The n˜ ≤ n features with a significant peak are retained for the building
of templates. This is not the only way to select the relevant features to build templates
with, and various methods are explored in §3.3.3.
∆ =
|K−1|∑
i=1
|K|∑
j=i+1
(
µˆ(i) − µˆ(j)
)2
(3.7)
The selected points are highlighted by the red crosses in Figure 3.1(a). For the example
here we choose all the distinct peaks, which leads us to to select n˜ = 20 points. The effect
of selection too many or too few points is also further explored in §3.3.3. The initial peak
is the point in time where the output of the S-Box itself is processed, while the subsequent
smaller peaks are due to the use of the target value in the MixColumns operation. This
corresponds to the correlation peaks as seen in §2.7.2 as broadly the same leakage is being
utilised. Figure 3.1(b) shows the distribution of the all the trace points xj located at the
largest peak coloured according to their respective Hamming weights. It is this separation
of Hamming weight classes that allows templates to be constructed.
To evaluate the templates, the traces used to generate the templates are themselves classi-
fied first to calculate the training error. These traces are classified by taking the maximum
probability returned by Equation 3.4, as due to the Hamming weight distribution, each
template does not have an equal prior probability. The 10 k training traces are classified
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Figure 3.1: Template generation.
with an error rate of 0.318, which can be viewed as lowest error rate achievable with these
particular templates, with the error of the testing traces expected to be higher.
Template Testing
To test the templates 25 k traces acquired from the same device and using an identical
setup were acquired, this time with a uniformly random plaintext and constant key as
previously mentioned. The traces were processed in the same manner as before, and the
testing error rate on this unseen data was 0.3461, i.e. approximately a third of the traces
were assigned the incorrect class o(i), each of which represented a different Hamming
weight. The recovery of the correct Hamming weight of the S-Box output does not in
itself return the key, it provides the attacker with a subset of keys. Therefore an amplified
TA is required to recover the secret s [186]. The set of attack traces is randomly split
up into 1 k subsets of 25 traces, and Equation 3.6 is applied to see if the key byte can
be recovered from the 25 traces. All 256 byte values are tested and combined with the
plaintext to calculate a hypothesis for Hamming weight of the S-Box output. The relevant
probabilities returned by the templates are selected, with Figure 3.2(a) showing the result
of an example attack with the correct key plotted in red. This attack is repeated for all
1 k subsets independently, with the success rate as defined in §2.8 plotted in Figure 3.2(b).
It is clear from this plot that 25 traces will allow you to recover the key byte with a
probability close to one for this particular setup.
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(b) Success rate : 1k sets.
Figure 3.2: Template testing.
3.2.4 Full Key Recovery vs Partial Key Recovery
It is worth mentioning that the success rate given in Figure 3.2(b) is only for a single byte
of the key. Repeating the attack 16 times against all the S-Boxes to recover the entire
key, it is clear from Figure 3.3(a) that each S-Box does not leak information equally. To
calculate the expected success rate for an arbitrary key byte from this setup, the average
of all 16 success rates is taken as shown by the solid blue line in Figure 3.3(b). For
comparison the success rate from the first S-Box as used previously is given as the solid
red line. The overall expected success rate for the entire key can then be calculated by
raising the expected byte success rate to the number of bytes in the key, i.e. in this case
16. The actual success rate is given as reference also by computing the product across
each of the individual key bytes and is quite similar as expected, with the difference due
to numerical round-off errors. This shows that the results of the key recovery for a single
byte cannot be arbitrary extrapolated to the key as a whole.
3.3 Practical Attack Considerations
As highlighted by [186], there are many practical issues to be considered when performing
a TA. Attack choices depend on both the quality and quantity of your data, and affect
both the error rate and computational complexity. A comparative analysis of various
parameters is now given using the output of the first S-Box of the first round as the target
value which allows the recovery of a single key byte, unless otherwise stated.
When comparing the effect of various parameters on the classification performance, it is
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Figure 3.3: Full key recovery.
often more convenient to use the error rate given a single trace rather than the success
rate of an amplified attack with multiple traces. Hence, where the secret value can be
recovered in a single trace, the error rate is used as the comparison metric.
3.3.1 Power Model
Building templates is not restricted to the Hamming weight of the target value alone.
Some common models that can be used and their properties are outlined below.
Single-bit model: The single-bit model targets the same leakage as the original DPA
paper [126]. That is, templates are built for a single bit of the target value.
Multi-bit model: This expands on the single-bit model by building templates for each
individual bit of the target value using the same set of power traces. These bits
are subsequently combined using the probability of their occurrence to allow byte
recovery.
Hamming weight model: This model, as used in the previous experiments, follows
what is thought to be an good model of the power consumption for the device at
hand. It assumes that the power consumption is proportional to the number of bits
set to 1 in the target value. This is a valid model where the bus of a microprocessor
is a constant value, as can often be the case due to pre-charging, or where the same
op-code is called prior to the data being loaded on the bus.
Hamming distance model: Not applicable here, but this model assumes that the power
consumption is proportional to the number of bit-flips between the current and
Profiling SCA on Crypto. Algorithms Neil Hanley
Section 3.3: Practical Attack Considerations 46
Single-bit Multi-bit Hamming weight Identity
Training 0.1118 0.1447 0.3180 0.0020
Testing 0.1165 0.1526 0.3477 0.2764
Table 3.1: Power model error rates.
previous value. This power model is generally more suitable for hardware based
attacks such as FPGAs or ASICs as demonstrated in [1].
Identity model: Here, the templates are built for the target intermediate value directly.
This incurs a greater computational complexity as more templates need to be trained
and classified, i.e. in the case of a byte-sized target value, 256 as opposed to 9
templates when using the Hamming weight model. Therefore additional training
traces are also required to accurately model the extra templates.
The experiment was rerun using 10 k training traces once again, with 20 features retained
for each model using the sosd method, and 1 k testing traces were used to calculate the
test error as given in Table 3.1. As feature selection is calculated with the mean µˆ(i) of
each class o(i), these 20 features are not necessarily the same across models. These values
represent the model classification error rather than the byte recovery error. Examining
Table 3.1, some interesting points appear. The first is that in all cases, the testing error
is worse than the training error which is as expected as the model is fit to the training
set. However, it is worth noting that the difference between the errors for the single-bit
model is only 0.0063, while for the identity model it is 0.2744. This is due to the fact
that on average 10 k ÷ 2 = 5 k traces are available to generate each single-bit template,
but only 10 k÷ 256 ≈ 40 are available to generate each identity template. Also a random
guess in single-bit case will give an expected error of 12 , while for the identity case it is
1
256 . Note that the multi-bit errors are greater than the single-bit, with this error value
taken as the mean for all 8-bits. This difference is due to the fact that not all bits will
leak information equally, similar to the byte leakage as previously shown. Most interesting
however, is that the Hamming weight error rates are much higher than that of the identity
model, even though the correct key cannot be determined from a single correct Hamming
weight classification, unlike the identity model case.
In Figure 3.4(a), the difference points of the trace that are used to generate the templates
are highlighted. For the bit models, the section of the trace around the MixColumns op-
eration from 5 → 6µs as bracketed by the green lines, seems to have the most data
dependency with only a small bit of the leakage due to the S-Box output itself, which
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occurs about 3.7µs as highlighted in red. For the Hamming weight model, leakage from
both operations is utilised, and for the identity model the strongest leakage comes from
the S-Box operation which contains a double peak unlike the other models. This double
peak is actually due to the data leakage on both the input and output of the S-Box. As
it is the only model where the inputs and outputs map uniquely, this second peak only
occurs for this model. The multi-bit case is not plotted, as it is 8 individual bit models
which will all be similar to the single-bit plot in Figure 3.4(a).
The overall key byte recovery success rate for the models is given in Figure 3.4(b). As
can be seen, the most accurate model for returning a key byte is the identity model due
to the extra information obtained by modelling the second peak, followed by the multi-bit
model. The multi-bit model is considerably more successful than the single-bit model as
much greater utilisation is made of the available leakage (similar to the difference between
single-bit DPA and enhanced DPA). Hence, unless otherwise specified, the identity model
is used in future experiments. In the case of the attacks on the AES S-Box, each class o(i)
represents a different byte value and |K| = 256.
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Figure 3.4: Power model.
3.3.2 Data Normalisation
Where data is badly conditioned, it can be worthwhile applying a data normalisation tech-
nique prior to feature selection. This prevents a single dominant feature with a large range
from having a disproportionate effect on the subsequent classification. Some normalisation
techniques are as follows:
Norm: This method makes no underlying assumption about the distribution of the data.
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Original Norm Range Scale Z-Score
Training 0.0021 0.0057 0.0017 0.0017 0.0016
Testing 0.2760 0.3790 0.2250 0.2250 0.2180
Table 3.2: Data normalisation error rates.
The mean of each data column xj is subtracted from itself, and is then divided by
its norm such that the features have roughly the same scale.
Range: The principal of this method is similar to that of the norm, however instead of
dividing by the norm of the column vector, the range of the data is used instead.
Scale: This method assumes the data has a uniform distribution with the different points
having distinct ranges. Scaling the data linearly transforms it such that it is in the
range [0, 1]
Z-Score: Assuming that the points of the trace are normally distributed with each point
in time having a distinct mean and variance, calculating the z-score involves sub-
tracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation so each point has zero
mean and unit standard deviation.
Other non-linear normalisation techniques such as taking the percentiles of the data might
be useful in certain scenarios, however as an underlying assumption of template attacks is
that the noise is Gaussian these are not considered. While the normalisation parameters for
the training set are estimated from the set itself, these parameters are then reused to scale
the testing set accordingly. This is different to the approach by Montminy et al. [154],
where the testing traces are normalised using parameters estimated from the test set
itself. As the objective here is to minimise the error given a single attack trace, it cannot
be assumed that multiple traces are available to accurately estimate the normalisation
parameters. Using templates built with 10 k traces and 20 features using the identity
model, the error rates for the different normalisation methods are given in Table 3.2. As
taking the z-score of the data returns the lowest empirical error, this is reused through the
thesis unless otherwise specified. Normalisation has an added advantage of leading to less
numerical errors when computing the templates, as well faster convergence when training
the machine learning techniques in Chapter 6. Note also that the slight difference for the
original error rate compared with Table 3.1 is due to the random selection of traces.
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3.3.3 Feature Selection
Selecting the points to use in building templates is a non-trivial task. Too many points and
the templates won’t be an accurate representation of the target value (i.e. the templates
will mostly be modelling random noise), and too few points will give poor classification
results. Different methods for ranking the points according to interesting leakage are now
examined:
Sum of squares of difference of means (sosd): This is the method that has been
used to date and is given in Equation 3.7.
Sum of squares of t-difference of means (sost): This method was suggested in [81]
when it was noticed that templates performed poorly when the training set size was
restricted. Student’s t-test is a statistical method for distinguishing two sets taking
into account the variance of the sets as well as the distance between the means.
This was also suggested as an alternative to the classical DOM attack as outlined
in §2.7.3. The points to build the templates are chosen as the largest returned by
Equation 3.8.
∆ =
|K−1|∑
i=1
|K|∑
j=i+1
 µˆ(i) − µˆ(j)√
(σˆ(i))
2
m(i)
−
(σˆ(j))
2
m(j)

2
(3.8)
Correlation: This is a logical extension to make for feature extraction given that both
previous methods can be used for classical DPA. As calculating the correlation with
the known intermediate value will show the points in time where that data is pro-
cessed, these points can then be chosen to build the templates. Pearson’s linear
correlation is used here, but for non-parametric data Spearman’s rank correlation
can be used. The equation for calculating the linear correlation coefficient has been
given previously in Equation 2.6.
Principal component analysis (PCA): This method of feature selection was intro-
duced for template attacks by Archambeau et al. in [11]. PCA is a data dimen-
sionality reduction technique which projects the traces into a subspace where the
principal directions are orthogonal to each other and ranked according to variability.
Only directions with a high relative rank are retained for template construction. It
is a linear transformation and computes the subspace directions using linear com-
binations of the original data space [63, Ch. 3]. A projection matrix P calculated
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according to Equation 3.9 [11], can be used to project both the training and test
traces into the subspace and all template calculations performed there. To calculate
P , the covariance matrix Σ of the centred means for each class is first calculated.
Taking the eigendecomposition of Σ to get the eigenvectors U and eigenvalues D,
then allows the calculation of P . Note that D is a diagonal matrix so can be inverted
element-wise.
µ¯ =
1
|K|
|K|∑
i=1
µˆ(i)
Σ =
1
|K|
|K|∑
i=1
(
µˆ(i) − µ¯
)(
µˆ(i) − µ¯
)⊤
ΣU = DU
P =
1√
|K|
µˆ U D−
1
2 (3.9)
The eigenvalues D can be used to select the directions representing a “large” vari-
ance. Alternatively the cumulative sum of the eigenvalues can be calculated, and
the number of components to be retained determined by how many are required to
reach a given percentage of the variance. As an example, the three eigenvectors cor-
responding to the three largest eigenvalues are given in Figure 3.5(a), for when PCA
is applied to the AES training set. As the transformation is computed via matrix
multiplication x˜ = xP , the first point of a projected trace is the weighted sum of
the original trace according to the weights of the first column of P , the second point
the weighted sum of the second transformation column etc..
Fisher’s linear discriminant: This method also transforms the data to a reduced sub-
space however this time the inter class to intra class ratio is maximised [203]. Where
PCA seeks the directions that best represent the data, Fisher’s linear discriminant
seeks the directions that allow for optimal separation of the data [63]. To calculate
the projection matrix, an inter-class scatter matrix ΣB and an intra-class scatter
matrix ΣW are first calculated. The projection matrix can then be calculated with
an eigendecomposition as shown in Equation 3.10.
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ΣB =
|K|∑
i=1
m(i)
(
µˆ(i) − µ¯
)(
µˆ(i) − µ¯
)⊤
ΣW =
|K|∑
i=1
m(i)∑
j=1
(
x(j,i) − µˆ(i)
)(
x(j,i) − µˆ(i)
)⊤
(
Σ
1
2
B Σ
−1
W Σ
1
2
B
)
U = DU
P = Σ
1
2
B U (3.10)
For a full description of Fishers’s linear discriminant in the context of SCA including
numerical optimisation tricks see [45, 203]. Once again after the transformation
matrix P is calculated, both training and testing traces are projected to the subspace
and the attack performed there. The first three columns of the transformation matrix
P are given in Figure 3.5(b). It can be seen that, similar to PCA, the features which
are assigned the greatest weights are those around the time 3.7µs which is where
the S-Box operation occurs. Note also that the maximum number of features that
can be returned is |K| − 1.
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Figure 3.5: Transformation vectors.
Other methods of feature selection have been proposed such as normalised inter-class
variance (NICV) [28] or the use of an F -test [45], however these are not considered here.
Using these methods as outlined above, the learning curves for the template training and
testing error rates are given in Figure 3.6(a) and Figure 3.6(b) respectively, with the
error plotted as a function of the number of retained features. These templates are built
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using the identity model and 10 k normalised training traces, while 1 k traces are used
for testing. As can be seen, the training error decreases with the number of features
retained until an error rate close to zero is achieved for all feature selection methods.
Conversely, while the testing error in Figure 3.6(b) initially decreases as features are
added, it starts to increase towards the end. This is due to an over-fitting of the templates
on the training set, hence the model doesn’t generalise well to unseen data. For the testing
error which is what we are interested in minimising, the use of Fisher’s linear discriminant
for dimensionality reduction gives clear classification performance advantages, hence is
used for feature selection for the following experiments.
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Figure 3.6: Effect of feature selection.
3.3.4 Training Set Size
The size of the required training set is an important parameter in the context of a TA,
especially where an attacker might be somehow bounded in the acquisition stage of the
profiling traces. An interesting and relevant question is how few traces are required for a
successful TA attack, this issue was explored in [68, 81, 205], or how low an error can be
achieved given unlimited traces. Figure 3.7 shows the learning curve for the error rate as
a function of the training set size. The training errors are given by the dashed lines, with
the test error given by the solid lines.
For the identity model plotted in red, 12 features are retained using Fisher’s linear dis-
criminant and it can be seen that increasing the training set size reduces the testing error
(as well as slightly increasing the training error) up to about 20 k samples, after which
the extra samples have little effect. Hence the addition of extra training samples is un-
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likely to further decrease the error. Where the training sample size is less than ≈ 7 k, the
noise covariance matrix Σ(i) for the |K| = 256 classes for each byte cannot be accurately
modelled as only . 7 k256 ≈ 27 samples per class are available. To evaluate classification
performance with smaller training set sizes, the multi-bit model using the sost method
of feature extraction was used as only two classes need to be estimated giving many more
samples per class. The addition of extra training samples has no effect on the multi-bit
model, however even with 1 k traces there are already ≈ 500 traces to model the leakage
of each bit. However the relatively high error rate of ≈ 0.22 means an amplified TA will
most likely be required. Note that the normalisation and feature selection parameters
were recalculated on the number of training samples under consideration each time.
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
# Training traces (k)
Er
ro
r r
at
e
 
 
Training : Multi−Bit : sost
Testing : Multi−Bit : sost
Training : Identity : Fisher’s
Testing : Identity : Fisher’s
Figure 3.7: Effect of training set size.
3.3.5 Target Intermediate Value
The chosen target intermediate value or operation has a large bearing on the success of
an attack. It is shown in [181] that the more resistant an S-Box is to linear cryptanalysis,
the more susceptible it is to CPA attacks. Generally, as the primary function of the S-
Box is to introduce non-linearity in the case of a block cipher, it can be a suitable candidate
function to attack in non-profiling attacks. A study of DPA against Boolean and arithmetic
operations is available in [133]. In the case of profiling attacks, such as TA, the S-Box too
is a suitable candidate function as shown in Figure 3.8. Here templates were built for the
first output byte of all AES functions up to round two1. The section of the power traces
consisting of communications between the PC and arm7 microprocessor board was not
1Note that recovery of the plaintext, MixColumns or round two input bytes will not allow key recovery,
the classification is only to illustrate the effect of selecting various intermediate values.
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considered for the attack, hence the classification of the plaintext and key reflect leakage
during the operation of the algorithm only. The training set size is 25 k samples, hence
only the identity model is used, and 12 features retained using Fisher’s linear discriminant.
When using the identity model, there is a bijective relationship between the round one
input and the S-Box bytes, hence building a template for one is equivalent to building a
template for the other (the error curve of the round one input is hidden by the plot of S-
Box ). The relative classification success of the S-Box operation compared to the others is
not solely due to the reasons outlined in [181]. The plaintext and MixColumns operations
perform poorly as each value is only used once in the algorithm. The key and sub-key
perform slightly better as, the key is stored in memory for reuse across different plaintexts
hence needs to be loaded prior to the AddRoundKey function, while the sub-key needs to be
computed prior to use (only the key rather than the expanded keys are stored in memory).
The S-Box output is subsequently reused four times in the MixColumns operation, as well
as utilising what leakage is relevant for the round input. Therefore more data-dependent
points where these bytes are processed are available.
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Figure 3.8: Error rates for various intermediate values.
3.3.6 Classification Methods
It is suggested in [145, Ch. 5] that in order to avoid numerical errors when inverting
the covariance matrix, as well as reducing computation time, that reduced templates are
used. A reduced template attack is where only the diagonal of the covariance matrix
is used (i.e. the variance of each feature), with all off-diagonal matrix elements set to
zero, which is essentially the Na¨ıve Bayes learning algorithm. Inverting the matrix then
simply consists of inverting each point on the diagonal individually, hence it also scales
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well with an increasing number of features. The underlying assumption behind this is
that the various leakages used to generate the templates are mostly independent, and the
information leakage due to taking the covariances into account is lost due to numerical
errors in the matrix inversion. To verify this assumption, the covariance matrices of the
entire 25 k training set are given in Figure 3.9. The 20 features in Figure 3.9(a) are chosen
through sost, while in Figure 3.9(b) they are chosen with Fisher’s linear discriminant. In
both cases the features are ordered from the from the most “informative” to the least.
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(b) Feature selection : Fisher’s linear discriminant
Figure 3.9: Training data covariance matrices.
In the sost case it is clear that there is a significant covariance between the difference
features hence the use of reduced templates will be sub-optimal. The diagonal (i.e. the
variance of each feature) is 1 due to the normalisation of the data. Where the features are
selected with Fisher’s linear discriminant however, the off diagonal elements are all zero
as the projection of the data to the subspace has de-correlated the various features. Hence
in this case the use of reduced templates will have little or no effect on the classification
performance. Note also that the variance of the transformed features increases as they
become less “informative”, as they contain a greater noise component.
A TA such that each class is modelled as a multivariate Gaussian with a mean vector
and covariance matrix, is known as quadratic discriminant analysis (QDA) in statistical
learning as detailed in [95, Ch. 4]. Another option, also detailed in [95, Ch. 4] is to assume
that all classes have the same covariance matrix which is known as LDA, which was also
suggested as a classifier for SCA in [45]. This fits the model of SCA as the covariance
matrix represents the noise on the traces, and there is no reason to believe that the different
classes representing data values would have different noise components.
The error rates for LDA, QDA, reduced LDA and QDA, and the Euclidean distance (this
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assumes the covariance matrix carries no information and it is set to the identity matrix)
are given for sost feature selection in Figure 3.10(a), and for Fisher’s linear discriminant
in Figure 3.10(b). The Euclidean distance performs the worst in both cases, for the case of
Fisher’s linear discriminant it performs no better than a random guess and is not shown
on the plot. While QDA initially performs relatively well, as the features which don’t
contribute as strongly to the classification performance are added, then numerical errors
occur as not enough traces are available to model the noise for those less informative points.
LDA performs strongly in both cases, with the reduced methods also performing equally
as well in Figure 3.10(b) where the data has been transformed such that the features are
strongly uncorrelated.
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Figure 3.10: Classification methods.
An interesting point is that the use of LDA as a classifier with a straightforward feature
selection method such as sost, performs equally as well as feature selection with Fisher’s
linear discriminant combined with any “reduced” classifier. LDA and Fisher’s linear dis-
criminant are closely related however so this is not too surprising (the terms are often
used interchangeably), with LDA seeking to assign a label to data and Fisher’s linear
discriminant looking the assign a continuous variable which allows efficient discrimination
of the data. Regardless of feature selection, in general LDA is a more efficient and robust
classifier than QDA for SCA and is used for future work unless otherwise specified.
3.3.7 Noise Effect
An important aspect of any SCA is how it performs in the presence of increased noise.
Additive noise is often used in conjunction with other countermeasures as a simple yet
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effective method to improve the resistance of a cryptographic implementation against SCA
(note that on its own, an adversary can overcome the addition of noise by simply utilising
more traces). Additionally different target devices will have greatly varying noise charac-
teristics, and acquisition setups or any on-chip parallel processing can an all contribute to
the difficulty of performing an attack. As the noise is assumed Gaussian (as previously
shown in Figure 2.4), averaging multiple traces with the same input can be used to reduce
it. However, in reality this is equivalent to requiring more traces to perform an attack
hence is not used here.
As previously mentioned in §2.5, the SNR can be used to measure the relative strength
of the signal component compared to the noise component of a trace. Using a training
set of 25 k traces each trace is replaced by its equivalent empirical mean, and increasing
additive Gaussian noise is added to evaluate to SNR calculated as shown in Figure 3.11(a).
The SNR of the actual traces is also given for reference by the red circle. The addition
of Gaussian noise to mean-free traces has been used previously in papers such as [188] to
examine the effect of increasing noise on attacks. In Figure 3.11(b), TAs are performed
on the traces with artificially added noise using a training set of 25 k traces, the identity
model, Fisher’s linear discriminant to select 20 features, and LDA to classify the data. It
can be seen that as the noise increases, eventually the testing error rate goes to 1 and a
TA is no longer possible. The error rate for the actual noise is also marked for reference,
also by the circles.
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Figure 3.11: Effect of noise.
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Fclk Fs Filter Reduction
PIC 4MHz 250MSs-1 Low-pass 6MHz Max point per clock
8051 11MHz 250MSs-1 Low-pass 16MHz Max point per clock
arm7 7.37MHz 250MSs-1 Band-pass 6.87→ 7.87MHz Max point per clock
Table 3.3: Power trace acquisition & pre-processing parameters.
Training traces (m) 9 k
Testing traces 1 k
Data normalisation z-score
Model single-bit, Hamming weight, identity
Feature extraction sost
Number of features 2→ 100
Target Byte First byte of S-Box
Table 3.4: Template training parameters.
3.4 Platform Effect
Like all SCA, TAs are platform dependent. Following on from the examination of noise,
three separate software platforms are now attacked to highlight differences due the to un-
derlying target platform, and how those differences will affect subsequent analysis. The
software AES target platforms are a low-cost PIC smartcard, a low-cost Atmel 8051 mi-
crocontroller2, and the arm7 microprocessor chip used previously for reference. While the
template training parameters are kept constant between the platforms, difference acqui-
sition setups were not and are given in Table 3.3. The different filters parameters were
selected through empirical evaluation on a per device basis.
In all cases, the parameters from Table 3.4 are used to build the templates. Restricting
the number of training traces to 9 k was required for the comparison, as only 10 k traces
in total were available for two of the target platforms, and the sost method of feature
selection was chosen over Fisher’s linear discriminant as the number of features for the Bit
and Hamming weight models would have been restricted to 1 and 8 respectively otherwise.
It is clear in Figure 3.12 that the identity model performs well on all platforms where
enough features are taken into consideration. As mentioned previously in §3.3.5, the
extra information contained at the S-Box input helps in this regard. Note also that
2These power traces were supplied by Dr. Elisabeth Oswald of the University of Bristol while conducting
the research in [92]. They are a subset of the traces used extensively in [145]
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further traces for the Bit and Hamming weight models are required to recover the key
byte. It is interesting to note however, that compared to the PIC smartcard and 8051
microcontroller platforms, the Hamming weight model clearly does not accurately reflect
the power consumption of the arm7 microprocessor (This is also borne out in a CPA
attack which has a lower absolute correlation peak for the correct key guess compared
to the other platforms). Hence, while broad recommendations can be made with regards
to how to approach an TA for a given device, analysis is required to find the optimum
parameters.
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Figure 3.12: Testing error on various software platforms.
3.5 Model Validity
A pertinent question when examining TAs, is how valid is the assumption that templates
built using one device are transferable to extract keys from another device. Many publi-
cations to date assume that the leakage from the target device is identical to that of the
training device (i.e. the same device is used to acquire both training and testing traces).
In [188], the authors use the concept of perceived information (PI) to account for discrep-
ancies between the template models and actual target device leakage. The targets of their
experimentation are nano-scale devices however, and inter-chip power variation increases
as the chip fabrication process decreases. In [69], the authors examine the portability of
templates by comparing acquisitions taken from the same chip at different times (they
compare two sets of traces, taken four years apart with different acquisition setups) and
supply voltage. Rather than the PI approach, they use attack metrics to justify their
work, which is also the approach used here. Also, in [154] PIC smartcards are used to
examine the validity of electromagnetic emanation based templates as it has been shown
that electromagnetic emissions can be used as a form of physically unclonable function
(PUF) [51], hence the leakage must have some device dependency. In [139], three micro-
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processors from each of {350, 130, 90} nm manufacturing processes (i.e. nine in total) are
used to evaluate the building of templates on one device and testing on another for various
families.
Here 20 of the PIC smartcards, as used in the previous section, are used to examine power
based templates, with the work in this section forming the basis of [91]. As mentioned, the
clock supplied to the card is 4MHz, and the sampling rate is 250MSs-1. For each card, 10 k
power traces with random plaintexts and random keys are acquired. As no suitable trigger
signal is available, the communication bus is used to trigger the oscilloscope leading to
the traces being widely out of sync with each other. Each set is individually synchronised
using cross-correlation after filtering, before reduction to the maximum point per clock
cycle. Finally the sets of traces are aligned using euclidean distances between the means
of each set.
While the Hamming weight model best fits the PIC smartcard as shown in Figure 3.12(a),
the templates are built for the identity model as this allows for a more concise comparison
based on the recovery of a key byte. Templates were first built with 9 k traces from each
set individually, and these used to classify 1 k traces from every other set. To train the
templates the z-scores of the data is first taken, then Fisher’s linear discriminant is used
to project the feature set into a reduced subspace retaining 20 features. When calculating
the z-scores, it is important to note that the mean and standard deviation normalisation
values for the testing data must be taken from the training set, i.e. it is not assumed
that enough traces are present in the attack stage to accurately estimate the mean and
standard deviation of the test set which is the approach taken in [154]. As an advantage of
TA is that keys can be recovered with few or even a single trace, if many traces are present
to accurately calculate the z-score, then a regular DPA attack can simply be performed.
The top left to bottom right diagonal in Figure 3.13(a) is the error rate when classifying
the devices using templates generated by the same device. This can be viewed as a baseline
‘best case’ scenario (the green coloured bars in Figure 3.14 also display these values). It
is clear from the image that classification is not even between all devices. For example,
building templates with devices 〈1, 2, 11, 12, 16, 17, 20〉 generally return a higher error rate
regardless of what device is being tested, as can be seen by the “redder” colouring. On
the contrary however, templates built with devices 〈6− 8〉 allow for a low error rate when
attacking any device as indicated by the blue.
It is interesting to note that pairs of devices don’t always have similar classification as
might be expected. For example, when device 1 is being attacked, building templates with
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Figure 3.13: Template attacks using different devices.
device 13 returns a high error rate, while building with device 16 gives a low error. It is
reasonable to expect that a somewhat similar relationship will hold when attacking device
2, however in that case both devices 13 and 16 give a low error rate. This can be further
explored by examining Figure 3.13(b) where the point in time at the output of the S-Box
is manipulated, selected via the sost method, is represented by a box-plot for each of the
20 PIC smartcards. This allows the difference in the mean values, as well as the spread
of the points as a whole, to be easily compared. It can be seen that the mean of device
1 is below the average, and less than the mean of both devices 13 and 16, however much
closer to device 16. The mean of device 2 however falls in between those two means. This
gives a rough indication as to why, counter-intuitively, the classification of pairs of devices
don’t always follow each other as expected.
A more general way to generate the templates, is to use traces from many devices as
suggested in [188]. Figure 3.14 shows error rates where 9 k randomly selected traces from
across 19 devices are used to generate the templates, and used to classify 1 k traces from
the other device. Only 9 k in total are selected rather than 9 k from each to allow for
a fair comparison with the same training set size. For comparison, the average error
rate of generating the templates with difference devices, and the error rate of generating
the templates with the same device are also given. When generating the templates from
multiple devices, there is a substantial reduction in the error across most devices, with set
18 the only set retaining a substantial error.
This section highlights that the presumption that templates are immediately applicable
to any other ‘identical’ device is not entirely accurate. It must also be kept in mind
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Figure 3.14: Multi-device templates.
that the PIC smartcard cards used in this work are inherently quite basic devices so are
likely to more ‘similar’ than other devices such as the arm7 microprocessor3. Overall
performing TAs while using the same device to acquire both training and testing traces
has merits however, especially for penetration or standardisation labs, as it can be viewed
as worst case scenario testing, i.e. real world performance is likely to be somewhat less than
projected. From an adversarial point of view however, if multiple identical devices can be
used to attack a separate unseen device, then the attack performance can be improved.
3.6 Conclusion
TAs have been extensively examined in this chapter, with various training options ex-
plored with respect to how they effect the resultant classification error. The effect of
increasing noise and different target platforms was also examined. Finally the validity of
the underlying assumption that an identical device is available is explored using favourable
devices.
It was found that taking the z-scores of the data should be the first step in any profiling
attack as it helps reduce numerical errors by scaling the data. Using a pooled covariance
matrix with LDA rather than the originally suggested QDA, improves both the classifica-
tion performance and reduces the computational complexity as only a single matrix needs
to be inverted. The use of a single covariance matrix to model the noise is justified as the
noise is independent of the feature components of each class. Looking to directly recover
3The PIC smartcards were used for the comparison rather than a different device such as the arm7
microprocessor as many cards could be purchased due to their cheap cost.
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the byte component as opposed to the Hamming weight can also be advantageous when
attacking a software target as there will be multiple points in time where a linear function
of the byte will be computed on which can also leak side-channel information that can be
utilised by the model. Note when targeting hardware designs this is unlikely to be the case
due to the varying initial register state, and following the Hamming distance model will
possibly give better performance. Although feature selection is a vital step of an attack,
it was shown that simpler methods such as sost can perform as well as transforming the
data through Fisher’s linear discriminant, when LDA is used as a classifier and a larger
number of features are retained. The larger number of features in the original set doesn’t
necessarily contain more leakage information however, as the projected traces are linear
combinations of the entire original data set.
While different classification methods are looked at such as quadratic and linear discrimi-
nant analysis, as well as reduced TAs, a notable exclusion from this chapter is alternatives
to TAs such as SMs [195] or SVMs [103, 135]. These are dealt with, along with other
machine learning methods in Chapter 6.
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Trace Only Template Attacks - AES
4.1 Introduction
In the TAs conducted in the previous chapter, it is assumed that either the plaintext or
ciphertext is available to use in conjunction with the power traces to recover the key. This
generally is true also of most non-profiling attacks attacks against symmetric algorithms.
In this chapter, TAs that only require a power trace are presented, i.e. no plaintext or
ciphertext information is required, the key is recovered entirely from the power trace. This
is achieved in two different ways, firstly by attacking more than one intermediate value in
the trace [92], and secondly by building templates on the key value directly.
In some respects, building templates on multiple intermediate values is closely related to
algebraic side-channel attacks [189]. Algebraic attacks were first proposed as a powerful
cryptanalysis technique against block ciphers [55]. They were subsequently extended to
a powerful class of side-channel attacks firstly against the block cipher Present [189], and
then AES [187]. Algebraic attacks make use of SAT solvers to solve an over-defined system
of equations to recover key information from a single trace in an unknown plaintext or
ciphertext adversarial model. Templates are used to provide inputs to the SAT solver based
on the power model of the device, from multiple intermediate stages of the encryption.
Recently, the attacks were extended to include probabilistic intermediate values [168] to
allow for non-ideal template classification which allows for use in practical scenarios.
In the attacks presented here, the restriction on recovering the key from a single trace is
relaxed in order to reduce the complexity of the attack which makes use of SAT solvers.
This is felt to be a reasonable trade-off as while recovering the key from a single power
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trace highlights the power of SCA, the overheads of having a different key for every block
of data to be encrypted are substantial so it is likely to be applicable in specific, real-world
scenarios such as challenge response protocols. Hence there will be many cryptographic
devices which will encrypt multiple blocks per key. It must be noted too also, that de-
pending on the power model, i.e. if there is a bijection between the target intermediate
values based on a function of the key, and the noise of the device under attack, the key
can also be recovered from a single trace in the simpler attacks presented here.
Comparing to classical non-profiled attacks, attacking multiple intermediate values or
operations can be viewed as a form of higher-order attack [150]. However here multiple,
multi-variate attacks are performed, while in non-profiled attacks a combination function
is often used to combine the data prior to performing a univariate attack (for a more
detailed discussion on non-profiled higher-order attacks see [208]). While higher-order
attacks look to overcome masking type countermeasures, here we look to remove the need
for plaintext or ciphertext. The effect of the attack when the masking countermeasure is
used is also examined in §4.3.
While it may not be immediately obvious why key recovery is useful if the corresponding
ciphertext isn’t known, there are many scenarios in which this could be useful. A concrete
example is when data is encrypted in Counter Mode [66], as shown in Figure 4.1. Here,
even if the ciphertext is known, the input or output of the encryption block itself is not
known, so in the context of a SCA the ciphertext is essentially unknown. The nonce and
counter values must still be known or guessed for plaintext recovery however. Knowledge
of the key could allow an adversary to verify any guess made at the counter values,
or even possibly perform a DPA attack against the inputs. A non-profiled attack which
doesn’t require knowledge of the plaintext, ciphertext or initial counter value was presented
in [105] based on the sequential nature of the counter provided the input to the block
cipher. Another attack not requiring plaintext values was presented in [143] against the
key schedule, where multiple scenarios are presented where no plaintext knowledge is
available, such as smart card applications employed by banks, credit card companies, pay-
tv broadcasters etc.While the precise input value might not be known due to randomness,
the protocol used or error-correcting-codes for example, the underlying cipher used such
as AES or triple-DES (3-DES) might be recognisable through the power trace patterns.
In this chapter, an outline of how the recover key bytes from AES without any knowledge
of plaintext or ciphertext values with the use of TA is given in §4.2, with the expected
number of traces required derived in §4.2.1. An empirical evaluation is carried out on two
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Figure 4.1: Block cipher counter mode of operation.
software targets in §4.2.2, with practical improvements to the attack suggested in §4.2.3.
The effect of the masking countermeasure on the attack is discussed in §4.3, as well as
strategies to overcome it. Finally an efficient TA on the key schedule is presented in §4.4.
4.2 Trace only Key Recovery
If we consider a straightforward implementation of a block cipher, a TA can be used
to extract key information without using any known plaintext (or ciphertext) values by
targeting two separate intermediate states in the encryption algorithm.
When attacking a block cipher a natural choice would be to build templates on y and z,
where z = S(y ⊕ s) where S is a substitution table, and s is some portion of the secret
key or sub-key. In the case of AES, y, z and s would each be eight bit values and 〈y, z〉
could be given by, but not limited to, the red or green pairs of lines in Figure 4.2.
Sub
Bytes
Mix
Column
Shift
Rows
Sub
Bytes
Plaintext
Key Subkey
Round 1
Figure 4.2: AES unknown plaintext attack target.
Where the templates are built for the intermediate value itself rather than the Hamming
weight, and the intermediate targets are chosen such that there is a bijective function
between them and the key value, the key can be recovered in a single trace. As shown
in §3.3.5 however, in the specific case of AES, due to the linear properties of the Mix-
Columns operation, the error rate is quite high when using the identity model. This can
be expected to apply to other symmetric algorithms also as examined in [181]. Where the
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templates are built following the Hamming weight model, an attacker would be interested
in constructing templates to identify the Hamming weight of y and z and using this to
derive s. If the second template is built on z, where z occurs before the substitution table
(i.e. z = y ⊕ s), the key cannot be extracted as there is a linear relationship between the
two template sets and a unique value cannot be determined.
An advantage for an attacker is that the attack can be applied to any round of a block
cipher, allowing countermeasures that are implemented on certain rounds, such as the
initial or final rounds, such as suggested with masking in [6, 8], to be circumvented. An
informal discussion is now given of the expected number of observations an attacker would
be required to make to derive s if applying this attack using the Hamming weight model
when targeting the S-Box function of AES is conducted. Of course, if the templates are
built for the identity model then, given “clean” traces with a high SNR, the key bytes
can be recovered from a single trace. However due to the greater separation required to
distinguish between 256 rather than 9 templates, this will be somewhat less robust and
more susceptible to noise for the MixColumns operation.
4.2.1 Computing the Number of Key Hypotheses for AES
Assuming templates are built for the Hamming weight of an intermediate value and that
they are correctly classified each time, the amount of possible values that y and z can
take can be computed from the Hamming weight h as
(
b
h
)
, where b is given by ⌈log2(|K|)⌉,
where K is again the set y and z can be drawn from. Trivially, we can say that if either
y or z have a Hamming weight of 0 or b, then the number of hypotheses returned for the
key will be dictated by the Hamming weight of the other variable. For a given pair of
observations, the number of valid key hypothesis returned can be computed by counting
all the valid combinations when the inverse S-Box is applied to z. The number of valid
key bytes for a pair of Hamming weight observations is given in Table 4.1.
The overall expectation can be computed from this by multiplying each table entry by
the probability of it occurring, i.e.
( bHW(y))·( bHW(z))
22 b
, and computing the sum of the result.
In the case of the b = 8 as is being examined, this produces an expected number of key
hypotheses for a single observed pair, HW(y) and HW(z), to be 246.5. This means that one
would expect to acquire log2(256/246.5) = 0.0545 bits of information from one observed
pair, and to derive all eight bits would therefore be expected to require 8/0.0545 = 146.743
observations. This is assuming that the Hamming weight is correctly identified every time,
so this can be viewed as the expected lower bound on the number of traces required.
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HW(y)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 1 8 28 56 70 56 28 8 1
1 8 54 163 219 236 218 153 58 8
2 28 146 251 256 256 256 249 153 28
3 56 222 256 256 256 256 256 226 56
HW(z) 4 70 244 256 256 256 256 256 246 70
5 56 222 256 256 256 256 256 226 56
6 28 146 251 256 256 256 249 153 28
7 8 54 163 219 236 218 153 58 8
8 1 8 28 56 70 56 28 8 1
Table 4.1: The number of key hypotheses.
4.2.2 Experimental Results
To experimentally verify the attack, the Atmel 8051 microcontroller traces from §3.4 are
used due as their leakage closely follows the Hamming weight model. Looking at the
expected error rate for the S-Box as previously shown in Figure 3.12(b), it is clear that
the identity model also leads to a very low error rate so the attack is conducted for both
models. To re-iterate, the traces were acquired with a clock frequency of 11MHz and a
sampling rate of 250MSs-1. The mean of each trace was subtracted and it was then filtered
with a low-pass filter with a cut-off frequency of 16MHz.
Correlation Analysis
The correlation coefficient is useful sanity check to perform in order to determine the leak-
age from a given function and/or intermediate variable. The success or otherwise of a TA
cannot however, be inferred by the strength of the correlation coefficient. Concentrating
on the first possible attack target pair from Figure 4.2, i.e. the plaintext input and S-Box
output, Pearson’s correlation is calculated with the knowledge of the correct intermediate
values in order to gauge the respective leakage of each value as shown in Figure 4.3.
There are two interesting points to take from Figure 4.3. Firstly, the correlation peaks for
the Hamming weight model are close to one, and are higher than their respective identity
model peaks which verifies that the power consumption closely follows the Hamming weight
model, and secondly, there are many more peaks, in both models, for the S-Box operation
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Figure 4.3: Correlation of intermediate target values → 1 k traces.
than for the plaintext where the S-Box output is re-used in the MixColumns function.
Intuitively, one would then expect a higher error rate in the classification of the plaintext
than the S-Box as fewer data-dependent points are available to generate the templates.
Template Attack
As only 10 k traces in total were available, the set was split into two sets of 5 k, one for
training and one for testing. The sost method of feature selection was used to select 30
points of interest to build the templates, with this value chosen from the learning curve
in Figure 3.12(b). The z-scores of the trace set were taken prior to feature selection and
the templates were built for both the Hamming weight and identity models. LDA with
the pooled covariance matrix is used as a classifier.
The separate set of 5 k testing traces were then used to conduct the attack, split into 25
distinct sets of 200 randomly selected traces without replacement. This was to ensure that
no short term acquisition effects could adversely effect the results. As the plaintext inputs
are random uniformly distributed numbers, each key probability can be multiplied on a
trace by trace basis for key recovery over a number of traces. In an ideal scenario when a
key hypothesis is classified as incorrect, it has a probability of 0 so will subsequently be
eliminated by multiplication. However, in a practical attack, the correct Hamming weight
is not classified with a probability of 1, with incorrect values consequently 0. Therefore,
keys are not ruled out on a trace by trace basis, but instead are multiplied by a smaller
probability.
A single instant of an attack against the 8051 microcontroller when the Hamming weight
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model is used is shown in Figure 4.4(a). After ≈ 60 traces the correct key byte has a
significantly higher probability than the incorrect keys, and the probability is close to one
after ≈ 100 traces. The success rate as averaged over 25 sets is given in Figure 4.4(b), and
while 25 is a relatively small number to average over, the trend in the data is still clear. The
empirically calculated expected number of traces required for a successful attack follows
the theoretically calculated value of 146.7 quite well. This indicates that the Hamming
weight for both the plaintext and S-Box is classified correctly the majority of the time. A
closer inspection of the error rates for each individual Hamming weight shows that this is
the case. In Table 4.2 the Hamming weight error between the actual and estimated values
are given for both the plaintext and S-Box cases. When the attack was performed using
the identity model, both target bytes were classified correctly nearly every time, with the
error is given in Table 4.3. Hence the key was correctly recovered from only a single power
trace over 99% of the time.
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
# Traces
 
 
Correct key
Incorrect keys
(a) Single attack instance
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1s
t  O
rd
er
 s
uc
ce
ss
 ra
te
# Traces
(b) Success rate over 25 sets
Figure 4.4: Unknown plaintext attack on 8051 with Hamming weight model.
Conducting the attack against the arm7 microprocessor software implementation of AES
the attack is not so successful however, with keys only recovered successfully sporadically
when using the Hamming weight model, hence it is not plotted here (the success rate after
250 traces was ≤ 0.1). The same template generation parameters were used except 50
rather than 30 features were retained. Also, this time a larger trace set was available so
25 k training traces were used, and a separate set of 25 k traces were used for testing, split
into 100 sets of 250 traces. Again, inspecting the Hamming weight error rates as shown
in Table 4.2, it is clear that intermediate values are classified much less successfully than
in the case of the 8051 microcontroller, especially so for the plaintext. Therefore the error
in the cumulative probability of the keys prevents the correct one being identified.
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HW 8051 arm7
Error Plaintext S-Box Plaintext S-Box
0 0.9992 1.0000 0.2716 0.6155
1 0.0008 0.0000 0.4394 0.3628
2 0.0000 0.0000 0.2148 0.0211
3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0611 0.0005
4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0113 0.0001
Table 4.2: Comparison of Hamming weight errors.
8051 arm7
Plaintext S-Box Plaintext S-Box
Error 0.0082 0.0082 0.9868 0.0320
Table 4.3: Comparison of byte errors.
Examination of the model error rates in the previous chapter such as in Figure 3.12(c),
shows that this poor classification performance on the arm7 microprocessor when using
the Hamming weight model should not be too surprising. The same figure does show
however that using the identity model gives a much lower error rate. The attack on the
arm7 microprocessor was re-run using the same parameters except using the identity
model instead with the results given in Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: Unknown plaintext attack on arm7 microprocessor with identity model.
The extremely poor classification of the plaintext values on the arm7 microprocessor
as shown in Table 4.3, requires that multiple traces can be expected to be required to
recover the secret key, unlike the successful recovery with only a single trace for the 8051
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microcontroller. This low classification rate is in line with the results from §3.3.5 where
the classification of various target intermediate values were compared. On the one hand
it is quite surprising that the attack works due to the fact that the plaintext is classified
correctly so infrequently, however as noted previously, an incorrect classification does not
mean that the correct plaintext value has been discarded, rather that it was not assigned
the highest probability for that trace. Over a number of traces, eventually the correct
value will be chosen with a greater frequency as shown in Figure 4.5(b), however the
success of the attack cannot be guaranteed.
4.2.3 S-Box Only Attack
On the arm7 microprocessor platform, given the discrepancy between the classification
of the S-Box operation and the plaintext or MixColumns operations (Figure 3.8 shows
that the classification performance of the MixColumns operation is similar to that of the
plaintext), it makes sense to see can the key be recovered while solely targeting the S-Box
operation.
Looking at the AES description in Appendix A, we can see that the MixColumns input
to the AddRoundKey function, depends on 4 S-Box outputs. Therefore to recover a single
sub-key byte, templates have to be built for 4 S-Boxes in round r and a single S-Box in
round r+1 as illustrated in Figure 4.6. The four recovered bytes are then used to calculate
the MixColumns operation output to allow for sub-key recovery. As the key expansion
operation for AES is reversible, the recovery of a full round sub-key allows an attacker to
learn the secret key.
This method of applying the attack introduces some restrictions however, as the Hamming
weight model can no longer be used due to the fact that the combination of all possible per-
mutation inputs to the MixColumns operation doesn’t reduce the search space. Likewise,
key probabilities from different traces can no longer be combined either, as combining the
probabilities of each permutation of the 4 bytes doesn’t allow for any one value to achieve
a higher probability. In the previous attack strategy, incorrect keys were still retained and
the cumulative probabilities removed it from contention. However, if targeting 4 bytes to
generate the MixColumns output rather than the output itself, there are 232 combinations
to keep track of which is extremely computationally intensive1. A consequence of this is
that there is no direct way to combine multiple traces for an amplified TA for key recovery
1While not computationally infeasible, the effort required would make it unlikely that this would be
the most efficient method for key recovery.
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Figure 4.6: Target S-Boxes to extract the first sub-key byte.
bar majority voting, so where possible the keys should be extracted from a single trace.
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Figure 4.7: Success rate for each sub-key byte.
As each sub-key is dependent on four S-Boxes from round r and a single S-Box from
round r+1, any time a single S-Box is classified incorrectly from round r, 4 sub-keys will
be incorrectly guessed. Figure 4.7 gives the success rate for each of the 16 sub-key bytes
calculated using the method described for round 1 of AES on the arm7 microprocessor
platform. It is interesting to note that the first 4 sub-keys are classified correctly signifi-
cantly more often than the other sub-keys. A closer examination of the individual S-Box
errors in Table 4.4 explains why, as S-Boxes 〈1, 6, 11, 16〉 from round 1 all have very low
error rates, and due to the ShiftRows operation these are the 4 bytes that are used by
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S-Box
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 0.0087 0.1088 0.0753 0.0752 0.1271 0.0037 0.1555 0.1020
2 0.0104 0.0490 0.1103 0.0704 0.1068 0.0075 0.1632 0.1491
S-Box
Round 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 0.1170 0.0731 0.0050 0.1209 0.1279 0.1194 0.0797 0.0108
2 0.1911 0.1232 0.0124 0.1941 0.1931 0.1190 0.1467 0.0098
Table 4.4: Comparison of S-Box classification errors.
the MixColumns operation to calculate the input the the AddRoundKey operation for the
first four bytes.
The overall success rate for a given sub-key byte in this experiment can be approximately
estimated as (1−0.0927)5 = 0.6149, where 0.0927 is the expected error rate averaged over
all 32 S-Boxes from Table 4.4. This compares with the empirically calculated value of
0.6525 through direct calculation of the estimated MixColumns values. The discrepancy
between the values, while small, is still relatively larger than might be expected given the
sample size (10 k traces were used to estimate the error in this case), however this is due
to the fact that each S-Box classification from round 1 affects 4 sub-key bytes, which was
not taken into account.
4.3 Application to Masking
As outlined in [145], there are two main approaches to counteract power and electro-
magnetic attacks, hiding and masking. Hiding looks to obscure the amplitude of data-
dependent leakage, for example with additive noise to decrease the SNR or custom logic
styles [140] to equalise the power consumption. Alternatively traces can be desynchronised
in the time domain, for example via shuﬄing of operations or randomising the clock. Each
countermeasure has specific time, memory, area and power trade-offs depending on the
user requirements or projected attacker model, and must be carefully selected to minimise
any potential leakage. These type of countermeasures are generally applied in conjunction
with some methods from the second class of countermeasures, masking [7, 41, 85, 150].
Masking, or secret sharing [161], are algorithmic level countermeasures which seek to break
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the link between the intermediate value that is being processed and the power consump-
tion by randomising the value for every encryption run. This prevents an adversary being
able to hypothesise on intermediate values to perform a DPA attack. Of course such ran-
domisation must be removed prior to the end of the algorithm to ensure correct operation.
Therefore, there can be a significant performance and memory penalty incurred in keeping
track of masks, and the number and updating of masks must be tailored to the device at
hand. Common methods of masking are additive, affine, boolean, and multiplicative. It
must be noted however, that while hiding and masking countermeasure combine to make
an adversaries job considerably harder if implemented correctly, there is no technique that
can guarantee perfect side-channel resistance against higher-order attacks [150] or more
advanced power models such as those which take into account glitching [147]. A designer
seeks to implement countermeasures such that the benefit of breaking the device is not
worth the effort to do so.
Examining Boolean masking, anywhere an intermediate state is stored in memory, it is
xored with some random value that varies for each execution. This random value is
chosen to be a convenient size for a given block cipher2, e.g. for AES this would typically
be an 8-bit value because of the S-Box function. The target equation would then become:
z ⊕ τ = S′(y ⊕ s⊕ τ) = S(y ⊕ s)⊕ τ (4.1)
where τ is a random value generated for each execution of the implementation of AES.
This is illustrated in Figure 4.8. Note this is not the only way to implement masking, for
example in [7] the output of the masked S-Box function would be given as S(y ⊕ s)⊕ τ ′,
where τ ′ is a different mask. However for the purposes of the analysis this is the method
we focus on. As previously mentioned, masking inner and outer rounds only as suggested
in [6, 8] can be trivially overcome using the proposed attack, however the application of
masking in this way has also been shown to be weak in the context of regular DPA [89]
and is not recommended.
Using templates against masked implementations of AES was originally examined in [173,
178], as well as a different approach using Gaussian Mixture Models in [134]. In all these
attacks the plaintext is required however. To attack a masked implementation of AES with
unknown inputs where the target device follows the Hamming weight power model, the
observations become HW(y⊕τ) and HW(z⊕τ). There will be some values of τ that will not
be possible given a pair of observations (dictated by the structure of the function S), the
2This applies for other masking methods also.
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Figure 4.8: Boolean masking for AES.
simplest method of evaluating the expected number of hypotheses returned by evaluating
a pair of observations is to again count all the possibilities as given in Table 4.5.
HW(y ⊕ τ)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 163 254 256 256 256 256 256 254 163
1 254 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 254
2 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256
3 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256
HW(z ⊕ τ) 4 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256
5 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256
6 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256
7 254 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 254
8 163 254 256 256 256 256 256 254 163
Table 4.5: The number of masked key hypotheses.
As described in §4.2.1, the overall expectation can be computed from this by multiplying
each table entry by the probability of it occurring, i.e.
( bHW(y⊕τ))·( bHW(z⊕τ))
22 b
, and computing
the sum of the result. This produces an expected number of key hypotheses for an ob-
served H(y ⊕ τ) and H(z ⊕ τ) to be 255.9. This means that one would expect to acquire
log2(256/255.992) = 4.299 × 10
−5 bits of information from one pair of observations, and
to derive all 8 bits would therefore be expected to require 8/4.299× 10−5 ≈ 186k samples,
once again assuming the Hamming weight is correctly identified each time.
Examining this in the context of the identity model, each observation pair will return
163 valid keys, i.e. the same as when the Hamming weight observations in Table 4.5
are both either 〈0, 8〉. Following the analysis above, this gives an expected number of key
hypothesis for an observed y⊕τ and z⊕τ pair to be 163×256
2
2562
= 163, giving log2(256/163) =
0.6513 bits of information. Assuming that each value is correctly classified each time, then
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(8/0.6513) ≈ 12.3 traces are required to successfully extract the correct key value.
4.3.1 Attacking Masked Implementations
Eliminating the Mask
To successfully attack a masked implementation while using the Hamming weight model,
an attacker would be required to construct a third set of templates on τ . A known plaintext
version of this attack is described in [173]. In the unknown plaintext scenario, the attack
is restricted to the first round only, as one of the templates must be built on y before it is
masked, not y⊕ τ which would allow any round to be targeted. In the case of building the
templates for y⊕ τ , removing the mask from both y⊕ τ and z⊕ τ by xoring both sets of
values with the third template on the mask τ , limits the amount the valid key-space can
be reduced when subsequently combining the values after the removal of the mask which
prevents key extraction. On the other hand, by using templates built on τ to just remove
the mask on z by xoring all possible combinations together, then the templates based on
y can be used to extract the secret data s in z = S(y ⊕ s) as before. The attack reverts
as the previously explained method without masking, at the cost of extra traces being
required to deal with the extra unknown value τ . Hence, similar to the result presented
in [173], Boolean masking does not theoretically prevent key extraction in the context of
an unknown plaintext template attack, but the attack will be device dependent. However
extra traces will be required regardless of the device under attack.
Extending this to the identity model, if templates could be built for τ , y⊕τ (or simply y as
in the Hamming weight case), and z⊕τ , then the key can be trivially extracted with a single
trace if the values are successfully classified, as the mask can simply be removed. However
previous experiments have shown that successful TAs against intermediate values other
than the S-Box are non-trivial classification problems, and the extension of the attack to
the S-Box only attack of §4.2.3 is not feasible as each byte will have a different mask value.
The validity of being able to build templates for the random mask values is also open
to question. Ideally the masks would be generated internally on a secure device, so even
though an attacker posses an identical device to generate the templates, knowledge of the
mask value would be still unknown. However, in the context of worst case analysis it
makes sense to give an attacker this capability. For example collision-based attacks [196]
with known data could be used to estimate the mask values, or if there is the capability
to program the identical device, then knowledge of the mask values could be read out
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through some known function.
Predicting the Plaintext
It has also been shown in [105] that DPA is possible against an implementation of a block
cipher where a counter is part of the plaintext, e.g. counter mode used for random number
generation [66]. The initial value of the counter does not need to be known for an attacker
to mount an attack against an implementation where no countermeasures are present. The
same technique could be used to guess the values of a counter present in the plaintext to
guess values of y such that information can be derived in a similar manner, by evaluating
all the possible values of τ and z ⊕ τ , from templates constructed on y ⊕ τ and z ⊕ τ .
The advantage of this attack over eliminating the mask is that templates only need to be
constructed on two points, however it is assumed the input can be accurately predicted
somehow.
4.4 Building Templates On the Key
SCAs against the key schedule are somewhat under-represented in the literature relative
to targeting intermediate values of an algorithm, as DPA requires randomly varying val-
ues to succeed. Also, where memory is not an issue, the key expansion might only be
performed once prior to the encryption and stored in memory to encrypt many blocks of
data. However in resource constrained devices where throughput is not a priority, such as
smart-cards, the key expansion can often performed in line with the encryption.
Prior to the selection of Rijndael as the winner of the AES competition, a theoretical anal-
ysis of the key schedules for all AES candidates was carried out in [29], and a SPA attack
against the key expansion of AES was presented in [143]. More recently, machine learning
techniques were examined in [135] while targeting the key of a 3-DES implementation.
Although the authors did not build their models on the key schedule per se, the labels
were assigned directly on the key bits hence the classification is still determined by the
key expansion. As the key schedule of DES consists of bit-shifts and permutations rather
than an non-linear operations such as in AES, it is suited to this kind of analysis as each
key bit will influence the power consumption across multiple rounds, as shown originally
in [1].
The SPA in [143] can be viewed as a template attack as the author looks to identify
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Hamming weights of intermediate values of the key schedule and use this knowledge to
reduce the brute-force search space of the key. Averaging is suggested to reduce noise to
allow distinguishing between values, as well as profiling on another device as suggested
originally in [70]. This paper pre-dates TAs as presented in [42], which are ideally suited
to this scenario. An attack is now presented that can be viewed as an extension to that
presented in [143].
Templates were built for each key byte directly with a set of 25 k traces from the arm7
microprocessor, each trace with a different uniformly random plaintexts and keys. As
before the data was normalised by taking the z-scores of the data, the identity model was
used, and sost was used to select 50 features to build the templates with. The results of
using LDA for each key byte on a separate set of 1 k traces are given in Figure 4.9. As a
comparison the peak correlation value between the 1 k traces and corresponding key bytes
is also given so show that the presence of a correlation peak does not necessarily imply a
successful TA.
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Figure 4.9: Error rate for each key byte → 1 k traces.
As has been shown previously, the classification of the output of the S-Box function far
outperforms that of the other functions, which is again the case when building templates
directly for the key as is clear from Figure 4.9. Even though all 16 sub-key bytes have a
strong correlation with the power traces, only the final 4 key bytes have low error rates.
Examining the key schedule from [163], it can be seen that these four key bytes are passed
through the S-Box function.
This leads to the question of can all the key bytes be recovered by solely recovering the
output of the S-Boxes in the key schedule which is now examined. The difference between
the attack presented here and the one in [143], is that while in [143] the author assumes
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the Hamming weight of arbitrary values in the key schedule can be recovered, here the
attacker is assumed to be able to successfully recover the output byte value of the S-Box
functions only. Note the attack in [143] can be seen as a precursor to Algebraic SCA [189].
Depending on underlying leakage properties of the target device, this assumption might
hinder or assist the attacker.
While the analysis here is for AES with a 128-bit key, it is equally valid for 192 and
256-bit keys. Following the notation of [163], the entire secret key is split up into 32-bit
words, with the entire sub-key consisting of 44 of these words. As mentioned previously,
recovery of any single sub-key for any round (i.e. the consecutive words w0,1,2,3 where
〈0, 1, 2, 3〉 ∈ 0 . . . 43 (mod 4) ), allows an attacker to recover the actual key due to the
reversible nature of the key schedule. The key expansion consists of rotations, xor’s and
the S-Box function. The S-Box function, which is the attack target, is only used on every
4th word, i.e. 4 bytes of each round sub-key.
Recovery of the four bytes of w3 is possible by attacking the first use of the S-Box, where
in the following description S-Box indicates the use of it across the 4 bytes of a word.
Attacking the next use of it then allows an attacker to recover w7. However as w3 is also
known, this allows w6 to be recovered as when i 6= 0 (mod Nk) (for AES-128, Nk = 4),
then wi = wi−1⊗wi−Nk → w6 = w7⊗w3. Advancing to the next use of the S-Box gives an
attacker w11, with w6,7 used to recover w9,10. Finally attacking the 4
th use of the S-Box in
the key expansion combined with w9,10,11 gives an attacker the entire sub-key, w12,13,14,15,
which is the sub-key used for round 3 of the encryption. Note this is not taking advantage
of all instances of the S-Box used in the key expansion, where a sub-key byte is classified
with a small probability, further rounds can be looked at to increase the certainty of the
classification. Figure 4.10 gives the success rate over 1 k sets for key recovery of the entire
128-bit key, where multiple traces are available to allow an amplified TA, with the product
of the success rate for the individual key bytes taken to calculate this overall success rate.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter is based on the work published in [92], and outlines TAs against AES in which
it is assumed an adversary has no knowledge of the inputs or outputs of an AES encryption.
A single plaintext/ciphertext pair is useful for an attacker after key recovery to test the key
hypothesis, although by no means necessary. The expected number of traces required for a
successful key recovery in the case of a target device following the Hamming weight power
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Figure 4.10: Success rate for the entire key → 1 k sets.
model was developed, and compared to empirical estimations from two different target
devices, an 8051 microcontroller which closely follows the Hamming weight power model
and an arm7 microprocessor which does not.
The attack was subsequently modified to achieve better classification results while target-
ing the arm7 microprocessor, by focusing only on the S-Box operations which have been
both proved in the literature [181], and heuristically shown in the majority of DPA publi-
cations to be an suitable target for SCA. Two S-Box only attack methods were presented,
one targeting the data path and another attacking the key schedule.
The application of the attacks in the context of masking was examined, however there is
scope for much further work in this regard. As well as improvements in algorithmic or key
recovery efficiencies, unsupervised or semi-supervised machine learning algorithms such as
that in [134, 137] could be a quite interesting avenue to further explore. Unsupervised
learning algorithms could be especially useful in the context of randomised countermea-
sures such as masking as mask knowledge might not be required in the profiling step [134].
Clustering has already been suggested as both a DPA type SCA distinguisher [20], as
well as for key recovery in the context of non-profiled single trace attacks for public-key
algorithms [100] which is the topic of the next chapter.
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Chapter 5
Trace Only Template Attacks -
Multiplication
5.1 Introduction
While the attacks in Chapter 4 looked to recover the secret key from ciphers by building
templates on intermediate values in an algorithm, in this chapter a different approach
is taken, again with the goal of key recovery from a single trace where possible. While
asymmetric ciphers such as RSA [192] and ECC [123, 152] are targeted, the approach
also can also work for some symmetric ciphers depending on their underlying primitive
operations. The work in [93] forms the basis for this chapter. While attacks in the
literature are often explained in the context of RSA or ECC, due to the duality between
the square & multiply ⇔ double & add methods of implementation, the attacks are often
applicable to both.
To recover the secret key, the approach here is to try and distinguish between multiplication
and squaring operations, even when the same software code or hardware unit is used to
calculate the operation so as to prevent SPA type attacks. It was shown by Amiel et al. in
[10] that the expected Hamming weight of the result of a multiplication is different to that
of a squaring. This is utilised to build templates to distinguish between the operations as
detailed below.
The construct of asymmetric algorithms is vastly different from that of symmetric ones
due to the need for a back-door function to enable the public/private key pair to en-
crypt/decrypt. For example, the security of RSA is based on the assumed difficulty of
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factoring large integers, while the security of ECC is based on the assumption that finding
the discrete logarithm of a random elliptic curve element with respect to a known base
point is computationally infeasible. While the required doubling and addition group op-
erations for ECC are performed on an elliptic curve with a given set of parameters, the
underlying addition, subtraction, multiplication and inversion field operations are gener-
ally performed in prime, GF (p) or binary Galois GF (2m) fields. Integer multiplication and
squarings are an essential operation in both algorithms, as well as many other asymmetric
algorithms such as ElGamal [76] or Paillier [176], and it is these operations that are now
targeted in this chapter. The attack is demonstrated by attacking a single Montgomery
multiplication algorithm [153], with subsequent application to a secure RSA cryptosys-
tem explained. The attack method is then extended to a practical demonstration against
ECDSA power traces.
The ability to recover the secret key component from a single trace has many advantages,
not least in the context of countermeasures such as outlined by Coren in [52] which might
seek to restrict an adversary to a single side-channel trace, but also in the case of ECDSA
where the scalar operand is different on every use [165] by design which inherently limits
an adversary to just one sample.
A very brief overview of RSA and ECC is now given in §5.2, followed by a look at some
of the proposed single-trace attacks against them in §5.3. The source of the leakage
that is targeted in this chapter is explained in §5.4 and the building of templates with this
leakage to attack a multi-precision multiplication is demonstrated in §5.5. How this affects
secure RSA implementations is examined in §5.6, with the attack extended to a practical
demonstration against an ECDSA ephemeral scalar multiplicand in §5.7. An attack on a
hardware Montgomery multiplier is examined in §5.8 before a brief overview of where the
attack could be applicable in a symmetric-key setting in §5.9. Various countermeasures
are looked at in §5.10, before conclusions are drawn in §5.11.
5.2 Asymmetric Algorithms
While asymmetric cryptography incorporates encryption, key exchange and signature pro-
tocols, the attacks here focus on RSA exponentiation [192] and the ECC scalar multipli-
cation [123, 152], which form the basis for these constructions. A brief overview of both
is now given.
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5.2.1 RSA Exponentiation
RSA is a widely used algorithm introduced by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [192] which
provides both encryption and signature capabilities. A public key accessible to anybody
is used for encryption of data, with only the owner of the corresponding private key
able to decrypt it. Its security is based on the difficulty of factoring the product of two
large primes p and q. A modulus N = p q is computed which is part of both the public
and private key. A count of the relatively prime numbers to N is then calculated by
φ(N) = φ(p)φ(q) = (p − 1) (q − 1), where φ is Euler’s totient function. The second part
of the public key e is then chosen such that 1 < e < φ(N) and gcd(e, φ(N)) = 1. The
corresponding private key part d is calculated as d ≡ e−1 mod φ(N), which can be derived
using the extended Euclidean algorithm. Encryption and decryption is simply modular
exponentiation as shown in Equation 5.1.
c = me mod N
m = cd mod N (5.1)
When implementing Equation 5.1, the bit-size of the private key d should be at the very
least 2048-bits in size hence an efficient implementation such as that given in Algorithm 5.1
[149] will be required, however the public key e can be chosen to be much smaller. Here
the bits of the exponent are stepped through one at a time, performing a squaring on each
step and a multiplication where the exponent bit is 1, with all operations done modulo
N . In practice RSA needs to be used in conjunction with some padding mechanism
such as PKCS #1 v2.2 [129] due to the homomorphic properties of the exponentiation.
As embedded devices will generally have an 8, 16 or 32-bit single-precision multiplication
unit, the multiplication and squaring operations in each loop are still much too large to
be implemented directly. Hence each is a multi-precision operation, consisting of many
single-precision multiplications which use the hardware multiplier unit in the processor
core.
5.2.2 ECC Scalar Multiplication
Elliptic curves have recently gained widespread acceptence due to their lower key sizes
for equivalent security which has speed and storage advantages, particular for low power
embedded designs. For the work here, an elliptic curve E over a prime finite field Fp
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Algorithm 5.1: Square and multiply algorithm.
Input: N , x < N , e ≥ 1, b the binary length of e (i.e. 2b−1 ≤ e < 2b)
Output: A = xe mod N
1 A← 1 ;
2 for i = b downto 0 do
3 A← A ·A mod N ;
4 if ei = 1 then A← A · x mod N ;
5 end
6 return A ;
consists of points (x, y), with 〈x, y〉 ∈ Fp, that satisfy the short Weierstraß equation in
Equation 5.2.
E : y2 = x3 + a x+ b (5.2)
with 〈a, b〉 ∈ Fp also, and the point at infinity denoted O. The short Weierstraß form of
the curve is used since the attack targeting ECC described in this thesis will be conducted
against an instance of ECDSA using the P-192 elliptic curve, as described in the FIPS
186-3 [165]. The set E(Fp) is defined in Equation 5.3.
E(Fq) = {(x, y) ∈ E |x, y ∈ Fp} ∪ {O} (5.3)
where E(Fp) forms an Abelian group under the chord-and-tangent rule andO is the identity
element [198]. The addition of two points P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2) with P 6= −Q is
given by P+Q = (x3, y3) where:
x3 = λ
2 − x1 − x2
y3 = (x1 − x3)λ− y1 (5.4)
with λ =

y1 − y2
x1 − x2
if P 6= Q [addition operation]
3x1
2 + a
2y1
if P = Q [doubling operation]
.
The scalar multiplication of a given point is a fundamental operation in cryptographic
algorithms that use elliptic curve arithmetic, i.e. [k]P for some integer k < |E|. This
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operation uses algorithms analogous to standard exponentiation algorithms such as in
Algorithm 5.1, with squarings replaced by point doublings, and multiplications replaced
by point additions.
5.3 Single-Trace Attacks
The original SPA attack [126], as previously mentioned in §2.3.2, showed that straight-
forward implementations of both RSA and ECC could be trivially broken through visual
inspections of the power traces due to the different power consumption profile of the condi-
tional operation. This can be easily prevented through the use of square & multiply always
(or double & add always for ECC) [52], or through unified [35] or atomic [44] algorithms.
A more through examination of countermeasures and how they affect the proposed attack
is given in §5.6.
One of the first single trace attacks against asymmetric algorithms was the Big Mac attack,
introduced by Walter in [219]. This is a non-profiled attack. which, like the work here,
also tries to recover secret exponent bits by distinguishing between side-channel atomic
[44] multiplication and squaring operations, as well as not requiring knowledge of the input
plaintext values. A template trace is required, but can be computed from the first multi-
plication operation of the target trace which is known to be a squaring operation for RSA
(see line 3 of Algorithm 5.1). It works against both m-ary and sliding windows exponenti-
ation methods [149, Ch. 14], however cannot recover key bits from regular exponentiation
algorithms which perform the same order of operations regardless of the key [110]. Aver-
age traces for the single-precision multiplications in each loop of a multi-precision integer
multiplication are computed and compared to the known squaring multiplication at the
beginning of the algorithm. As the power consumption of the multiplier is correlated to
the number of bits that flip, and the number of bits that flip is also proportional to the
Hamming weight of the input operands, squarings can be distinguished from multiplica-
tions by examing the Euclidean distance between the power consumption of the unknown
operation under consideration and the initial known squaring operation.
Another single trace attack is Horizontal Correlation Analysis as introduced in [48]. This
is a powerful attack to recover secret key exponents by correlating across the single-
precision multiplications in a long-integer multiplication to determine if a given operand
was used. If a correlation is present then the operation was a multiplication, otherwise it
was a squaring. This method has the advantage of working against regular exponentiation
Profiling SCA on Crypto. Algorithms Neil Hanley
Section 5.3: Single-Trace Attacks 87
algorithms, unlike the Big Mac attack and the work presented here, but requires knowledge
of the padded message or curve base point. While suggestions are given to overcome
scenarios where the base exponent is blinded (hence unknown) [43], the effectiveness of
the attack is reduced. Another interesting single-trace attack using clustering algorithms
was introduced in [100]. Using this non-profiled machine learning method, the authors were
able to recover the secret exponent from an elliptic curve scalar multiplication. However,
multiple measurements from the same execution were required to improve the SNR to
allow the attack to succeed.
Recent advances in Collision attacks, first introduced in [196] targeting DES, have also
led to single-trace key recovery against asymmetric algorithms. The doubling attack [75]
was the first collision attack against RSA, with furter attacks introduced in [102, 230,
233]. These attacks require two or more acquisitions however, hence can be protected
against through randomising the exponent (or scalar multiplier). Rosetta analyses [47]
can overcome this limitation and allows an attacker to distinguish between multiplications
and squarings regardless of message or exponent blinding. The collision attacks presented
in [90] expand this even further by detailing how to attack an exponentiation even when
implemented as a regular algorithm. While collision attacks can be powerful, in reality
all the attacks proposed to date require relatively clean traces to allow the collisions to
be detected which is where templates have a significant advantage, at the cost of stronger
adversarial model.
5.3.1 Template Attacks on Asymmetric Algorithms
Most TA to date have focused on symmetric algorithms, generally targeting AES, DES,
and to a lesser extend RC4. One of the first TAs published against an asymmetric algo-
rithm was against ECDSA [148]. The authors built templates for multiple intermediate
values for the initial bits of the ephemeral ECDSA key. This was then either iteratively
repeated (i.e. the templates for the entire key could not be built in advance), or else
lattice-reduction based attacks used to recover the full key from a few known exponent
bits as shown in [160]. While the attack only requires a single trace to work, the base
point is required hence it is ineffective against multiplicative blinding of the base point.
A related paper [97] extends this work to show how the masking of the point can be re-
moved by building templates for the Hamming weight of intermediate partial products in
a long integer multiplication, and subsequently filtering out invalid masks which cannot
occur. The attack of [148] can then be applied to recover the ephemeral key. Another TA
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is shown against an FPGA target [101] where the authors perform an attack against a
decapsulated Xilinx Spartan-3 FPGA running an elliptic curve scalar multiplication. This
attack is somewhat different from the attacks in [97, 148], or the work presented here as
they target leakage from the physical location of registers rather than intermediate values
or operations. A TA against ECDSA was presented in [157], however the templates are
built for the modular inversion required in ECDSA rather than attacking the elliptic curve
operation itself.
There is a large body of publications on secure implementations and attacks for both the
RSA and ECC cryptosystems. Informative surveys of attacks against ECC and subsequent
countermeasures are available in [59, 71, 72], while a survey of regular exponentiation
algorithms for both ECC and RSA is available in [110, 112]. The attack as presented here
has advantages over many other single-trace attacks due to its applicability in the presence
of many countermeasures, and the fact that its not as susceptible to noise as some other
methods. This of course comes with the tradeoff that a similar device must be available
to build templates.
5.4 Target Leakage
It was observed in [10] that the expected Hamming weight of the result of a multiplication
is different than the result of a squaring operation. The difference in the expected Ham-
ming weight can be observed by measuring these side channels as shown in [10]. As this
observation applies to a single-precision operation, i.e. whenever the hardware multiplier
unit in a microprocessor is used for example, this difference will be present in many time
locations in any word-by-word multiplication algorithm. Non-profiling attacks based on
distinguishing multiplications and squarings were also shown in [4, 223] on the basis that
the number of internal bit-flips, hence power, in a hardware multiplier is linearly related
to the Hamming weight of the input operands. However, as shown later, this is not the
main source of leakage that is utilised here.
This observation on the leakage of multipliers assumes that the power consumption of
the device under consideration is proportional to the Hamming weight of the values being
manipulated. It was shown in Chapter 3 that for the arm7 microprocessor the Hamming
weight model is not wholly accurate. However it suffices for that attack here, particularly
when coupled with that advantage that no intermediate values need to be known to con-
duct the attack which is advantageous when countermeasures are present as explained in
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§5.6. Many devices also conform to the Hamming distance model, for example attacks on
hardware such as FPGAs or ASICs rather than software implementations on microproces-
sors will often need knowledge of the previous register value in order to be successful. This
complicates the attack somewhat as the power consumption is no longer solely dependent
on the input operands. For the attacks presented in this chapter it is assumed that the
target device corresponds to the Hamming weight model unless otherwise specified.
Assuming that a multiplication takes place between two random uniformly distributed
b-bit values, the expected Hamming weight output can be calculated for smaller values
of b using Equation 5.5 as shown in [10]. This essentially consists of taking the average
of the Hamming weight of the product of all pairs of possible input values. Likewise, the
expected Hamming weight value for a squaring can be calculated with Equation 5.6.
E(X · Y ) =
2b−1∑
i=0
2b−1∑
j=0
HW (i · j) · Pr[X = i ∧ Y = j] =
1
22b
2b−1∑
i=0
2b−1∑
j=0
HW (i · j) (5.5)
E(X2) =
2b−1∑
i=0
HW (i2) · Pr[X = i] =
1
2b
2b−1∑
i=0
HW (i2) (5.6)
Using these equations, the expected Hamming weight difference between multiplications
and squarings for different operand bit lengths b were calculated as shown in Figure 5.1(a).
It can be seen that for a 16-bit multiplication, the expected Hamming weight of the output
of a multiplication is ∼ 0.9 greater than that of a squaring. A closer examination of why
this is so can be see in Figure 5.1(b) for 16-bit input operands, giving a 32-bit output.
The probability of each bit output being equal to one is plotted for both operations. The
restricted set of values that a squaring operation can take is reflected in the distribution
of the lower bit probabilities. As this occurs every time a multiplication is calculated, this
difference will be present in each of the single-precision multiplications that are required to
compute a multi-precision multiplication. The plot in Figure 5.1 is only directly calculated
for up to b = 16-bit operand lengths due to the computational complexity of greater
bit-lengths, however the same leakage is present in larger bit-lengths also as shown in
Appendix D where a subset of all possible values are selected.
Before looking at the practical effect of this on the arm7 microprocessor device used pre-
viously, a short description of how the multiplier on this device operates is first outlined.
The hardware long multiplication operation mull on an arm7 microprocessor is imple-
mented such that it computes the multiplication of two 32-bit words in 2→ 5 clock cycles
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Figure 5.1: Hamming weight analysis.
[138]. The number of clock cycles required depends on the bit length of one of the multi-
plicands, that is the multiplication will terminate early if a number of the most significant
bytes of one multiplicand are set to zero. The precise algorithm of how the mull op-code
operation is defined in Algorithm 5.2 [87].
Algorithm 5.2: A functional description of arm7 multiplication.
Input: The 32-bit integers x and y.
Output: The 64-bit result A = x · y.
1 A← 0;
2 for i = 0 to 3 do
3 Astep ← x · y7...0;
4 A← A+ (Astep ≪ 8i);
5 y ← y ≫ 8;
6 if y = 0 then return A;
7 ;
8 end
9 return A ;
Several attacks are described in [87] that demonstrate that na¨ıvely using this multiplier
to implement cryptographic algorithms will provide an attacker with an exploitable vul-
nerability. That is, the number of clock cycles taken by each multiplication can be seen in
the power consumption and used to deduce information on the values being operated on.
This means that the multiplier has to be used such that it will perform a multiplication in
a constant amount of time irrespective of the bit length of the multiplicands. An example
of such an algorithm is shown in Algorithm 5.3 [87]. For the implementation of the attack
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here, this algorithm was used to provide an implementation with a minimum level of
security. That is, an implementation that is not vulnerable to attack by simply inspecting
a small number of power traces.
Algorithm 5.3: A constant time algorithm to replace arm7 multiplication.
Input: The 32-bit integers x and y.
Output: The 64-bit result A = x · y.
1 γ ← (y ∧ 00FFFFFF(16)) + 01000000(16) ;
2 τ ← (y ∧ FF000000(16))≫ 24 ;
3 A← x · γ ;
4 A← A+ ((x · τ)≪ 24) ;
5 A← A− (x≪ 24) ;
6 return A ;
Algorithm 5.3 ensures a constant time implementation of the multiplication by replacing
the most significant byte with 0x01 hence always ensuring the full 5 clocks are required.
The multiplication by the most significant byte is then performed separately as a 32 × 8
operation requiring 2 clock cycles.
Using Algorithm 5.3, the leakage of the multiplier output can now be examined. Fig-
ure 5.2(a) shows a portion of a power trace recorded while the arm7 microprocessor was
performing the constant-time multiplication as given in Algorithm 5.3. The trace is aver-
aged over 10 k acquisitions with random uniformly distributed values. The sampling rate
was 250MSs-1, and the clock frequency 7.3728MHz, and for the example here no filtering
nor reduction of the acquisitions was performed1. The 32-bit single-precision multipli-
cation corresponding to line 3 of Algorithm 5.3 can be seen as a decrease in the power
consumption at the start of the trace, while the shorter 32× 8 multiplication of line 4 can
be seen as the second shorter decrease just following it.
Following [10] where the power consumption difference between a multiplication and squar-
ing is shown by looking at the difference of means of a large set of traces, Figure 5.2(b)
shows the difference of means trace between the 10 k multiplication traces from Fig-
ure 5.2(a), and 10 k squaring traces. The largest peak occurs right at the end of the
32-bit single precision multiplication, just after 13.5µs. There is a smaller peak towards
the start of the multiplication, likely due to the effect of bit flips dependent on the inputs as
explained in [4, 223]. The arm7 microprocessor multiplier returns the 64-bit multiplicand
as two 32-bit words [138], and as a sanity check, the correlation of the least significant
1The traces used in this example are a subset of the traces used in §5.5 prior to pre-processing.
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word for the multiplication traces is given in Figure 5.2(c). The strongest correlation oc-
curs at the same point in time as the DOM peak, which is expected from Figure 5.1(b).
This confirms that the leakage at the output of the multiplier is what is causes the DOM
peak. No DOM is present for the upper 32-bit word as examining line 1 of Algorithm 5.3,
it can be seen that the most significant byte is replaced with 0x01 therefore the upper bits
where a difference is expected to occur cannot be set. While in [10] a DOM attack was
suggested to utilise this leakage, templates are now built to allow distinguishing between
the operations with a single trace.
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5.5 Application of Templates
In this section an example TA exploiting the described leakage is conducted, targeting the
Montgomery multiplication algorithm [153] as would be used in an RSA exponentiation,
or the underlying field multiplications in an ECC scalar multiplication.
5.5.1 Montgomery Multiplication
When implementing modular exponentiation a commonly used multiplication algorithm is
Montgomery multiplication [153], since the modular reduction is interleaved with the mul-
tiplication. The result of a modular multiplication using this algorithm is not x y mod N ,
the algorithm actually returns x y R−1 mod N , where R−1 mod N is introduced by the
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algorithm as shown in Algorithm 5.4. R = bw, where the modulus consists of w words
of size b, with b generally chosen according the architecture size of the device being pro-
grammed for, i.e. b = 232 would generally be chosen for the arm7 microprocessor under
consideration as it has a 32-bit architecture. In order to use Montgomery multiplication,
x and y need to be first converted to their Montgomery representation, i.e. x˜ ← xR
mod N and y˜ ← y R mod N . Then, when x˜ and y˜ are multiplied together using Mont-
gomery multiplication, the result is x y R mod N . This algorithm requires 2w (w + 1)
single-precision multiplications [149]. Where repeated multiplications are required, such
as exponentiation or elliptic curve scalar multiplication, this has computational advantages
as the division is simply shifting by a power of 2.
Algorithm 5.4: Montgomery product.
Input: N = (Nw−1, . . . , N1, N0)b, x = (xw−1, . . . , x1, x0)b, y = (yw−1, . . . , y1, y0)b with
0 ≤ x, y < N , R = bw, gcd(N, b) = 1 and N ′ = −N−1 mod b.
Output: A← x y R−1 mod N .
1 A← 0 ;
2 for i = 0 to w − 1 do
3 ui ← (a0 + xi y0)N
′ mod b ;
4 A← (A+ xi y + uiN)/b ;
5 end
6 if A ≥ N then A← A−N ;
7 return A ;
Algorithm 5.4 has been demonstrated to be vulnerable to side channel because of the final
conditional subtraction that takes place if A ≥ N on line 6. This conditional subtraction
affects the entire execution time of an exponentiation leading to an attack based on total
time taken to compute an exponentiation [224]. It has also been shown that individual sub-
tractions will be visible in the power consumption, or electromagnetic emanations, leading
to efficient attacks [220, 221]. The simplest countermeasure would be to always conduct
the subtraction and take the result as required. However, this approach is problematic
since the bit that is used to make this choice may be visible in a side channel. More-
over, this could potentially be attacked by a fault attack, where a fault in a subtraction
that does not affect the result of an exponentiation identifies a dummy subtraction [232],
similar to the square and multiply always fault attack. More effective countermeasures
involve increasing the number of iterations of the main loop so that the final subtraction
becomes unnecessary [88, 218]. However, these attacks and countermeasures do not have
any impact on the attack as described and can be considered beyond the scope of this
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work. Note also that while the attack here is conducted against an implementation using
the Montgomery multiplication, it is equally valid against many other multiple-precision
multiplication algorithms such as long-integer or Comba.
5.5.2 Difference of Means
To put the attack into practice, a 1024-bit Montgomery multiplication algorithm was
implemented on the arm7 microprocessor and power traces of multiplication and squaring
operations recorded. In all cases the inputs are uniformly randomly distributed. The
acquisition parameters were the same as for the AES traces, i.e. a clock frequency of
7.3728MHz, a sampling rate 250MSs-1 with the 20MHz bandwidth limiter of the scope
turned on. Each trace was also pre-processed using the parameters as outlined previously
in §2.10. In total, 10 k traces for each of multiplication and squaring operations were
recorded, with 9 k of each used for training (i.e. m = 18 k) with the remaining 1 k of
each used for estimating classification accuracy. Each trace is randomly allocated to one
of the two sets to remove any potential hidden bias present between traces that were
recorded in close proximity time-wise. The operations are labelled such that y0 represents
a multiplication, and y1 is a squaring.
The difference between the mean of the two classes of the training set is given in Fig-
ure 5.3(a). As the arm7 microprocessor contains a 32-bit multiplier, to compute the
1024-bit multiplication 1024 ÷ 32 = 32 iterations of the Montgomery multiplication loop
are required. This can be seen in the 32-peaks of Figure 5.3(a), corresponding the the
xi · y operation on line 4 of Algorithm 5.4. This 32× 1024-bit multiplication is performed
as 32 separate single-precision multiplications. The power difference occurs when xi = yj
in the case of a squaring, as the equality isn’t present (other than random chance) in the
case of a multiplication.
A closer examination actually reveals 33 peaks, as well as a number of smaller peaks at
the beginning of the trace. Figure 5.3(b) highlights the section which corresponds to the
first loop of the Montgomery multiplication at the beginning of the trace in Figure 5.3(a).
The initial large peak of Figure 5.3(b) at ≈ 0.03ms is actually due line 3 of Algorithm 5.4
where x0 = y0 in the first round. The multiple smaller peaks can then be attributed to
the re-use of u0 on line 4 as u0 = x0 · y0 ·N
′ mod b.
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Figure 5.3: Difference of means trace.
5.5.3 Template attack
To perform the template attack, the peaks from Figure 5.3(a) were used to build the
templates. As there are only two class labels, i.e. multiplication and squaring, taking the
absolute magnitude of the peaks is the same as the sost method as outlined in §3.3.3.
Prior to feature selection, the traces were normalised by taking the z-scores of the traces.
Using the full set ofm = 18 k training traces, the error rate of classifying the multiplication
and squaring test traces is given in Figure 5.4(a).
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Figure 5.4: Error rate for 1024-bit Montgomery multiplication.
It can be seen that very low error rates are achievable for the attack on this particular
device. The five different classification methods from §3.3.6 are used, distance again
simply denotes the Euclidean distance. The error rates are given as a function of the
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number of features retained, with the features sorted according to the height of their
absolute peaks. There are two peaks that can be utilised to build the templates for each
single-precision multiplication on line 4 of Algorithm 5.4 which leaks information, along
with the extra peaks from the initial round. It is interesting to note that for the Euclidean
distance and reduced LDA methods, where no covariance matrix and a shared variance
vector respectively are used, that the error increases with the number of features when
the number of features is & 70, which roughly corresponds to the two points per peak.
These particular features have lower absolute difference peaks hence contribute less to
the classification, or might not be leakage points at all. QDA gives the most accurate
classification results as the large training set coupled with the small number of classes,
|K| = 2, allows the mean vector and covariance matrix to be accurately estimated for both
classes. QDA outperforms LDA here as the covariance matrices are no longer equal due to
the small peaks from the partial products in the initial Montgomery multiplication loop.
To check if the acquisition of a greater number of traces for template building would be
beneficial, the training and testing error rates are plotted as a function of the training set
size in Figure 5.4(b). The z-score normalisation was again re-calculated on each iteration
only using the training trace sub-set, which themselves were randomly selected out of the
full training set. QDA was used to classify the data while retaining 100 features. As
can be seen both the training and testing error are quite low and stable, indicating extra
training samples won’t greatly improve the results.
Figure 5.5: Log-likelihood comparison for multiplication and squaring operations.
As it is a binary classifier and amplified template attacks are not being considered (i.e.
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the operation needs to be determined from a single trace), there is no need to compute
the probability of each operation when classifying. Hence in the results of Figure 5.4
only the log-likelihood is considered, with the operation being assigned according to the
template which returns the maximum log-likelihood. To visualise the overall classification
performance, the difference between the log-likelihoods for both operations are given as
a histogram in Figure 5.5, coloured according to their actual class. For each test trace,
the log-likelihood of it being a squaring was subtracted from the log-likelihood of it being
a multiplication. Hence, if the result is positive it is more likely to be a multiplication,
and if negative then it is assigned to be a squaring. The histogram in Figure 5.5 gives the
distribution of both operations, with 0 as the decision boundary. This plot also shows that
the error (i.e. the blue occurances less than zero or the red greater) is evenly distributed
between both operations, with no bias towards classifying one of them with a greater
accuracy.
Effect of Multiplier Length
The low classification error rate of the testing traces in the previous section benefits
from the large number of features that are available to build templates. For the 1024-bit
Montgomery multiplication example, on the arm7 microprocessor architecture with a 32-
bit embedded multiplier, a total of 33 single-precision multiplications will leak information,
as well as the multiple smaller peaks. A 1024-bit multiplier such as this would be used
for the multiplication or squaring operation in the loop of Algorithm 5.1 in a typical RSA
encryption with 1024-bit keys. For longer keys, the number of available features should be
even greater, e.g. for a high security 4096-bit exponent, there will be 129 multiplications
available to characterise a Montgomery multiplication on this platform. Therefore, as
previously noted for the same reasons in [47, 220], long keys should counter-intuitively
provide less security against this attack as there are a greater number of single-precision
multiplications to model.
Conversely, this also means that for shorter exponent lengths that there is less information
leakage hence they are harder to break. While RSA exponents should obviously never be
set less than 1024-bits, and should be set to at least 2048-bits for any new implementations,
ECC provides equivalent security for much smaller bit-lengths. For example a 1024-bit
RSA key and a 160-bit ECC key, both have approximately the same security against
known mathematical attacks, which is computationally equivalent to brute forcing 80-
bits of a symmetric cipher key. While for ECC the Montgomery multiplication is used
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to calculate the group operation rather than the main addition chain as in RSA, it is
included here to see how the multiplier bit-length affects the attack, while a full attack on
a scalar multiplication is subsequently given in §5.7. For an wide-ranging comparison on
the required key lengths for various cryptographic algorithms see [83].
The attack is re-run against a 160-bit Montgomery multiplication using exactly the same
acquisition settings, post-processing and template training parameters. There are now w =
5 words in Algorithm 5.4, leading to 6 single-precision multiplications that can be utilised
to generate the templates with. As can be seen in Figure 5.6(a), the error rate when using
QDA has now risen to just over 0.062% up from 0.012% from the longer multiplication
before, which is also clear from the greater overlap in the histograms of the log-likelihood
difference plot in Figure 5.6(b). As before there are two points per multiplication that are
efficient to construct the templates with and, as can be seen in Figure 5.6(a), retaining
& 20 features leads to a higher error rate for classification methods which don’t take
into account the covariance matrix, i.e. least-squares, and reduced LDA/QDA. Taking
into account the fewer single-precision multiplicatoins, this is similar to the 1024-bit case
in Figure 5.4(a) where when retaining & 70 features an increase occurs for the same
classification methods.
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Figure 5.6: 160-bit Montgomery multiplication analysis.
An important point to note however is that although the error rate is higher for elliptic
curve size multiplications, the elliptic curve doubling and addition group operations will
contain many of these prime field multiplications. This is explored in more detail in §5.7.
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Building Templates from a Single Multiplication
It was suggested in [93] that when performing TAs against asymmetric algorithms on an
embedded device, an identical device might not be required for characterisation. If the
public verification function executes using the same code, which is a reasonable assump-
tion, then templates could be built using power traces from these operations instead. This
is a significant weakening of the attacker capabilities both in terms of having an open
identical device to program, as well as eliminating the effect of the power consumption
variation between devices. Another possibility is that an attacker might be able to access
the multiplier in a non-cryptographic setting and have the ability to build templates on
just a single, single-precision multiplication. It is this scenario that is now examined.
Using the 1024-bit Montgomery multiplication traces from before, the 33 multiplications
which leak information are extracted. While cross correlation using the difference of means
peaks is used here to extract the required multiplications, in a real-world attack the power
traces could just as easily be extracted without this information due to, either the regular
nature of the algorithm, or correlating with the known input data of whatever function
is being used to find the multiplication location. This time, rather than utilising all 33
single-precision multiplication leakages, just one is randomly selected from each of the
m = 18 k training samples. The rest are discarded to allow comparison of the results with
the previous experiments by keeping the same training set size. Once again 2 k testing
traces are used, with the single-precision multiplications extracted in the same manner.
All 33 of these are retained however.
To build the templates, all 50 points of the reduced trace multiplication are retained and
normalised by taking the z-score. The templates are then applied to each of the single-
precision multiplications of the testing traces individually. The classification results of
Figure 5.7 are for taking an increasing number of multiplications into account. Where
only a single multiplication is used, the attack is barely better than randomly guessing the
operation. However as the number of multiplications is increased comparable performance
to building templates with the entire trace length is achieved, even though the same
template has been used to classify every multiplication. The error rate from building
templates on the entire trace from §5.5.3 is given in red for comparison.
As expected, the greater the number of multiplications utilised, the lower the error rate
although there are some exceptions which adversely affect the error. When all the mul-
tiplications are used, the error rate is quite similar to the original results from using the
full trace length giving credence to the hypothesis that, where possible, non-cryptographic
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Figure 5.7: Classification using a single multiplication.
functionality of a device could be used to build templates. Although this is a somewhat
contrived experiment, it gives a useful insight into the portability of the attack, as well as
providing a nice visualisation as to how a longer key helps rather than hinders the attack
as explained previously, as well as providing the basis for an interesting avenue of future
research.
5.6 Application to Secure RSA Implementations
The attacks to date show how to distinguish between a multiplication and a squaring
operation, with various examples for a single Montgomery multiplication of different word
sizes. The implications of this for secure RSA implementations is now discussed.
As mentioned previously, if an RSA exponentiation is straightforwardly implemented us-
ing the left-to-right binary exponent algorithm as given in Algorithm 5.1, the key can be
trivially read out from a power or electromagnetic emanation trace due to the different
power profile of the multiplication and squaring operations. The most straightforward
method to counteract this is through the use of the square & multiply always algorithm,
where the multiplication is always performed regardless of the bit value, and discarded
if not required. This obviously has a performance disadvantage as on average half the
performed multiplications are redundant. However it is also susceptible to Safe Error
[232] type attacks where an attacker can introduce faults during a multiplication opera-
tion. Given a correct/faulty exponentiation pair, it can be determined if the operation
where the fault was injected was redundant allowing the key bit to be determined. Hence
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regular algorithms such as the Montgomery powering ladder [113] where the order of op-
erations is the same regardless of exponent, are preferred. Greater information on regular
exponentiation algorithms can be found in [110, 112]
Another option is to remove the difference between a squaring operation and a multipli-
cation. This means that, to square a value x, the calculation of x2 mod N is replaced
with x · x mod N rather than using a dedicated squaring algorithm which is often the
case in resource constrained environments. This idea is put forward in [44], where two
instructions are defined as side channel equivalent if they are indistinguishable through
side channel analysis, and algorithms are termed side channel atomic if the algorithm can
be broken down into indistinguishable blocks. This principle, applied to the square and
multiply exponentiation in Algorithm 5.1, is demonstrated in Algorithm 5.5. This algo-
rithm would prevent an attacker from being able to distinguish a multiplication from a
squaring operation by simply observing the difference in a side channel, since an optimized
squaring operation is not used.
Algorithm 5.5: Side channel atomic square and multiply algorithm.
Input: N , x < N , e ≥ 1, b the binary length of e (i.e. 2b−1 ≤ e < 2b)
Output: A0 = x
e mod N
1 A0 ← 1; A1 ← x; i← b− 2; k ← 0 ;
2 while i ≥ 0 do
3 A0 ← A0 ·Ak mod N ;
4 k ← k ⊕ bit(e, i) ;
5 i← i− ¬k ;
6 end
7 return A0
If RSA is implemented in a side-channel atomic manner following Algorithm 5.5, typically
using Algorithm 5.4 or a variant to implement to multiplication step, recovering the secret
exponent is equivalent to distinguishing between the multiplication and squaring opera-
tions hence side-channel resistance cannot be assumed. However, when implementing a
cryptographic algorithm on a device that is potentially vulnerable to side channel analysis,
one would typically include other specific countermeasures, in conjunction with side chan-
nel atomicity, to prevent an attacker being able to derive information on cryptographic
keys.
For RSA this would typically mean implementing the blinding countermeasures, such that
the input message and exponent are randomised on every execution, following the blind
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signature scheme [43]. These countermeasures modify the exponentiation algorithm such
that the values being operated on at a given point in time cannot be predicted by an
attacker. Given that the Hamming weight leakage model as utilised above is based on
the number of bits being manipulated at a given point in time, these countermeasures
randomize the bitwise representation of all the variables being manipulated. For instance,
to implement a function to compute a RSA signature ς = ϕ(m)d mod N , where m is the
message, d the secret exponent, and ϕ an appropriate padding scheme such as PKCS #1
v2.2 [129], each variable would be modified with a random value as shown in Algorithm 5.6.
This is referred to as blinding since an attacker is unable to determine the values being
manipulated at a given point in time, and different intermediate values would be computed
for two instantiations of the same signature.
Algorithm 5.6: Blinded exponentiation.
Input: m, d,N , ϕ a padding function, φ Euler’s Totient function and non-zero random
values ri, for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Output: ς = ϕ(x)d mod N .
1 m′ ← ϕ(m) + r1N ;
2 N ′ ← r2N ;
3 d′ ← r3 φ(N) + d ;
4 ς ′ ← µ(m)d
′
mod N ′
5 return ς ′ mod N
The addition of r1N to ϕ(m) provides a redundant representation of ϕ(m) modulo N
and is referred to a message blinding. Given that ϕ(m) + r1N ≡ ϕ(m) mod N , and
this will remain true for all the intermediate states during the execution of the algorithm,
the computation should not take place in the set of invertible elements (Z/NZ)∗ (where
Z/NZ = {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}) since the blinding would be removed. The bit length of the
modulus is therefore increased by multiplying it by a random value so that the computation
takes place in (Z/N ′Z)∗ = (Z/r2NZ)∗ instead. The values held in memory at a given
point during the computation of the exponentiation cannot be predicted without knowing
these random values. However, the values held in memory at a given point in time would
represent the same value in (Z/NZ)∗ for a fixed exponent.
The bitwise representation of the exponent is also modified by replacing the exponent
d with r3 φ(N) + d, where φ is Euler’s Totient function, and is referred to as exponent
blinding. Any value raised to a multiple of φ(N) will be equal to itself in (Z/NZ)∗, i.e.
it is an identity function. Adding a multiple of φ(N) to the exponent changes the bitwise
representation of the exponent without changing the result of its use in (Z/NZ)∗.
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One would typically choose the values of ri, for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, to be at least 32 bits. As
noted in [199], one would also want the bit length of r2 to be longer than the longest
run of zeros in the bitwise representation of φ(N) so that all the bits of d are blinded.
Furthermore, some side channel attacks could potentially derive an exponent if the bit
length of these random values is too small [48].
When implementing a TA as described on the output of the multiplication operation, the
use of message blinding aids an attacker as it randomises the bitwise representation of the
values being operated on by the exponent. This helps an attacker since the values being
operated on will be random and uniformly distributed and any values set to a constant
will be randomized, e.g. the PKCS padding scheme sets parts of its output bytes to fixed
values. The increase in the bit length of the modulus will also mean that the Montgomery
multiplication will require at least one more iteration of the main loop, providing more
single-precision multiplications that can be analysed by an attacker. As illustrated in
Figure 5.7, the more single-precision multiplications available to build templates with, the
higher the success rate of the attack.
The use of exponent blinding randomizes the bit wise representation of the exponent
and therefore randomizes the sequence of multiplication and squaring operations that are
computed. An attacker would be unable to take several acquisitions in an amplified TA
type attack to improve the quality of classification since the operation being computed at a
given point in time during the execution of the algorithm will vary from one instantiation
to another. This means that an attacker has to determine whether an operation is a
multiplication or a squaring operation from one single acquisition. From a practical aspect,
an attacker also needs to acquire a single trace that includes the power consumption during
an entire exponentiation to attempt to derive the exponent used, and therefore recover a
value equivalent to the exponent d. Due to the computation time of RSA, it is a non-trivial
issue to record a power trace of this length while retaining a high enough sampling rate.
Alternatively some synchronous sampling method such as the low-cost proposal in [167]
could be used to reduce the memory and storage requirements.
The TA results from the previous section can distinguish between 1024-bit multiplications
and squarings with an expected error rate of only 0.012, so for a given acquisition of Algo-
rithm 5.6 on an arm7 microprocessor, an attacker could expect to correctly identify ≈ 99%
of the bits of an exponent. The incorrect classification of operations can be corrected to a
certain extent, since the Hamming weight of the entire exponent can be computed by ob-
serving the total number of operations, and that a multiplication will always be preceded,
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and followed by, a squaring operation in a side-channel atomic implementation such as
Algorithm 5.5. One approach to conducting this analysis is through the use of hidden
Markov models (HMMs) as suggested in [86, 116, 172]. Overall the attack highlights the
importance of using regular exponentiation algorithms such as the Montgomery Ladder
[113] which perform the same sequence of operations regardless of the input hence, distin-
guishing between a multiplication and squaring operation does not leak key information.
Further countermeasures are examined in §5.10.
5.7 Attack on ECDSA
The attack is now extended to recover the secret multiplicand from an ECC scalar multi-
plication. Unlike previously where the training and testing traces were of the same format,
i.e. the both consisted of a single Montgomery multiplication, here templates are built for
point doubling and addition operations, while the testing traces are a full ECDSA power
trace. The individual point operations must first be extracted, and the same templates
then used to determine each operation. The ECDSA algorithm is given in Appendix B,
however it suffices to say here that the scalar operand k must be random for each signa-
ture so that only a single trace is ever available to recover the secret, similar to exponent
blinding in the case of RSA. Where k is not always random, it leads to a complete break
of the system which is what happened in the Sony PS3 console attack [38]. Hence only
the ECC scalar multiplication component of ECDSA is of interest here.
In practice a combination of countermeasures is used to increase the level of side-channel
resistance. To protect the arm7 microprocessor implementation against side-channel at-
tacks, a number of countermeasures are also implemented. Randomised projective co-
ordinates are used where the base point is blinded by replacing the Z-coordinate with a
192-bit random value and modifying the x and y-coordinates as required on every exe-
cution. Projective coordinates [229] are an efficient implementation method to avoid the
need for the costly point inversion operation when computing point doubling and addition
by changing the point representation from (x, y) to (X,Y, Z). The introduction of Z means
that the points are no longer unique hence any Z value can be chosen to calculate x = X
Z
and y = Y
Z
. A side channel atomic left to right binary multiplication algorithm is used
following Algorithm 5.5 where squarings are replaced by doublings, and multiplications
by additions. Unified group operations [35] as described for Edward’s Curves in [24] and
given in Algorithm 5.7 are used. Blinding of the base point P as suggested in [52] is not
implemented, however as no knowledge is assumed of P this does not affect the attack.
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Likewise, randomisation of the scalar multiplicand [52] similar to the exponent blinding
for RSA is unnecessary as the scalar is only used once regardless.
Algorithm 5.7: Edwards curve → unified addition formula.
Input: Input projective coordinate points {X1, Y1, Z1},{X2, Y2, Z2}
Output: Output projective coordinate point {X3, Y3, Z3}
1 A← Z1 × Z2 ;
2 B ← A2 ;
3 C ← X1 ×X2 ;
4 D ← Y1 × Y2 ;
5 E ← D × C ×D ;
6 F ← B − E ;
7 G← B + E ;
8 X3 ← A× F × ((X1 + Y1)× (X2 + Y2)− C −D) ;
9 Y3 ← A×G× (D − C) ;
10 Z3 ← C × F ×G ;
11 return {X3, Y3, Z3}
This TA is considerably different to that presented against ECDSA previously in [97, 148]
as no knowledge of intermediate values is required, hence the use of point blinding or
randomised projective coordinates has no bearing on the outcome of the attack as a
hypothesis is not being made on intermediate values. Similarly, the previously mentioned
TA against ECDSA by De Mulder et al. [157] targets the modular inversion, and the attack
by Fouque et al. presented in [74] looks to defeat exponent randomisation by attacking
the randomisation steps, rather than attacking the elliptic curve operation itself.
The acquisition setup for these traces was slightly different, with the traces recorded at
the University of Bristol by Dr. Mike Tunstall as due to the execution time of the ECDSA
operation the memory of the oscilloscopes available were too small. The same model of
arm7 microprocessor board as used previously was targeted again, however this time the
sampling rate was reduced to 125MSs-1, with the resultant traces containing ≈ 185M
points. In total 100 traces were recorded for testing the classification error. For building
the templates, 4.5 k training traces of each of the unified point doubling and addition
operations were recorded (i.e. m = 9k), with these traces being ≈ 640 k points long. The
traces were filtered as before, however to compress the traces the individual clock cycles
had to be initially extracted using the inverse fast Fourier transform (FFT) as suggested
in [65] before taking the maximum point to prevent de-synchronisation of the traces as
explained in §2.10.3.
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5.7.1 Attack Procedure
A sample trace of the entire ECDSA operation is given in Figure 5.8(a), while in Fig-
ure 5.8(b) the mean of the unified group operations in the training set is plotted. Due to
the scale of the ECDSA trace it is difficult to discern any information from Figure 5.8(a)
and it is simply provided for reference. It is worth pointing out that the end of the trace
around ∼ 1.3 s has a distinctly different power profile than the rest of the trace. This is
where the hash computation and multiplication/inversion steps as given in Appendix B
are performed. A quick sanity check can be performed by checking that the length of
time the point operation takes roughly corresponds to the length of time for the ECDSA
algorithm, i.e. 192 × 4ms × 1.5 = 1.15 s ≈ 1.3 s where 192 is the bit length b, 4ms is
approximately the length of time of the unified point operation (as can be seen on the
x-axis in Figure 5.8(b)), 1.5 assumes that half the bits are 1 (hence the group operation is
performed twice), and 1.3s is approximately the length of time for the scalar multiplication
section of the trace in Figure 5.8(a). This is only a rough approximation, however suffices
for checking that the traces represent what is expected.
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Figure 5.8: ECDSA target & training power traces.
To extract the group operations from the trace, the cross correlation between the ECDSA
traces and the mean unified group operation as shown in Figure 5.8(b) was calculated for
each of the 100 testing traces individually. A randomly selected cross correlation plot is
shown in Figure 5.9(a). Note the cross correlation values were scaled such that the largest
value is equal to 1. For the particular trace the correlation plot is shown for, the 192-bit
key has a Hamming weight of 87 which, ignoring the msb, gives 275 group operations,
each of which corresponds to a single peak. A zoomed section of the trace is shown in
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Figure 5.9(b) for clarity. No peaks occur after ∼ 1.3 s where the power consumption in
Figure 5.8(a) is distinctly different, again validating what was expected. On a practical
note, the group operations can be automatically extracted more reliably when the cross
correlation is performed prior to trace reduction at the cost of a longer running time and
greater memory requirements, hence extraction of the group operations from the ECDSA
trace is recommended prior to trace compression. This likely holds true when extracting
operations for other attacks also.
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Figure 5.9: Unified group operation extraction.
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Figure 5.10: Template building of unified group operations.
To build the templates, features were extracted as before by examining the difference of
means trace of the unified operation which is plotted in Figure 5.10(a). The peaks again
indicate the points in time where the Hamming weight of the output of a single-precision
multiplication differs depending on if the inputs are equal. While the training set traces
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represent point addition and point doubling traces, the underlying leakage is still that
of field multiplications or field squarings. A different approach to selecting the number
of features to build the templates with is used here, as the training and testing traces
no longer directly correspond with each other like previously. Rather than estimating
the error on the test set for an increasing number of features, 10-fold cross validation
is used on the training set to select the number of features to use. The templates are
then built across the entire training set for this number of features. This cross validation
error is shown in Figure 5.10(b). The traces were normalized by taking the z-scores of
the individual cross validation training sets separately, and QDA was used to classify the
examples. It is clear from Figure 5.10(b) that when too many features are retained that
the training error continues to decrease while the cross validation error increases hence
the templates are over fitting the training data. An attacker would expect that retaining
30 → 40 features should give the best classification for these particular traces as this is
what minimises the cross validation error.
When classifying the extracted group operations from the test ECDSA traces however,
the mean error rate was found to be significantly higher at ≈ 0.3. This mean error rate
was calculated by classifying all group operations from all 100 test traces individually and
averaging, hence it is an operation error rather than a bit error. A plot of the error rate
as a function of the number of features retained is given in Figure 5.11(a) where it is clear
that using in the region of 12 features gives considerably better results than when using
the 35 predicted by cross validation. A closer examination of this result reveals that the
12 features are all in two large peaks of Figure 5.10(a), where each peak is actually 6
distinct peaks. Using only these 12 features results in a mean error rate of 0.113 which
is closely aligned to the expected cross validation test error for this number of features.
The distribution of the mean error for each of the 100 individual ECDSA traces is given
in Figure 5.11 to estimate how accurately an adversary could recover the entire scalar
operand. For a 192-bit scalar multiplication, an attacker would expect to incorrectly
classify 192× 1.5× 0.113 = 32.54 point operations per trace. Hence to successfully forge
an ECDSA signature, these mis-classified bits at unknown locations must be corrected
somehow.
5.7.2 Hand-tuning the Results
The use of the test error in Figure 5.11(a) to select the number of features to use can
be viewed as somewhat cheating as post attack information is required, i.e. an attacker
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Figure 5.11: Analysis of testing error rates.
won’t have the correct secret to verify the results hence allowing the choice of the best
parameters. However the knowledge that the ratio of point doublings to additions will be
approximately 2 : 1 can be used to manually adapt the selection of training parameters
according to the test probabilities. As an example, in Figure 5.12(a) the training traces
were classified using the templates they built and a histogram of the probability of each
trace being a doubling operation is shown. As it is a binary classification system, the closer
to zero a probability is, the higher the chance of it being a point addition. As the number of
point doubling and addition training traces are evenly distributed in the training set, there
is a symmetry to the graph as the operations are largely classified correctly. In contrast,
Figure 5.12(b) shows the classification distribution of the operations extracted from all the
ECDSA trace group operations when 35 features are retained following the cross validation
results. Here there is a very clear bias towards classifying doubling operations which
indicates the templates are a poor fit and don’t generaise well. In contrast Figure 5.12(c),
where 12 features are used which is known to provide the lowest error rate, the distribution,
although still biased towards classifying point doublings, is a much closer to the expected
ratio of 2 : 1. It must be acknowledged that this is a somewhat ad-hoc method of refining
the template parameters, however is likely to be applicable to many scenarios where the
classifier can be hand tuned.
A closer examination of the error rates in Table 5.1 looks at the misclassification differences
between point doublings and additions for both the training and testing traces, where 12
features are retained. Its interesting to note that while the errors are evening distributed
for the training set, there is a large bias towards classifying the test operations as point
doublings, hence reducing the point doubling error rate compared to the training set and
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(a) Training distribution. (b) Testing distribution - 35 fea-
tures.
(c) Testing distribution - 12 fea-
tures.
Figure 5.12: Distribution of point doubling & addition classification probabilities.
Training Testing
Doubling 0.1156 0.0473
Addition 0.1153 0.2441
Table 5.1: Comparison of point operation errors.
increasing the point addition error rate. This is a somewhat trickier problem for an attacker
as while the traces under examination here have this effect, there is no reason to assume
that a set from a different target platform (or even a set on the same target platform
using a different group operation formula) will have a similar effect. Setting the decision
boundary larger than 0.5 will rebalance the error rates, but without prior knowledge an
attacker will simply be making random choices as to how to proceed. One scenario where
this might apply could be where an attacker is looking to break many ECDSA signatures,
each with a different ephemeral scalar operand. After performing an attack on the first
trace where considerable effort might be required to recover the secret, this information
could be used to further refine the key recovery stage. Iteratively updating the template
model in a reinforcement type learning manner should lead to greater accuracy hence a
faster correction stage, i.e. the greater the number of elliptic curve multiplicands recovered,
the faster it is to recover them.
5.7.3 Correcting Scaler Multiplicand Bit Errors
As mentioned previously, the error rate can be corrected somewhat due to the fact that two
consecutive addition operations cannot appear. HMMs [63, Ch. 3] were used to perform
this correction as suggested in [86, 116], however a slightly different approach is taken here.
Rather than the hidden states representing key bits as suggested in the previous work, the
hidden states here represent doubling and addition operations directly. In [116] emissions
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correspond to double or double-add, which is impractical for this analysis as it only allows
correction of errors between those operations. A more realistic approach is presented
in [86] where an extra variable is introduced to keep track of the number of operations
analysed allowing for distinguishing errors between point doubling and point additions
directly. This approach can be simplified here however due to the extra information
available due to our template training data set. By classifying the training set itself, the
emission probabilities of the HMM can be estimated, hence removing the extra complexity
of the tracking variable required in [86].
To generate the emission probabilities of state 0, i.e. the doubling state, a template is
first built for the doubling operation using the available traces. These doubling traces are
then classified using that template, with each trace being assigned a probability that it is
a doubling. The mean, and one minus the mean, of these probabilities are then used as
the emission probabilities for that state. The same procedure is repeated for the emission
probabilities of the addition state using the addition traces. Note that ideally, the traces
used to generate the emission probabilities would be separate to those used to build the
templates. A diagram of the HMM for this particular attack is given in Figure 5.13. These
HMM parameters can be viewed as extra parameters to train in the profiling stage, with
the emission probabilities dependent on the data under consideration. This slightly reduces
the overall error rate from 0.1131 to 0.1084, with a similar distribution to Figure 5.11(b).
Note that this method still does not make full use of the available information. The
classification probabilities of the predicted test operations go unused and the integration
of this information into the HMM could be an interesting topic to explore.
0
1
0.5
0.5
1
1 | 0.8332
0 | 0.1668
1 | 0.16750 | 0.8325
Figure 5.13: Hidden Markov model parameters.
To correct remaining key bits after the template attack, a few options are available. Where
the base point and scalar multiplication output are known, a brute force search can be
attempted. Note the output template probabilities give a natural search order to the
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key bits. A lattice based attack was also proposed in [193] where if a few bits of the
ephemeral nonce from the elliptic curve scalar multiplicands from several signatures was
available, the secret key can be recovered. Lattice based attacks require correct nonce
bits to work however. The work in [157] takes into account the probabilistic nature of
templates using Bleichenbacher’s Solution [31] when correcting ECDSA ephemeral scalar
multiplicand bits.
5.8 Attack on Hardware Montgomery Multiplier
The attacks to date have been all been against software algorithms running on the arm7
microprocessor. This is a suitable target device as it leaks, like many other microproces-
sors, a Hamming weight approximation of the values being manipulated. Hence it is worth
exploring how the attack would fare against a hardware platform such as an FPGA where
the leakage would approximately follow the Hamming distance model.
A 1024-bit version of the coarsely integrated operand scanning (CIOS) Montgomery mul-
tiplier [124] algorithm as given in Algorithm 5.8, was implemented with the architecture as
given in Figure 5.14. The target device was the Sasebo-G evaluation board with a Xilinx
Virtex-II FPGA, and 10 k each of the multiplication and squaring traces were taken from
the circuit while running at 2MHz, while recording the power consumption using a Pico-
Scope 3400 oscilloscope with a sampling rate of 250MSs-1. Algorithm 5.8 as implemented
requires w (2w+6)+2 clock cycles to complete. The radix b is set according the to size of
the single-precision multiplier, which is set to 32-bits in this case, and w = ⌈1024/b⌉ = 32.
While the choice of 32-bits is to allow for a more direct comparison with the software
results from the arm7 microprocessor, it must be noted that this is not an ideal choice
for the underlying FPGA device. A dedicated 18-bit signed embedded multiplier block
is available on the Virtex-II device [231], so for the choice of 32-bits cascaded multiplier
blocks must be used. As no pipe-lining is present between the embedded multipliers this
is a suboptimal use of resources, however it is adequate for the evaluation purposes here.
The CIOS architecture was chosen from the available options in [124] as the additions
could be scheduled to allow the use of a shift register rather than random access memory
(RAM) as shown in Figure 5.14.
The traces were filtered using a 100-point bandpass FIR filter with a Blackman window
and cut-off frequencies of 100 kHz and 9MHz, and the traces were reduced to a single
point per clock cycle by selecting the maximum point per clock. A sample multiplication
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Algorithm 5.8: CIOS Montgomery product.
Input: m = (mn−1, . . . ,m1,m0)b, x = (xn−1, . . . , x1, x0)b, y = (yn−1, . . . , y1, y0)b with
0 ≤ x, y < m, R = bn, gcd(m, b) = 1 and m′ = −m−1 mod b.
Output: A← x y R−1 mod m.
1 for i = 0 to n− 1 do
2 C ← 0 ;
3 for j = 0 to n− 1 do
4 (C, S)← aj + xj yi + C ;
5 aj ← S ;
6 end
7 (C, S)← an + C ;
8 an ← S ;
9 an+1 ← C ;
10 C ← 0 ;
11 t← a0m
′ mod R ;
12 (C, S)← a0 + tm0 ;
13 for j = 1 to n− 1 do
14 (C, S)← aj + tmj + C ;
15 aj−1 ← S ;
16 end
17 (C, S)← an + C ;
18 an−1 ← S ;
19 an ← an+1 + C ;
20 end
21 return A
trace is given in Figure 5.15(a) for reference, and the difference of means for all traces is
given in Figure 5.15(b).
Three distinct peaks are visible in the difference of means trace in Figure 5.15(b), two at
the beginning and one at the very end. A delay was implemented between reading and
writing data from the serial port, and execution of the multiplication to ensure that any
leakage is from the multiplication itself rather than the communications which can have a
significant effect on the power due to driving the loads of the pin-outs. Using the Xilinx
simulation tools to determine exactly where the peaks occur, the first two peaks can be
attributed to line 4 of Algorithm 5.8 when i ≡ j ≡ 0 and i ≡ j ≡ 1 respectively. The
third peak can be attributed to the last loop of line 19 where the output of the second
multiplication loop is input to the shift register. While this leakage point seems to be at
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Figure 5.14: CIOS Montgomery product architecture.
odds with what is expected, closer examination reveals that the control signal for shift
register a also controls shift register y, and this final multiplication step results in x0, y0
once again being routed though the embedded multiplier blocks although the output is
not used. Unlike when targeting a software implementation, a peak is not present for
for every time i = j however. This is likely due to the fact that the output register a
has to be cleared after each full multiplication for the correct accumulation of the single-
precision multiplication outputs hence it is only at the start that the Hamming weight is
leaked. While this does not fully explain the leakage of the final peak, it is likely to be
something similar due to the resetting of the circuit states back to their original values. It
is worth pointing out that the leakage is indeed due to the output Hamming weight of the
multiplier and not the bit transitions within the multiplier unit as described in [4, 223],
as if the latter was the reason for the leakage peaks would occur on line 4 of every loop
iteration when i = j.
Templates were built with 15 k traces randomly selected for the training set out of the set
of out of the 20 k, with the remaining 5 k allocated for testing. As before, the templates
were built by taking the z-scores of the traces, using the difference of means to select points
of interest. Cross validation is not used here as with the ECDSA attack, as the training
and testing traces are drawn from the same set. The expected classification error when
using QDA for this particular setup is given in Figure 5.16(a) as a function of the number
of features retained. When compared to the results from the arm7 microprocessor, the
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(a) CIOS Montgomery multiplication trace.
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(b) Difference of means trace.
Figure 5.15: CIOS Montgomery multiplication architecture trace examples.
error rate is much higher at ≈ 0.37, and the number of features that minimises the error is
much less due to the fewer number of peaks available to build the model. In Figure 5.16(b)
the error is plotted as a function of the training set size to see if a larger training set would
reduce the error rate however both the training and test errors are similar for a training
set size greater than approximately 10 k, hence a larger training set will unlikely decrease
the error.
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(a) Error rate as a function of retained features.
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(b) Error rate as a function of training set size.
Figure 5.16: Error rate for CIOS Montgomery multiplication architecture traces.
Despite the relatively few leakage points due to the Hamming weight difference under con-
sideration, templates can still be built to distinguish between multiplication and squaring
operations, albeit with a larger error rate than when attacking software implementations.
Hence in the context of key recover from an elliptic curve cryptosystem the attacker might
require multiple acquisitions with the same scalar multiplicand to compensate. Other
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options to improve the error rate could be to adopt a different strategy for feature extrac-
tion such as examining non-linear combinations of the data. The most effective method
however would be to take a more targeted approach to building templates. Currently
no knowledge of the underlying circuit architecture is assumed and the general approach
used is favourable to attacks against software implementations, however if an adversary
had access to source code or a bit file a more detailed template model could be built based
on bit transitions or a custom power model.
5.9 Application to Symmetric Key Algorithms
While the nature of asymmetric algorithms such as RSA and ECC encryption is suited
to being attacked by distinguishing multiplications and squarings, it can also be applied
against symmetric algorithms where multiplications are required. While it might not be
the most efficient method to recover a key for a given number of traces, there could be
scenarios in which building templates based on intermediate values is not feasible, for
example due to applied countermeasures.
Taking AES as an example, the MixColumns operation is in fact polynomial multipli-
cation modulo an irreducible polynomial. This involves byte-wise multiplications, with
the required operands being 2 and 3. If AES is implemented in this manner then the
templates could be built to determine when the input to the MixColumns is one of these
values which would allow key extraction in a known plaintext (or ciphertext) scenario. In
an 8-bit device it is likely look-up tables would be used, however in [25] an efficient method
to implement the MixColumns on 32-bit platforms using the multiplier is presented. As
this involves 32-bit words a chosen plaintext adversarial model is likely more appropriate.
Likewise the block cipher International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) [130] also
requires multiplications as shown in Figure 5.17. The algorithm has a 64-bit state with
128-bit keys, where each data path of Figure 5.17 is 16-bits wide. A chosen plaintext
attack where a squaring can be distinguished from a multiplication would trivially return
sub-keys k1, k4 with at most 2
16 inputs. The sub-keys k3, k5 can be jointly recovered by
varying the input to the modular addition with k3 while holding the other inputs constant.
Once the value that causes a squaring with k5 has been found a search of the 2
16 × 216
possible sub-keys returns the valid pairs. Sub-keys k2, k6 can be recovered in a similar
manner. Finally sub-keys k7, k8, which are used in the following round, can be trivially
found once the other sub-keys are known.
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Figure 5.17: IDEA block cipher round function.
5.10 Countermeasures
The presented attack highlights the importance of using regular exponentiation algorithms
such as the Montgomery Ladder [113], square only exponentiation for RSA [49] or add
only scalar multiplication for ECC [110]. An in-depth look at regular exponentiation
algorithms can be found in [110, 112]. It has been shown here that commonly used coun-
termeasures for RSA or ECC cryptosystems such as randomisation of the message/base
point, randomisation of the exponent/scalar multiplicand, side-channel atomic/unified al-
gorithms or the restriction of exponent/scalar use to a singe case, can be easily defeated if
templates can be built to distinguish between single-precision multiplication and squaring
operations.
The authors in [4] also attack ECC by distinguishing between squarings and multiplica-
tions. While they propose a method to recover the scalar operand when the Montgomery
ladder algorithm is used, the attack requires the use of a special elliptic curve point and
the attack does not generalise. Many attacks exist against regular algorithms however, and
all regular exponentiation algorithms were shown to be potentially vulnerable to collision
Profiling SCA on Crypto. Algorithms Neil Hanley
Section 5.11: Conclusion 118
attacks in [90]. This highlights the difficulty of protecting devices against SCAs due to
the varied adversarial threats.
A countermeasure proposed in [48] was to randomise the internal order of the single-
precision multiplications in a long integer multiplication. For the Montgomery multipli-
cation outlined in Algorithm 5.4, this would involve randomising the order that xi y was
computed on line 4. This should have a relatively low computational overhead, however
will make an attackers job considerably harder as he now has to determine if one single-
precision multiplication per loop is a squaring. For the arm7 microprocessor, this should
provide a strong level of security as looking at Figure 5.7 the classification rate of a single
multiplication isn’t much better than a random guess.
5.11 Conclusion
In this chapter it is demonstrated that the principle of side channel atomicity is not valid
simply because the same code is executed for a given function for all possible inputs. This
was done by characterizing the difference in expected Hamming weight of the result of a
multiplication and squaring operation given random uniformly distributed inputs to gen-
erate templates, based on previous descriptions of this difference in [10]. These templates
are generated by considering single-precision multiplications rather than multiplications
between multi-precision values.
These templates can be used to characterize multiplications and squaring operations to
determine a private exponent when an RSA signature is generated using Algorithm 5.5.
Previous work in this area [97, 148] has concentrated on building templates on inter-
mediate values (e.g. such as observing where the input value is reused in a left-to-right
exponentiation algorithm) rather than the expected distribution of the result of a given
function.
An advantage of this work over previous work based on the template model originally
proposed in [42] is that an attacker does not need an open identical device to conduct
the attack as demonstrated in §5.5.3. That is, an attacker does not need a device where
all the input and cryptographic keys can be changed to arbitrary values. An attacker
can use an identical device with a known key, or a verification functions that uses the
same operations. Furthermore, the values being operated on do not need to be known, an
attacker just needs to know that the values are random.
The work also applies to elliptic curve scalar multiplication as shown in §5.7. If strongly
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unified formulae such as those defined for Edward’s [24] or Weierstraß curves [35] are used,
then an algorithm equivalent to Algorithm 5.5 can be defined. While the bit length of the
prime field using in ECC is significantly smaller than the bit length of an RSA modulus
there are numerous operations in the prime field for each operation, i.e. the addition and
doubling operation, that could be exploited.
The attack is similar to the Big-Mac attack [219] in that recovery of the secret is due to
determining if an operation is a multiplication or squaring, however it trades a stronger
adversarial model, i.e. an attacker can generate templates, for a more robust attack.
Horizontal CPA [48] also looks to determine if an operation is a multiplication or squaring,
however intermediate values are used to determine the path taken by the algorithm. The
TA described here will also, counter-intuitively, become more effective with longer key
lengths due to the extra single-precision multiplications required, as previously noted in
[220] for similar reasons. This is also true of many of the other related attacks mentioned
in this chapter. Overall this work gives a strong argument for using regular exponentiation
algorithms such as found in [112], rather than, or in conjunction with, side channel atomic
algorithms.
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Chapter 6
Machine Learning Methods for
Side-Channel Attacks
6.1 Introduction
While TAs are the main method of choice for profiled SCA, they are not the only one. SMs
were introduced by Schindler et al. [195] as an alternative method to conduct profiling
attacks based on linear regression. However both TAs (or discriminant analysis) and
SMs assume a Gaussian distribution of the variables. While in the context of SCA this
assumption is often valid, there can be scenarios where it is not so, or where it would be
beneficial for an attacker not to be constrained by such assumptions. Hence supervised
machine learning methods seem a suitable topic for application to profiled attacks.
There is a large body of research in the computer science domain on machine learning
techniques which can be adapted for attacks, much of which pre-dates the topic of SCA
itself. Machine learning as a topic is becoming ever more important in the age of big data
to extract value from the slew of information being constantly generated.
One of the first references of machine learning in the context of cryptography was by
Rivest [191], who explored how advances in cryptanalysis contributed to advances in ma-
chine learning, and vice versa. It was many years then before one of the first uses of su-
pervised machine learning, as opposed to discriminant analysis, in the context of SCA was
used in an acoustic attack against dot matrix printers [14]1. Recently there has been a num-
ber of papers investigating the use of machine learning in the context of “classical” SCA,
1Cluster analysis was used prior to that in an unsupervised machine learning attack by Batina et al. [20]
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such as SVMs [19, 96, 99, 103, 104, 135], random forests [135, 136] and self-organising
maps [135]. Na¨ıve Bayes [63] is a widely used probabilistic classifier which assumes mul-
tiple independent features. It is essentially equivalent to the reduced TA of [145, Ch. 5]
where the off-diagonal elements of the covariance matrix are set to zero, thereby removing
any correlation between the features. Another profiling attack was presented by Sugawara
et al. [209] based on multivariate regression analysis. This is somewhat similar to the SM
as it uses linear regression to model expected power consumption values, however in the
classification step CPA (or any other non-profiling distinguisher) is used for key recovery.
This was also suggested by Whitnall et al. in [226]. Gaussian mixture models (GMM)
as previously used in [134] is another method for which closer examination could lead to
interesting results. There has also been a number of papers investigating unsupervised
methods for non-profiling attacks based on clustering [20, 100], as well as investigating
clustering as a means to improve classical TA [137], however these unsupervised methods
are outside the scope of this thesis which focuses on profiled attack methods. Although
profiling attacks were originally suggested at the 1999 CHES workshop [70], the same
year Kocher et al. first presented power analysis in the Crypto conference, it is only
recently that the large body of literature on widely used machine learning algorithms
have begun to be applied. Hence any general purpose book on statistical learning such as
[30, 56, 63, 95, 106] will have relevant algorithms and techniques to improve classification
performance.
To compare classification methods, the error rate of unseen testing data is used which is
essentially the inverse of the success rate as outlined in §2.8. Although all algorithms are
used such that they return probabilistic outputs allowing for amplified TAs, key recovery
from a single trace is preferred hence the error rate is the main metric used to compare
algorithms. A paper by Standaert et al. comparing TAs and SM [205], uses an entropy
reduction matrix to compare the efficiency of the profiling stage, with the mutual informa-
tion [80] directly derived from it. This idea was further expanded in [188] with the notion
of perceived information which can be viewed as the mutual information where a different
device is used to build templates, as it accounts for the difference in power consumption
between devices. Perceived information is upper bounded by the mutual information as
identical leakage between devices can be seen as the best case scenario for an attacker.
Two trace sets are used in the following, the first are the 160-bit multiplication traces
from §5.5.3 implemented using a constant time 32-bit single precision multiplier. This is a
binary classification problem where the goal is to distinguish between a multiplication and
a squaring operation. A total of 10 k traces are allocated as training traces, and the error
Profiling SCA on Crypto. Algorithms Neil Hanley
Section 6.2: Stochastic Methods 122
rate is calculated over a separate set of 5 k testing traces. These 15 k traces are randomly
selected for each experiment from a larger set of 40 k. The training traces are normalised
by taking their z-scores, with the empirical mean and standard deviation then applied
to the testing traces. Feature selection is always performed using the sost method as
outlined in §3.3.3, as due to the binary classification problem Fisher’s linear discriminant
can only return a single feature. Note also that the use of Fisher’s linear discriminant will
bias the features prior to non-parametric methods such as SVMs or NNs. Where the error
curve is a function of the training set size, the z-score and feature extraction calculations
are performed using the current number of training samples.
The second set of traces used are the AES traces from the arm7 microprocessor that have
been used extensively through this thesis. The target is always the value of first byte of
the S-Box output in round one, giving a K = 256 multi-class classification problem. Here
25 k traces are used for the training set, chosen at random from a set of 50 k for each
experiment, with 5 k samples again used for error calculation, chosen from a different set
of 50 k traces from the same device. Feature selection is also performed using the sost
method to ensure consistency with the binary classification results.
The first four sections of this chapter deal with Stochastic Methods §6.2, Logistic Regression
§6.3, Support Vector Machines §6.4, and Neural Networks §6.5. An overview of each is
given, with attacks against the two trace sets as described above evaluated for various
parameter selections. A comparison between the classifiers is given in §6.6 using the
parameters that minimise the error for each model. An overview of the importance of
feature selection is given in §6.7, with conclusions drawn in §6.8.
6.2 Stochastic Methods
SM were first introduced by Schindler et al. [195] as an alternative profiling attack to TA.
The stated goal of the approach aims to achieve the efficiency of the template attacks in the
key extraction phase but requiring far less measurements in the profiling phase [195]. While
works such as [81, 205, 226] have already discussed the relative merits of SM compared to
templates, here different methods of building SM are explored, before comparing them to
different machine learning techniques in §6.6.
SM allow an adversary to take advantage of any knowledge he may have about the target
device during the profiling stage, however they can equally be generalised such that an
adversary is assumed to have no prior device specific information. Following the description
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in [205], given a set of leakage traces x(i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, there will a some point in time
where x
(i)
t which corresponds to the target leakage function Lt(F(p
(i), s)) where p(i) is a
known input corresponding to x(i), s is the secret we wish to recover and Lt(F()) some
leakage at a specific time corresponding to a function of both inputs, such as the S-
Box function of AES. For illustrative purposes it is be assumed that recovering y(i) =
F(p(i), s) is equivalent to recovering s, hence the error is calculated for y(i) ∈ K. While
this will not necessarily always be the case, the model can be easily adapted when it is
not so.
The SM assumes that the leakage function Lt can be written as a deterministic and a
random part, i.e. Lt(y
(i)) = δt(y
(i))+ρt. Both parts are then profiled separately to build a
model for key recovery. The training samples are split into two (not necessarily equal) sets
{x˙, x¨} such that x˙∩ x¨ is empty, with m1 samples in x˙, m2 samples in x¨, and m = m1+m2.
6.2.1 Approximation of the Deterministic Part
Assuming that the deterministic part of the model can be computed as a linear sum,
δt(y
(i)) =
∑u−1
j=0 βj,t ·gj,t(y
(i)) for some base functions gj,t, the coefficients β can be approx-
imated using linear regression. The problem is then reduced to finding u base functions
gj,t that allow an accurate approximation of δt.
In practice, the chosen base function is simply the bit values of the chosen target function.
For example, if the target when attacking AES was the output byte of an S-Box, this
would give gj,t(y
(i)) = bit( S(p(i) ⊗ s), j ) for 1 ≤ j ≤ 8. A bias term is required for the
approximation of the β coefficients via linear regression therefore g0,t(y
(i)) = 1 ∀ i, hence
u = 9 in this particular scenario. This choice of base function, while simple, is generally
quite effective as it has been shown that different bits will contribute varying amounts to
the power consumption [5].
The matrix A is constructed as in Equation 6.1 for each of the m1 training samples,
allowing the β weighting values to be then calculated according to Equation 6.2. As
y(i) can only take on |K| finite values, an approximation of δt for each possible value
can be precomputed for use in both the approximation of the random part, as well as
the classification stage using Equation 6.3, where G is similar to the matrix A, except
constructed for the |K| distinct values of y(i).
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A =

g0,t(y
(1)) g1,t(y
(1)) · · · gu−1,t(y(1))
g0,t(y
(2)) g1,t(y
(2)) · · · gu−1,t(y(2))
...
...
. . .
...
g0,t(y
(m1)) g1,t(y
(m1)) · · · gu−1,t(y(m1))
 (6.1)
bt = [β0,t, β1,t, . . . , βu−1,t] = (A′ ×A)−1 ×A′ × x˙ (6.2)
∆ˆt = [δˆ0,t, δˆ1,t, . . . , δˆ|K|−1,t] = G× bt (6.3)
6.2.2 Approximation of the Random Part
As outlined in [195], approximation of the random part of the traces is not strictly neces-
sary, however in practice a lower classification error is achieved when it is. For each of the
m2 traces, the δˆi,t corresponding to y
(i) is subtracted to leave a noise vector r(i) = x¨(i)−δˆi,t.
An empirical covariance matrix Σˆt, can then be calculated using these noise vectors. This is
similar to the calculation of the single noise covariance matrix calculation for LDA, §3.3.6
(as opposed to the classical QDA which has a noise covariance matrix for each class).
Rather than subtracting the empirical mean vector µˆ(i), the deterministic section of a
trace δˆi,t is used instead. It is worth pointing out that using a separate set of traces to
model the noise component would likely be beneficial for regular TA also. However in the
case of QDA a substantial penalty on the number of training traces would be required.
There are no set rules as to the ratio to split the training set m into m1 and m2. In
previous work, a split [195, 81, 134, 205] of 0.5 is commonly used. The optimum split is
wholly dependent on the target device and acquisition setup, with particularly low noise
devices maybe benefiting from a larger number of traces allocated towards estimating the
deterministic trace parts. In the experiments that follow, all traces are allocated evenly
and at random between m1 and m2, and any plot indices representing the number of
traces used for training represent the the number of traces used for both m1 and m2. The
random allocation of traces from across m rather than just the first or second half is also
important to prevent any potential biases adversely affecting the results.
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6.2.3 Classification using Stochastic Models
The classification stage differs depending on if the random part is modelled or not. Where
it is not available, the attack is known as Min, and the minimum distance between the
attack trace x(i) and the various δˆi,t indicates the most likely intermediate value. It was
shown in the original paper [195] that this is not as efficient as the Max method which
includes the noise covariance estimation, however for completeness is is included here.
The likelihood of an attack trace given a set of learned stochastic models, including the
noise covariance, can be calculated using Equation 6.4, which again is quite similar to
classical TAs. Indeed from an implementation perspective, the main difference between
a TA and using the SM is in the generation of the mean vectors µˆ(i) and the deterministic
trace parts δˆi,t. Once the likelihoods for all models is computed the maximum value is
taken as most likely, or if probabilities are required then Bayes’ theorem, Equation 3.4,
can be used. Likewise for an amplified attack where more than one trace is available
for key extraction, Bayes’ can be applied iteratively as in Equation 3.6. It is also worth
noting that in the case of aMin attack, likelihoods can be calculated by taking the identity
matrix, I, in place of the noise covariance matrix, Σˆt, allowing the same equation to be
used.
L
(
x(i) | δˆi,t, Σˆt
)
=
1√
(2π)n
∣∣∣Σˆt∣∣∣ e
− 1
2(x
(i)−δˆi,t)Σˆ−1t (x(i)−δˆi,t)
⊤
(6.4)
6.2.4 One-Hot Encoding
The choice of the base function gj,t() greatly affects the outcome of a Stochastic based
attack. While the selection of intermediate bit values as explained previously is widely
used, it is not the only method. It was also suggested in [195] that a Hamming weight based
model could be used by appending the Hamming weight of the intermediate value to
the bias term as shown in Equation 6.5 to give a two-dimensional basis. From here
it is a straightforward step to simply append the intermediate value itself rather than
the Hamming weight as in Equation 6.6.
Profiling SCA on Crypto. Algorithms Neil Hanley
Section 6.2: Stochastic Methods 126
A =

1 HW (y(1))
1 HW (y(2))
. . . . . .
1 HW (y(m))
 (6.5) A =

1 y(1)
1 y(2)
. . . . . .
1 y(n)
 (6.6)
Another option, which has not been previously examined in the literature, is to encode the
intermediate target value using one-hot encoding, for example as in Equation 6.7, where
only a single column of each row besides the bias term contains a 1. An advantage of this
is that each β parameter now represents a different intermediate value as opposed to a part
of a weight sum. This allows a more accurate representation, as power consumption due to
bijections of the target value (such as the S-Box input in the case of targeting the AES S-
Box output) are now also considered. A disadvantage of this encoding however, is the
extra β parameters that need to be estimated, which is now of the order of the number
of unique classes, rather than log2 of the number, hence a greater number of traces is
required for the profiling stage.
A =

1 0 0 · · · 0 1
1 0 0 · · · 1 0
...
...
...
. . .
... 0
1 0 1 · · · 0 0
1 1 0 · · · 0 0

(6.7)
Using the AES traces acquired from the arm7 microprocessor as described in the intro-
duction, a profiling attack using the SM was conducted for various base vectors. Note
Hamming weight based models were not considered as the goal is to recover the key with
only a single trace.
Examining Figure 6.1, training errors are given by the dashed lines, with the testing error
given by the solid lines. The plotting of the training error in learning curves is useful as
the relationship between the error curves can help to distinguish bias or variance in the
model. It is clear from the graph that using one-hot encoding provides the lowest error
rate, keeping in mind that a large number of training samples were used (m = 25 k as
specified in §6.1). It is interesting to note however, that when only using a small number
of features, the Min and Max attacks give somewhat similar results, likely due to the fact
that all 25 k traces are used for estimating β in the Min attack while in the Max attack
Profiling SCA on Crypto. Algorithms Neil Hanley
Section 6.2: Stochastic Methods 127
they are split between estimating β and Σ. Simply appending the target values in the
case of the identity model gives poor results as is expected.
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Figure 6.1: Error rate as a function of retained features.
6.2.5 Polynomial Basis Functions
Another option for the basis function is to explore polynomial combinations of the bits,
as suggested by Whitnall and Oswald [226]. A related, lower order approach was also
examined by Gierlichs et al. in [81] where they utilised a 17-point basis function to include
S-Box input leakage by incorporating the bits of the input and the output. Here, every
combination of bits is calculated hence contributions due to the square or cube of bits
are calculated, unlike in [226]. This leads to larger computational complexities for higher
orders however as the expansion has u =
(
b+ℓ
ℓ
)
terms where ℓ is the expansion order and
b the bit-length of the target value. For example for a ℓ = 6th order polynomial, there are
u =
(
8+6
6
)
= 3003 base function components. Practically, this matrix needs to be inverted,
and the exponential nature of the expansion means that larger values become infeasible.
Looking at Figure 6.2(a), it is clear that by increasing the polynomial order that the error
rate can be significantly reduced compared to the base function based on the bit values,
and is comparable to the identity model using the one-hot encoding. Only the Max
method using the bit and one-hot basis functions are retained from Figure 6.1, as they
are they original, and give the lowest error rate respectively. The training error is omitted
in Figure 6.2(a) for clarity. Fixing the number of retained features to 100 to minimise
the testing error (note in a real-world attack cross-validation would need to be used to
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determine the number of features to retain), the effect of the training set size is examined
in Figure 6.2(b), with the training error again represented by the dashed lines. The use
of a 6th order polynomial gives comparable performance to that of the one-hot method,
however with the advantage that profiling is still possible for a low number of training
samples, unlike the one-hot method which requires at least 4 traces per intermediate value
(2 each for the deterministic and random parts).
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(a) Polynomial expansion of basis function.
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Figure 6.2: Error rate of polynomial expansion.
6.2.6 Higher-Order Stochastic Attack
To see exactly why polynomial expansion of the basis function gives improved results,
higher-order attacks are examined. Figure 6.3(a) gives the error rate when attacking the
both the S-Box input and output, as well as combining the probabilities of both profiling
attacks to give a higher-order attack. The lines with circles here represent the original
base function based on bit values, while the lines with the crosses are where a 6th order
polynomial is used. It can be seen that the higher order attack greatly reduces the error
rate for the Bit model, while it only slightly improves the polynomial expansion results.
As shown in [117], plotting the β characteristics can reveal interesting information about
where the trace leakage occurs. Here, instead of the β values, a plot of the sum across
∆ˆ is provided instead in Figure 6.3(b). No feature reduction method is used here prior
to model building to give an idea of the β weighting values in the time dimension. This
then gives the expected trace representation as modelled by the SM. For reference, the red
crosses along the base of the graphs represent the first 100 features as would have been
selected by using the sost method. The top two graphs of Figure 6.3(b) have different
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peaks referring the input data (upper) and the MixColumns operations (middle). They
share a common peak around where the S-Box operation occurs, but closer examination
shows that the large peaks are slightly offset as they represent the S-Box input and output
respectively. In contrast in the lower plot from the high-order polynomial basis, all the
peaks are present, including a wider peak about the S-Box. Hence the error rate is lower
due to the greater utilisation of the leakage data.
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Figure 6.3: Error rate for higher order stochastic attack.
Overall, if conducting a SM attack and a large training set is available, then building the
basis functions using the one-hot method will give the best results, however as a larger
training set is required this negates the main advantage of the SM, i.e. the small profiling
base. For smaller set sizes, setting the basis functions as polynomial expansions of the
bit components of an intermediate value should give a significant improvement in the
classification over simply taking the bit-values.
6.3 Logistic Regression
LR is a widely used binary classification algorithm [95, 158] that can also be use to con-
duct side-channel attacks. It is similar in ways to the linear regression based SM attack as
presented in the previous section. In a stochastic attack the weighting parameters, β, are
used to determine an empirically modelled trace, δˆ, for some hypothetical intermediate
value in an attack. This is then subtracted from the actual attack trace to leave a noise
vector, and the multivariate Gaussian distribution is used to determine the likelihood of
that intermediate value occuring, given the target trace. In contrast, in LR the weighting
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values, θ, are applied directly to the selected features of the attack trace to give a hypoth-
esis of between 0 and 1, with 0.5 generally being the decision boundary between the two
classes.
To perform classification using LR, it is required to learn weights for each feature (i.e. se-
lected trace points) such that 0 ≤ hθ(x) ≤ 1. This can be achieved with the use of the
Sigmoid function as shown in Equation 6.8.
hθ(x) = g(θ
⊤x) =
1
1 + eθ⊤x
(6.8)
A graphical representation of the sigmoid function is given in Figure 6.4, and it shows that
the larger the negative (resp. postive) input is, then the asymptotically closer to 0 (resp.
1) the function outputs. Therefore if we train our θ values such that negative numbers
represent class 0, and postive numbers class 1 then we have a bounded output which also
gives us the probability that the input trace x belongs to class 1.
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Figure 6.4: Sigmoid function.
Following the tutorial as provided in [158], to learn the θ parameters, the cost function
as given in Equation 6.9 must be minimised. This is a convex minimisation problem and
can be solved using normal equations, similar to the SM in Equation 6.2, or through
methods such as gradient descent. The use of normal equations becomes problematic for
larger training sets due to the requirement of a matrix inversion of the order of the num-
ber of features. However, packages such as Matlab and GNU Octave contain efficient
numerical minimisation algorithms that are often faster than gradient descent, especially
for training sets with a large number of samples and/or features. In the work here, an
slightly modified version of the gradient descent minimisation algorithm provided by the
tutorials in [158] is used. Plotting the cost as function of the number of iterations in the
minimisation algorithm gives an efficient way of viewing the convergence of the algorithm.
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J(θ) = −
[
1
m
m∑
i=1
y(i) log hθ(x
(i)) + (1− y(i)) log(1− hθ(x
(i)))
]
+
λ
2m
n∑
j=1
θ2j (6.9)
The number of training samples is represented by m, x(i) is a training feature vector,
and y(i) the corresponding class label. A regularisation parameter λ is also included in the
cost function to prevent over-fitting of the model, as otherwise the minimisation algorithm
could lead to a result that perfectly fits the training samples but generalises poorly to the
population sample as a whole.
6.3.1 Attack on Multiplication
As LR is a binary classifier, it is first applied to the 160-bit multiplication & squaring traces
from §5.5.3, using 10 k training traces with feature selection as outlined in the introduction.
Both the training (dashed line) and testing (solid line) error rate for an increasing number
of features is given in Figure 6.5(a). It can be seen that larger values of λ not only lead
to a lower testing error, but also increase the training error hence preventing the selection
of θ values which cause over-fitting of the model.
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Figure 6.5: LR attack on 160-bit multiplications.
The error rate as a function of the number of training samples is also given in Figure 6.5(b),
with 1 k features and λ = 100 used to train the classifier. It can be seen that the testing
error is still falling as the training set size is increased, hence the error could likely be
further decreased with the addition of extra training traces. The increase in the training
error again shows that the model is beginning to fit the model as a whole rather than the
subset of the training samples.
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To analyse why the LR based attack works, the training stage is again run using 10 k
training traces, except this time without any feature selection pre-processing step. The
z-scores of the traces are still taken however, as this allows a faster convergence of the
gradient descent algorithm. The learned θ values are shown in the lower plot of Figure 6.6,
with the sost selection trace given for comparison in the upper plot. Note the largest
peak is truncated for clarity in the sost plot. It can be seen that LR largely assigns
weights according to the sost peaks, except for the initial smaller peaks which are due
to the re-use of y0 in line 3 of Algorithm 3. When classifying using LR, the weighted
sum of θ with the target trace should only be greater than 0 prior to the application of
the sigmoid function when the target class is multiplication operation. This is because a
multiplication is expected on average to consume more power that a squaring, hence the
negative weights at the points of interest will cause the sum of a squaring trace to add up
to less than 0.
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Figure 6.6: LR weighting values.
6.3.2 Attack on AES
To utilise LR classifier or any other binary classifier, such as SVMs, to recover a key byte
from AES, for example, an extension to a multi-class classifier is required. Two widely used
methods utilised in machine learning literature are One-v-All and One-v-One [106]. These
are used here along with a bit-wise model as now explained in the context of attacking a
byte-sized intermediate value:
Bit: Each target key byte can be simply decomposed into its binary format, and models
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built individually for these bits. The probability of each byte is subsequently calcu-
lated through the product of its individual bits. This gives a total of 8 models to be
trained for byte recovery, and all of the available traces are used for each model.
One-v-All: In this method, a model is trained for each byte individually, with each trace
belonging to that byte assigned to one class and all other training traces assigned to
the second class. All traces are again used for the training of each model, and 256
models in total need to be trained. It is worth keeping in mind that the class sizes
are no longer symmetric and, assuming uniformly random plaintext inputs, the ratio
of traces in each class is expected to be 1256 . Where the training set is large enough to
accurately model the θ parameters for the smaller class this is not an issue, however
for smaller training set sizes it could introduce a skew to the classifier. The correct
byte is then simply chosen as the one that gives the largest probability.
One-v-One: Depending on the data set size and number of classes, this can be quite a
computationally intensive method to train as it requires training a classifier for all
pairs of classes. In the case of classifying an S-Box output,
(
256
2
)
= 32640 separate
models are required. However, as only two bytes are considered for each model, only
2
256 of the training traces are used for each model. To perform the classification the
target trace is classified using every model, with the byte that is assigned most likely
assumed to be the correct one.
It must be noted that these are not the only binary to multi-class options available, and the
nature of power analysis is such that algorithms can be tailored for the problem at hand.
For example a binary tree based method could utilise a divide-and-conquer approach for
key recovery. This is the approach followed in [19], however it requires a strict order in
terms of the power consumption of each class such as the Hamming weight model.
The three methods listed above were used to classify both the AES traces, with the error
rate as a function of the number of retained features given in Figure 6.7. For this initial
analysis, 25 k training traces are used and λ = 0. It can be seen that the computationally
intensive One-v-One method outperforms the other methods with regards to byte-wise
classification, however the One-v-All method also performs relatively well. It is interesting
to see that the Bit method, while the most straightforward and quickest to implement,
performs significantly worse. This is somewhat expected as only the leakage of a bit is
being utilised for training a classifier rather than the leakage of a byte. Each bit also leaks
different amounts, this is shown in greater detail in Appendix C.
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Figure 6.7: LR multi-class comparison.
Due to the computational overhead for the One-v-One multi-class method for a K =
256 problem, the One-v-All method is used in future experiments where applicable. In
Figure 6.8(a), the effect of λ is examined and in contrast to the binary classification with
the 160-bit multiplication traces, larger values of λ give a higher error. Taking λ = 1 and
100 features, the effect of the training set size is explored in Figure 6.8(b). The error rate
is asymptotically decreasing as the number of training samples is increased with a larger
set size likely to further decrease the error rate, albeit by a small amount as the curve is
flattening out.
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Figure 6.8: LR attack on AES.
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When presented with a set of traces to perform supervised learning on, applying LR as
a first test is worthwhile, particulary if it is a large dataset with many training samples
and features, as it is quick to run and can give results comparable to more advanced
algorithms. Even where the results aren’t as accurate, it can give an indication as to what
to try next. The disadvantage of course is the lack of a native multiclass classification
method, with the extension choice directly affecting the error rate.
6.4 Support Vector Machines
As previously mentioned SVMs [54], have recently been proposed for use in profiling
attacks [104, 135], with further subsequent studies in [19, 96, 99, 103]. SVMs offer an
interesting alternative to TAs due to their non-parametric approach, thereby removing
the assumption of Gaussian distributed data. While power traces from many different
devices have been shown to be inherently Gaussian in nature, this could allow for some
interesting artificial feature constructions, such as that in [96] where the authors include
the plaintext bits when attacking an xor operation. Work to date has largely focused on
the Hamming weight leakage of software AES implementations running on basic micro-
controllers. An exception to this is the work by Lerman et al. [135] which looks at an
FPGA implementation of DES. They build models on the key-bits directly, the fact that
the key expansion in DES is simply bit-shifting means that key leakage occurs across the
full length of the encryption trace. Previous work [19, 99] has also shown that SVM based
profiling attacks can allow model building with a smaller number of training traces. As
before, we are interested in the error rate for a key byte given only a single trace, hence
models based on the Hamming weight leakage are not examined here.
Like LR, SVMs are a binary classification algorithm without any natural extension to
multi-class classification. Two assumptions underpinning the algorithm are that trans-
forming data into a higher dimensional feature space can convert complex decision bound-
aries to simpler, linear boundaries, and that the training samples closest to the decision
boundaries provide the most useful information for classification.
Following the explanation as given in [212], the SVM training process looks the maximise
the margin between the two classes as illustrated in Figure 6.9, where w is the normal to
the hyperplane H given by the solid line, b||w|| is the perpendicular distance to the origin,
and 2||w|| is the distance between the hyperplanes H−1 and H1, which are represented by
the dashed lines. To ensure the model generalises well, the hyperplane is chosen such that
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it maximally separates the two classes. The vector x(i) that represents H is that which
sets Equation 6.10 to 0, with the hyperplanes H−1 and H1 given by f(x(i)) = {−1, 1}
respectively.
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Figure 6.9: SVM decision boundary.
f(x(i)) = w · x(i) − b (6.10)
Given a set of m training samples, in order for them to be correctly classified, each trace
must satisfy Equation 6.11, however as we are also seeking to maximise the distance
between H−1 and H1, therefore 2||w|| must be as large as possible. Hence, finding H can
be seen as the problem of minimising 12 ||w||
2 subject to Equation 6.11. This original
primal optimisation problem and can be solved using the Lagrange function given in
Equation 6.12, where the Lagrange multipliers satisfy αi ≥ 0 for all i.
y(i) f(x(i)) ≥ 1, ∀i (6.11)
L(w, b, α) =
||w||2
2
−
m∑
i=1
αi
[
y(i) f(x(i))− 1
]
(6.12)
Consequently, this leads to
∑m
i=1 αi y
(i) = 0, and w =
∑m
i=1 αi y
(i) x(i), which can subse-
quently be substituted back into Equation 6.12 leading to the dual optimisation problem
as given in Equation 6.13. This is a convex quadratic programming (QP) problem for
which there are efficient solutions. A through explanation of the SVM algorithm is given
in textbooks such as [56, 95]. Note the use of a dot product x(i) · x(j) in Equation 6.13
which is important for the use of kernels as explained below.
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maximize
m∑
i=1
αi −
1
2
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
αi αi y
(i) y(j) (x(i) · x(j))
s.t.

m∑
i=1
αi y
(i) = 0
αi ≥ 0 ∀i
(6.13)
When the weights αi and bias b are calculated, classification is performed by taking the sign
of Equation 6.14 when applied to a test vector, where ms ≤ m is the number of support
vectors. Note that the SVM only returns what class a sample belongs to, it doesn’t return
any confidence measure of how correct it is, however f(x(i)) does return the distance to
the hyperplane which can be used to determine a probabilistic output as explained below.
Note that the two classes are given by y(i) ∈ {−1, 1} as opposed to the more usual {0, 1},
and that only the samples denoted support vectors, as indicted in red in Figure 6.9, are
required for the classification. Where a large percentage of the input samples are support
vectors, it can be a sign of over-fitting to the training set, or alternatively that the classes
are poorly separable.
f(x(i)) =
ms∑
j=1
αj y
(j) (x(i) · x(j))− b (6.14)
Soft Margins: Due to noise on the training traces, a separating hyperplane is unlikely
to exist, or where a kernel as described below is used, the hyperplane is unlikely to
generalise well and over-fit the training data if it is found. Hence slack variables, ξi,
are introduced for each training sample to allow its misclassification if it increases the
overall accuracy of the model. This modifies Equation 6.11 to that in Equation 6.15.
Trivial solutions exist where the ξi are made arbitrarily large, hence a regularisation
parameter C is introduced such that there is a Cost associated with each slack
variable. Note this performs a similar function as λ in LR, except it is now inverted
such that as C →∞ errors are not allowed hence the SVM becomes a hard margin
classifier with the slack variables set to zero. As C decreases a greater number of
errors are allowed and it is known as a soft margin classifier. Another way of looking
at this is that a large C gives a low bias, high variance model, while a small C gives
a higher bias, low variance model [158]. The primal optimisation problem now looks
to minimise 12 ||w||
2 + C
∑m
i=1 ξi subject to Equation 6.15.
y(i)f (x(i)) ≥ 1− ξi where ξi ≥ 0 ∀i (6.15)
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Kernel Usage: The use of kernels allows the classification of non-linearly separable data
through mapping to a higher dimensional feature space where it is linearly separable.
The dot product in Equation 6.13 and Equation 6.14 is replaced by a non-linear
mapping Φ such that 〈x(i) · x(j)〉 → 〈φ(x(i)), φ(x(j))〉. There is no need to know this
mapping explicitly, only the kernel K(x(i), x(j)) which is known as the kernel trick.
Commonly used kernel functions which are also used here given in Equation 6.16.
Linear x(i) · x(j)
Polynomial
(
x(i) · x(j)
)d
Gaussian e
−
(
|x(i)−x(j)|2
2σ2
) (6.16)
The linear kernel is equivalent to not using a kernel, and is only suitable in cases
where the data is linearly separable. As shown in [19], for low noise target devices
this is enough to allow the classification of Hamming weights. The Gaussian kernel is
also commonly referred to as the radial basis function (RBF) kernel and the terms are
used interchangeably here. Good visualisations of how the different kernels affect
the decision boundary in the two-dimensional case are given in [103, 104]. These
are not the only kernel functions however, and while arbitrary functions cannot be
specified as a kernel (functions need to satisfy Mercer’s Theorem [56]), there are
many other options such as perceptrons, string, chi-square, histograms, etc. One
disadvantage of using kernels is the extra parameter that now must be chosen, e.g. d
and σ for polynomial and Gaussian kernels respectively, as well as the cost C. For
the Gaussian kernel, increasing σ has the effect of smoothing the decision boundary
thereby giving a lower variance model and vice-versa. This is the opposite to the cost
C, however the relationship between them is non-linear. The classification algorithm
is now modified by taking the sign of Equation 6.17.
f(x(i)) =
ms∑
j=1
αj y
(j)K
(
x(i), x(j)
)
− b (6.17)
Probabilistic Output: The SVM classification is given by the sign of Equation 6.17,
and as previously mentioned this does not provide any probabilistic information on
the decision. Due to the inherent noise in a SCA, probabilistic values are useful
to determine the key by analysing multiple traces, or to enable an enhanced brute
search correction of an estimated key guess. It was suggested by Platt in [180] to
fit to Sigmoid function, as previously shown in Figure 6.4, to the returned distances
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f(x(i)) as shown in Equation 6.18, where the parameters {PA, PB} are found by min-
imising the negative log-likelihood of the training data. This method of generating
a probabilistic output was also used in [19], and a full explanation is given in [180].
Pr
(
y(i) = 1|x(i)
)
=
1
1 + ePA f(x
(i))+PB
(6.18)
The work in [103, 104] use a different variant of SVMs as just described, which is known
as least squares support vector machines (LS-SVM) [210]. Here the model is formulated
such that a solution can be found by solving a set of linear equations rather than a QP
problem. Rather than building support vectors based only on a subset of samples, all
samples are assigned some weighting value hence every sample is a support vector. Larger
weights indicate a greater contribution to the training sample to the decision boundary. In
practice, experiments indicate little difference in classification performance with the data
sets under consideration. While LS-SVM can be faster for smaller data sets, a matrix
inversion of the order of the number of training samples is required which can become
prohibitive so the original SVM construction is used here.
The attacks presented here use the SVMlight library [108] with the Matlab wrapper from
Anton Schwaighofer available at [107]. A secondary wrapper as used in [212] is used to
implement a grid search for the SVM cost parameter, as well as the extra parameters
depending on the kernel if required. The grid search alternates holding one parameter
constant while searching across a range of values for the other, using 10-fold cross validation
to minimise the error, hence both parameters are selected with respect to each other.
While this removes to need to select the SVM parameters, it does so at the expense of a
considerably longer training time.
6.4.1 Attack on Multiplication
Using the same multiplication traces as in the LR based attack previously, classification
is performed using SVMs to determine if a trace is from a multiplication or squaring
operation. The choice of 10 k training traces for this data set across all machine learning
methods, is actually due to the length of time it takes to train the SVM parameters.
Larger trace sets incur memory problems, as well as a considerably longer training time
due to the cross validation required to optimise parameter selection.
The error rate for the three kernels mentioned previously is given in Figure 6.10(a), where
the dashed lines indicate the training error and the solid lines the test error. It can be
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Linear Polynomial Gaussian
Cost 0.002 0.005 0.2
Kernel Param. – 1 (d) 8.41× 10−4 (σ)
Platt
PA 4.5310 3.9410 8.5171
PB 0.0876 0.0766 0.0907
Table 6.1: Learned SVM parameters.
seen that the linear and polynomial kernels outperform the Gaussian one, indicating that
the data sets are somewhat linearly separable. The parameters learned using 1 k features
for the three kernels are given in Table 6.1. The estimates for the Platt parameters, PA
and PB to return a probabilistic value are also given.
The SVM algorithm was rerun, except this time setting the number of features to 1 k
and varying the number of training traces, while using the linear kernel. As seen in
Figure 6.10(b), the error rate is still falling as the number of training traces is increased,
hence it is likely that further training samples would further decrease it, as was the case
with the LR classification method. However the error rate is already quite low for smaller
training set sizes.
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Figure 6.10: SVM attack on 160-bit multiplications.
6.4.2 Attack on AES
To extend SVMs for use in multi-class problems to determine the output of the AES
S-Box, the same methods as before can be utilised again, that is bitwise, one-v-all, one-
v-one. An empirical study of multi-class options for SVMs was undertaken in [62], and
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found a modified version of the one-v-one method incorporating Platt’s probabilities [180]
was most efficient. However for the data set here, the
(
8
2
)
number of combinations when
using one-v-one leads to an unrealistic training time despite the fact only a portion of the
training set is used each time. Likewise, due to the poor performance of the bitwise model
previously in §6.3.2, this method is also discounted. Hence only the one-v-all method is
used, however the large training set size again causes memory issues. To work around these
memory problems, for each of the 256 classes, the class under consideration is labelled 1,
and the −1 class is randomly selected from the remaining samples such that it is 10 times
larger. This arbitrary value of 10 is chosen such that the resultant subset of the training
set that is fed to the SVM has ≈ 1 k samples, which through experimental analysis, allows
the training of the SVM in a reasonable length of time without losing too much accuracy.
When training unbalanced data sets, the use of cross-validation to select parameter values
that minimises the error rate can be problematic as biasing the model towards always
correctly classifying the larger of the two classes will artificially lower the error rate and
generalise poorly to unseen samples. The SVM construction allows for separate cost
parameters, C, for both classes leading to asymmetric soft margins. However in this
scenario, the penalisation of one class over another isn’t desirable as both classes have an
equal a priori probability of occuring. Hence rather than looking to minimise the overall
error, the mean of the individual scaled class errors is minimised.
As can be seen in Figure 6.11(a), the Gaussian kernel gives the best results using 30 fea-
tures. Also, unlike in the previous experiment distinguishing multiplication and squaring
operations, as the number of features is increased the error rate also increases as features
which do not contribute to the target leakage skew the model towards lowering the training
error. Looking at the effect of the training set size in Figure 6.11(b), the error rate is once
again asymptotically decreasing. For smaller training set sizes, at least two samples per
class must be present to allow for training hence at least 512 samples are required, but as
the samples are randomly selected from a larger set, in reality closer to 1 k are required
before all classes have at least two samples. Finally it must be remembered that all sam-
ples are not used for training every multi-class SVM, hence even for smaller training set
sizes the actual fraction of samples used is expected to be only ≈ 11256 .
For both attacks, the SVM performs similarly to LR which is also a binary classifier, despite
only a subset of the training samples being selected because of computational issues due to
the grid search in the AES case. Compared to regular TA, for the experiments here SVMs
are not as effective, and required a considerably longer training time. While inefficient for
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Figure 6.11: SVM attack on AES.
this particular experiment, there is many scenarios where they are advantageous however,
and are interesting in a hardware context where the noise does not necessarily follow a
Gaussian distribution.
6.5 Neural Networks
NNs were originally envisioned so as to mimic the operation of the brain, with multiple
interconnected layers of neurons allowing the learning complex decision boundaries. Partly
due to their computational overhead, and partly due to the fact SVMs were totally different
to what had come before, they fell out of favour somewhat with the emergence of SVMs in
the 90s. However with the advent of deep-learning methods and more powerful multi-core
computers, they are once again considered state of the art [158].
A brief overview is given here, however for a through description of the topic one of the
many books available such as [30, 63, 95] provide a good reference. A sample NN diagram
is given in Figure 6.12. It consists of the input layer where each unit2 represents an input
feature, multiple hidden layers with differing number of hidden units, and an output layer
where each unit represents a class. The model in Figure 6.12 has 3 features, 2 hidden
layers with 4 and 3 units respectively, and is a binary classifier. A nice property of a NN
over an SVM is that it naturally extends to the multi-class case with the addition of extra
output units. Each layer except the output also has an extra bias unit which is fed into
2The units are alternatively known as neurons after as they were originally envisioned as representing
neurons of the brain.
Profiling SCA on Crypto. Algorithms Neil Hanley
Section 6.5: Neural Networks 143
the following layer to account for the intercept term.
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Figure 6.12: Artificial NN nodes.
Following the description in [158], every hidden unit and those in the output layer, has an
activation function a
(i)
j where j is the unit in a given layer, and i is the layer itself. While
this activation unit is often the Sigmoid function as previously shown in Figure 6.4, other
functions such as Gaussian (RBF) or step models are also possible. The initial activation
units are assigned the input feature values as shown in Equation 6.19, with subsequent
units calculated via some function G, of the weighted sums of the previous layer, where G
is the Sigmoid function in this work, and the weights are given by Θ. For clarity the unit
subscripts in Equation 6.19 are omitted, and each a(i) term is a vector. As each element
in the vector a(i) has a different set of weights for each unit of the previous layer Θ(i) is
therefore a matrix, e.g. in the illustration of Figure 6.12, Θ(1),Θ(2) and Θ(3) are of size
5×4, 4×5 and 2×4 respectively, taking into account the bias units. The decision of a NN
model given a input vector is given by hΘ(x
(i)) = a(l), where l is the number of layers in
the model. Each unit of the feed-forward NN3 outputs a non-linear function of its inputs,
which themselves have been mapped non-linearly, allowing complex decision boundaries
to be learned [63, ch. 6].
a(1) = x(i), a(i) = G(Θ(i−1) a(i−1)) (6.19)
3There are also recurrent NN that allow feedback within the network which essentially leads to a
memory capability within the model.
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Training a NN model requires the learning of the weighting parameters Θ for each layer
to minimise the cost function as given in Equation 6.20 [158]. The most common method
to determine these weights is through the use of the backpropagation algorithm. Random
initial weights for Θ are assigned, and for each training sample the output hΘ(x
(i)) is
calculated. The error is then calculated by subtracting the actual class label y(i) (note that
the one-hot encoding is used to encode the labels), and the errors for each training sample
are propagated back through the network to calculate the error at each layer. Minimisation
of Equation 6.20 entails modifying the weights Θ through an iterative algorithm like
gradient descent such that error is reduced. The number of classes in Equation 6.20 is
denoted by K, the number of samples by m, the number of layers by l, and the number
of units in a given layer by ui. A regularisation parameter λ is again present as in LR, to
prevent over-fitting of the training data through the selection of arbitrarily large Θ values.
J (Θ) = −
1
m
 m∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
y
(i)
j log(hΘ(x
(i)))j + (1− y
(i)
j ) log((1− hΘ(x
(i)))j)

+
λ
2m
l−1∑
i=1
ui∑
j=1
ui+1∑
k=1
(
Θ
(i)
kj
)2
(6.20)
There are no set rules with regards the selection of parameters for NN, with the number
of hidden units/layers greatly affecting the classification performance. Due to the com-
putational complexity of training a NN, a cross validated grid search as with the SVMs
is inefficient to implement, and neither it is clear how to optimally trade off hidden units
and layers while searching. There are a few rules of thumb to select parameters however.
It must also be pointed out that if the data is linearly separable, then no hidden layers are
required, and the NN is similar to LR. It is suggested in [158] that the number of hidden
layers should initially be set to 1, and the number of hidden units set to approximately
the number of features, subsequently extra hidden layers can be added in an attempt to
improve performance. Where a large number of features are available however, this re-
quires a significant amount of time to train. It is suggested in [30] that multiple layers
often add little in the way of performance improvement except in specialised cases, and
that choosing the number of units to be the mean of the input and output units gives a
good starting point. Regardless of selection advice followed, the optimal parameters are
going to be determined by the data.
The NN was implemented following the tutorial in [158], with the same gradient descent
based minimisation function as used for LR once again used here. The weighted inputs
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for the activation units for each layer can be efficiently calculated en bloc using matrix
multiplication, with subsequent unrolling allowing a vectorised input to the minimisation
function. The number of gradient descent iterations was restricted to a maximum of 250,
this number was heuristically chosen by examining the cost as a function of the number
of iterations such as in Figure 6.13. Here, as was the case with many other experiments,
minimisation occurred within 100→ 150 iterations.
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Figure 6.13: NN cost function.
6.5.1 Attack on Multiplication
Using the 160-bit multiplication and squaring traces as before, a NN model with a single
layer was trained for different values of λ. The number of hidden units was set to be
equal to number of input features, with the error rate as a function of the number of
features given in Figure 6.14(a). As can be seen, in this binary classification problem the
λ parameter has little effect, with λ = 100 giving slightly better results similar to LR.
Taking this value of λ, the number of hidden units is then varied independently of the
number of input features. This makes little difference to the error rate as shown in Fig-
ure 6.14(b), however smaller values for the number of hidden units are considerably faster
to train hence 100 units is chosen to examine the effect of multiple hidden layers in Fig-
ure 6.14(c). Again, the addition of extra layers has little effect on the error indicating
that, for this dataset, the rule of thumb as given in [30] is appropriate. The NN model
appears somewhat robust to parameter selection in this scenario, hence the parameters
can be picked with regards to efficiency of training.
Finally the error as a function of training set size for a single hidden layer NN model with
100 units and λ = 100 is plotted in Figure 6.14(d). Like the LR and SVM based attacks,
the error rate is still falling hence it is reasonable to expect that a larger training set will
further decrease the error.
Profiling SCA on Crypto. Algorithms Neil Hanley
Section 6.5: Neural Networks 146
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
# Features
Er
ro
r R
at
e
 
 
λ : 000.000
λ : 000.001
λ : 000.010
λ : 000.100
λ : 001.000
λ : 010.000
λ : 100.000
(a) NN lambda comparison.
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
# Features
Er
ro
r R
at
e
 
 
Hidden Units : 10
Hidden Units : 50
Hidden Units : 100
Hidden Units : 500
Hidden Units : 1000
(b) NN hidden units comparison.
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
# Features
Er
ro
r R
at
e
 
 
Hidden Layers : 1
Hidden Layers : 2
Hidden Layers : 3
Hidden Layers : 4
(c) NN hidden layers comparison.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
# Training Traces (k)
Er
ro
r R
at
e
 
 
Testing
Training
(d) NN training set size comparison.
Figure 6.14: NN attack on 160-bit multiplication.
6.5.2 Attack on AES
Following the same method as with the multiplication traces, NN models were trained for
the arm7 microprocessor AES traces for various values of λ, using a single hidden layer
with the number of hidden units of the order of the number of features. Figure 6.15(a)
shows that large values of λ significantly affect the results for the worse, with λ = 〈1, 10〉
giving the lowest error.
Taking λ = 1, the number of hidden features for a single layer was varied independently
of the input feature size, Figure 6.15(b). Here, in contrast with the multiplication traces,
too few hidden units gives a large error as the small number of units doesn’t allow for
accurate modelling of the K = 256 multi-class problem. More than 100 units doesn’t
further decrease the error, hence in Figure 6.15(c), the effect of the number of hidden layers
is examined, while setting λ = 1 and the number of hidden units to 100. Interestingly,
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increasing the hidden layers actually increases the error, with more layers giving a larger
error. This isn’t necessarily due to over-fitting of the data set, as the training error also
increases proportionally.
Finally the error as a function of the training error using only a single hidden layer is
plotted in Figure 6.15(d). The error converges quite fast with only a small decrease in the
error as the set size increases beyond 10 k traces.
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Figure 6.15: NN attack on AES.
In the two experiments above, NN have been shown to be a particularly effective for
profiling attacks, as well as being somewhat robust to parameter selection when reasonable
values for λ and the number of hidden units are selected. The selected parameters are
by no means optimal and a logarithmic grid search as implemented for the SVMs could
further reduce the error.
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Classifier Parameters
LDA single covariance matrix for all classes
QDA separate covariance matrix for each class
SM Max method with half the trace for estimating the noise, 2nd order
polynomial expansion performed on class labels
LR regularisation parameter λ = 100
SVM linear kernel with 10-fold cross validation used to estimate cost C
NN single layer with 100 hidden units and λ = 100
Table 6.2: Classification parameters → multiplication.
6.6 Comparison
As previously mentioned, comparisons between TAs and stochastic based attacks have
previously been performed in [81, 205], and comparisons between TAs and SVMs in [19,
99, 135]. Here, the parameters for the various classification algorithms which give the
lowest testing error are plotted against each other for the multiplication and AES traces.
6.6.1 Attack on Multiplication
Using the algorithm parameters as given in Table 6.2 determined by the previous sections,
the various learning algorithms are compared in Figure 6.16(a) by plotting the error as a
function of the number of retained features. While the multiplication traces weren’t used
previously for SM attacks in §6.2, experimental analysis shows that a 2nd order polynomial
minimises the error. It is noticeable that all the multivariate Gaussian distribution based
methods run into numerical difficulties when more than 700 features are retained, however
the extra features contribute some information as the error rate continues to fall for the
LR, SVM and NN methods.
Taking the number of features that minimises the error for 10 k training traces, the error as
a function of the training set size is given in Figure 6.16(b). Again there is little difference
between using LR, SVM or NN, with QDA having close to twice the error rate of these.
Note that results for LDA and QDA are different to that in §5.5.3, as a different feature
selection method and training set size is used.
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Figure 6.16: Classification performance comparison → multiplication.
6.6.2 Attack on AES
The selection parameters for each classification algorithm when attacking the AES traces
are given in Table 6.2, with the error rate as a function of the number of features given in
Figure 6.17(a). It is clear that the use of LDA still gives the best classification performance,
with NN and high-order polynomial based SM also giving very low error rates. In contrast
the original TA (QDA) gives comparatively poor results, as well as becoming numerically
unstable for higher numbers of features. This is expected due to the fewer traces available
to model the covariance matrix for each class. As noise is independent of the deterministic
power consumption (i.e. the mean vectors µ(i)) it’s perfectly reasonable to use a single
covariance matrix. The LR and SVM binary classifiers perform poorly in this multi-class
experiment, however keeping in mind that the One-v-All method was used when the One-
v-All method gave, in the case of LR, slightly more accurate results. Also, with regards
to the SVM results, the full training set wasn’t used for each model.
Looking at the effect of the training set size, the number of features that minimised the
error for each classification algorithm are retained and used in Figure 6.17(b). It is clear
that LDA is the most efficient here, as well as having the lowest error rate. One particular
advantage of the SM is its ability to build models given very few profiling traces, as
previously noted in [81, 205], as a profiling trace for each class label is not necessarily
required due to the choice of base function. Note that if the one-hot method was used
as a base function then its profiling sample size requirements would be similar to that of
LDA and NNs.
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Classifier Parameters
LDA single covariance matrix for all classes
QDA separate covariance matrix for each class
SM Max method with half the trace for estimating the noise, 6th order poly-
nomial expansion performed on bit decomposition of class values
LR One-v-All multi-class, regularisation parameter λ = 1
SVM One-v-All multi-class with the number of “All” samples restricted to
×10 of the “One”, Gaussian kernel with 10-fold cross validation used to
estimate cost C and sigma σ.
NN single layer with 100 hidden units and λ = 1
Table 6.3: Classification parameters → AES.
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Figure 6.17: Classification performance comparison → AES.
6.7 A Note on Feature Selection
A central step prior to the application of the machine learning algorithms above, was the
selection of relevant time instants to pass to the learning algorithm as features. This topic
was previously explored in §3.3.3, however warrants a further mention here with regards to
the non-parametric SVM and NN algorithms. Recall that the sost method as introduced
in [81], is an adaptation of the Student’s t-test in Equation 3.8 (or Welch’s t-test where
the class variances are not assumed equal) to determine the points in time of a trace where
the mean class values are different. This method of feature selection immediately biases
the results in favour of LDA/QDA and SM, as they seek to classify based on distinguishing
means assuming the Gaussian distribution of data (remember the SVM results are further
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disadvantaged due to the use of a likely sub-optimal multi-class method, and the fact only
a subset of the training samples are used due to computational issues). This is not to say
that SVMs and NNs would give better results without feature selection, but it is worth
keeping in mind when conducting a profiling attack.
LR and NN based classification methods are somewhat robust to feature selection as they
learn a weighting or ranking value to each input feature during the profiling stage. This
was shown for LR previously when targeting the multiplication traces by plotting the
weights in Figure 6.6. This can equally be shown for the weighting values in a single layer
NN and is given in Figure 6.18, where the weights for each of the 100 hidden units are
overlaid on top of each other in the lower graph. Therefore, the feature reduction step isn’t
strictly required, however it can give more accurate results as it prevents over-fitting of
the model to points in time which don’t contribute to distinguishing between the classes.
Note that LDA too is somewhat robust to feature selection, however due to the matrix
inversion required on the order of the number of features, larger traces must be reduced
somehow. Something similar was suggested by Bartkewitz et al. in [19] for SVMs where,
after learning the Lagrange multipliers αi, low values of the weight vector |wj | were set
to zero as they contribute less to the classification performance. There is much further
research in the field of computer vision as to how to optimally select features for SVMs
such as [159].
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Figure 6.18: NN hidden layer weights.
An interesting application of non-parametric learning algorithms could be with regards to
feature construction. As previously mentioned, this was already briefly looked at in [96]
when using an SVM to extract DES keys from a smart-card by appending plaintext bits.
Appending or replacing traces with mean (or distances to means), variance or entropy
values could lead to interesting low-order non-Gaussian datasets to classify. Likewise,
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non-linear or polynomial expansions of the training data (as opposed to the expansion of
the basis function of the training labels as in SM attacks) could also be interesting higher
order attack to explore as it would allow dependencies in the time domain to be taken
into account also. A similar approach taken by Lerman et al. in [136] has particular merit,
as it remaps the training traces to take into account said time-wise dependencies prior to
applying the learning algorithm.
6.8 Conclusion
In this chapter a comprehensive empirical comparison between different profiling attacks
was conducted on two data sets. Extensions to the SM of profiling attacks were looked at,
and LR and NN were evaluated for the first time in the context of SCA. The performance
of SVMs was also examined, using a grid search algorithm in conjunction with cross
validation for optimal parameter selection.
The results show that for data sets that follow a Gaussian distribution, LDA is hard to
beat and should be the first algorithm utilised by an attacker. As well as returning the
lowest error rate, it is also exceptionally quick to train as only mean traces for each class
and a single covariance matrix need be modelled. NN have significant potential in the
context of SCA also and further research on protected implementations is an interesting
topic. While they take slightly longer than LDA to train, they seem relatively robust to
numerical errors and are a useful general classifier to use in conjunction with LDA as they
do not assume Gaussian distributed data.
Where there was a large (|K| = 256) number of multi-class values, the performance of
the binary LR and SVM classification algorithms suffered, however they should not be
discounted as in the binary case when attacking the multiplication traces, SVMs performed
as well as the other algorithms. In scenarios where a particularly large data set with a
high-order number of features, the simplicity of LR might ensue that its the only feasible
learning algorithm to use. At the very least it would be worthwhile to initially train using
LR to see if slower algorithms such as SVMs or NNs are worth pursuing or do the features
need to be looked at first.
Finally the results in this chapter all pertain to software implementations, however the non-
parametric nature of some of the learning algorithms would likely suit a hardware target.
For example, the nature of FPGA leakage is such that it is dependent on the placement of
logic within the slice look-up tables (LUTs) and the subsequent path along the interconnect
Profiling SCA on Crypto. Algorithms Neil Hanley
Section 6.8: Conclusion 153
that data travels. The contribution of the interconnect can often be significantly more than
that of the slices themselves. Hence it is considerably more irregular than an embedded
software implementation, and the use of non-parametric learning algorithms such as NN
or SVM could have significant advantages over LDA.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
In the connected world we now live in, embedded systems play an increasing role as “smart
devices” become ever more prevalent. The ability to check bank balances, transfer money,
send email, read social media messages on the go, etc., is no longer considered a rarity
but is an expectation. Coupled with the expanding use of sensor data for increasing
automation in motor vehicles, the use of cryptography is essential to allow these devices
perform their functionality without leaking sensitive or critical information. The recent
Snowden revelations only highlight the need for secure end-to-end encryption in all digital
communications, as it is not just faceless criminals that seek to exploit our data. In
this thesis, a comprehensive evaluation of various profiling SCAs has been carried out
against cryptographic algorithms implemented on an arm7 microprocessor such as would
be utilised in an embedded scenario.
7.1 Contributions of this Thesis
In Chapter 3 a thorough analysis of template attacks was carried out, with various param-
eters in the training stage analysed to see the effect on the resultant classification error.
It was found that linear discriminant analysis with only a single covariance matrix was
generally more effective than the classical method, quadratic discriminant analysis, where
a covariance matrix for each class was required. It also had the advantage of being less
susceptible to numerical errors as all the traces were used to estimate the single covari-
ance matrix. The effect of noise was also examined through artificially adding normally
distributed Gaussian data to the arm7 microprocessor traces, as well as comparing the
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error rate of the attack on different software platforms. Finally the underlying concept
of the template attack in that power traces from one device can be used to attack an-
other is empirically evaluated for a set of smart-cards, and it is shown how to improve the
cross-device classification error by performing the training step with traces from multiple
devices.
In Chapter 4, the work from the paper Unknown Plaintext Template Attacks [92] as pre-
sented at the 10th International Workshop on Information Security Applications confer-
ence is presented and expanded upon. Key recovery is performed in this case without any
knowledge of the input or output data by building multiple templates at different points
of the power consumption trace. Theoretical results are given for the expected number of
traces required when the Hamming weight model is used, as well as how to decrease the
attack error by targeting only the S-Boxes. The effect of masking on the attack is also
examined, as is an analysis where the attack is performed on the key schedule, highlighting
the importance of protecting all steps of an algorithm.
Chapter 5 is based on the work from Using templates to distinguish multiplications from
squaring operations [93] as published in the International Journal of Information Security.
An analysis of the power consumption difference between a squaring and multiplication is
presented, and a template attack is derived utilising this leakage. Practical results against
an implementation of the Montgomery multiplication algorithm are presented, as well an
analysis of how the length of the key affects the classification accuracy. The effect of
countermeasures in the case of an RSA cryptosystem is examined, and the attack is then
extended to ECC based cryptosystems where a practical attack is conducted against a
protected ECDSA implementation. This attack builds templates on the underlying curve
doubling and addition formulas, which are then used across the ECDSA trace length in
order to recover the entire key. It is shown that many commonly applied countermeasures
are ineffective against this type of attack.
Finally in Chapter 6, machine learning methods are investigated for SCA. Different en-
coding schemes for the stochastic method are examined, with a comparison to the original
proposal given. Logistic regression and neural networks are used for the first time in the
context of SCA, with various respective parameter choices examined. In the case of logis-
tic regression different multi-class options are also examined. The use of support vector
machines is also explored, and all methods are compared to classical template attacks.
The comparison is conducted using the both the multiplication traces which is a binary
classification problem, and the AES trace set which is a multi-class problem, to evaluate
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the respective performance of the algorithms. It is shown that linear discriminant analysis
or neural networks are both effective general classifiers which should be applicable in a
wide range of scenarios.
7.2 Future Research Directions
Machine learning is an exciting area of research and there is considerable potential for
further research in the context of SCA here. The use of unsupervised machine learning
methods to overcome randomisation countermeasures needs to be further examined. As
mentioned in §6.7 on feature selection, the artificial construction of features is another
research topic that has a wide scope. The use of unsupervised learning methods such
as clustering, auto-encoder networks or support vector machine based feature selection,
to allow learning of features from unlabelled data could be applicable here also. Note
that these would not just be suitable for profiling attacks, but more general non-profiling
attacks also. The use of HMMs for error correction of incorrectly classified bits as in §5.7.3
also needs to be further explored.
Practically, a successful application of templates on a real world product has yet to be
fully realised (the attack as presented in [169] did not transfer across smart-cards due
to countermeasures present). The building of templates across multiple devices is also
worth further examination, particularly with regards to hardware implementations where
in the case of FPGAs, the circuit layout might not be exactly the same should a bit file be
regenerated prior to programming the next device. It might be possible to determine some
sort of rule of thumb as to how many devices and adversary should aim to model on based
on the SNR of the traces. A real-world analysis of building templates on public verification
functions, or indeed just a single multiplication operation, could also be powerful addition
to template attack if proven practically feasible.
From a learning algorithm viewpoint, there are many more learning methods that could
be used for SCA. Custom kernels could also be explored for support vector machines
optimised for some leakage model, or custom activation units in the case of neural networks.
Recurrent neural networks which allow for feedback within the model, could be interesting
to explore where there is time-series dependencies such as in masking, or in the context
of asymmetric algorithms where some patterns of key bits won’t be possible. The use of
ensemble learning, where a multitude of classifiers are used, to attack some cryptographic
system could also be examined for optimal error reduction.
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Appendix A
Advanced Encryption Standard
In 2001, the block cipher Rijndael by Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen, was selected
by NIST to become AES [163] as a replacement for the outdated DES algorithm. It is
an substitution-permutation network (SPN) based iterative block cipher which acts on
plaintext blocks of 128-bits and supports significantly larger key sizes than DES, i.e. 128-
bits, 192-bits or 256-bits. Depending on the key size, the number of rounds is either 10,
12 or 14 respectively. For the work in this thesis, only the 128-bit key size is used.
Algorithm A.1: Advanced Encryption Standard.
Input: Plaintext p , 128-bit Key s
Output: Ciphertext c
1 state ← p ;
2 state ← AddRoundKey(state, s0) ;
3 for i = 1 to 10 do
4 state ← S-Box (state) ;
5 state ← ShiftRows(state) ;
6 if i 6= 10 then state ← MixColumns(state) ;
7 state ← AddRoundKey(state, si) ;
8 end
9 return c←state
Algorithm A.1 outlines a high-level description of the AES algorithm. First, the plaintext
block p is copied into the state variable, which is a 4× 4 matrix of bytes. Then, an initial
AddRoundKey function simply xors the initial key to the state. This is followed by nine
identical round transformations which include the steps S-Box, ShiftRows, MixColumns,
and AddRoundKey. The tenth round skips the MixColumns operation to generate the
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ciphertext block c.
AddRoundKey : Each byte of the state array is XORed with the corresponding byte
of a sub-key that is generated from the secret key. The key applied in the first
AddRoundKey operation is the secret key, and subsequent sub-keys are generated
using a key schedule.
S-Box : Each byte of the state undergoes a non-linear byte substitution by combining its
multiplicative inverse in GF (28) with an invertible affine transformation. Typically,
the S-Box operation is pre-computed and stored in a 256-entry table. In this way,
the S-Box operation becomes a simple table look-up.
ShiftRows: This operation cyclically shifts the last three rows of the state by different
offsets.
MixColumns: As the name implies, this operation acts on the columns of the state
individually. The four bytes of each column are mixed by applying a linear trans-
formation.
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Appendix B
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDSA [165] provides an elliptic curve varient of the digital signature standard. This
allows a smaller key size for a given security level compared to DSA. The system parameters
are {E ,G, n} where G is a point of prime order n on the elliptic curve E . The signer has
a private key d (randomly chosen from [1, n− 1]) and public key E where E = [d]G. H is
a suitable hash function such as SHA-256 [164].
Signature: To sign a message m, the signer picks a random 0 < k < n and computes:
r ← x mod n where (x, y) = [k]G
s← k−1 (H(m) + r d) mod n
The signature of m is the pair: {r, s}.
Verification: To check {r, s} the verifier ascertains that:
r
?
= x mod n where (x, y) = [u1]G+ [u2]E ,
u1 = H(m) s
−1 mod n and u2 = r s−1 mod n .
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Appendix C
Logistic Regression Bit Analysis
The leakage of each bit of the AES S-Box contributes differing amounts to the overall
side channel leakage. Hence when training a LR classifier on the individual bits, (using
25 k training traces and 100 features) there is a large divergence between the error rates.
Histograms of the classification probabilities for each bit are plotted below, with any red
samples having a probability greater than 0.5 incorrectly classified, and any blue sample
less than 0.5 incorrect. It is clear that bit 5, and to a lesser extent bits 3 & 7 have poor
classification accuracy which contributes to the disappointing byte classification in §6.3.2.
(a) S-Box output - Bit 1. (b) S-Box output - Bit 2.
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(c) S-Box output - Bit 3. (d) S-Box output - Bit 4.
(e) S-Box output - Bit 5. (f) S-Box output - Bit 6.
(g) S-Box output - Bit 7. (h) S-Box output - Bit 8.
Figure C.1: Analysis of individual bit leakages with LR.
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Appendix D
Multiplier Hamming Weight Difference
The calculation of Equation 5.5 and Equation 5.6 in §5.4 is practically feasible for up to
l ≈ 16. For l ≥ 16 the computational requirements begin to become excessive, and for
l ≈ 32 or larger its not practical to evaluate over all possible inputs.
To illustrate that side-channel leakage due the difference in Hamming weight of multipli-
cation and squaring operations will also present for larger operand bit-lengths, the exper-
iment was re-run using 1M random, uniformly distributed inputs for bit-lengths up to 64.
As can be seen in Figure D.1(a), for input bit-lengths greater than about 20 the Hamming
weight difference no longer increases. Looking at Figure D.1(b), it is clear from both the
32 and 64-bit graphs, as well as the 16-bit graph in Figure 5.1(b), that the leakage only
occurs at the upper and lower bits, and the middle bits are equally likely to be 0 or 1.
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Figure D.1: Hamming weight analysis.
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